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THE CASE OF THE DISHONEST SCRIVENER:
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE CREATION OF
THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION
William Michael Treanor*
At the end of the Constitutional Convention, the delegates appointed the Committee of Style and Arrangement to bring together the textual provisions that
the Convention had previously agreed to and to prepare a final constitution.
Pennsylvania delegate Gouverneur Morris drafted the document for the Committee, and, with few revisions and little debate, the Convention adopted Morris’s draft. For more than two hundred years, questions have been raised as to
whether Morris covertly altered the text in order to advance his constitutional
vision, but modern legal scholars and historians studying the Convention have
either ignored the issue or concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener. No
prior article has systematically compared the Committee’s draft to the previously adopted resolutions or discussed the implications of those changes for
constitutional law.
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judge and a civic leader, he was a champion of the great values that underlie constitutional democracy. His recent passing, when he was far too young, was tragic, his legacy is great, and it is
an honor to dedicate this Article to his memory.
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This Article undertakes that comparison. It shows that Morris made fifteen
significant changes to the Constitution and that many of the Constitution’s
central elements were wholly or in critical part Morris’s work. Morris’s changes
strengthened the national executive and judiciary, provided the textual basis
for judicial review, increased presidential accountability through an expansive
conception of impeachment, protected private property, mandated that the
census report reflect “actual enumeration,” removed the constitutional text
suggesting that slavery was just, and fought slavery’s spread.
This Article also shows that Morris created the basis for the Federalist reading
of the Constitution. Federalists—notably including fellow Committee member
Alexander Hamilton—repeatedly drew on language crafted by Morris as they
fought for their vision of the Constitution. Because the changes Morris made
to the Convention’s agreed language were subtle, both Republicans and Federalists were able to appeal to text in the great constitutional battles of the early
republic. Modern originalists claim that the Republican reading reflects the
original understanding of the Constitution, but this Article argues that the
largely dismissed Federalist reading explains words, phrases, and punctuation
that the Republican reading ignores or renders unintelligible. By contrast, the
Federalist reading of the Preamble (which they saw as a grant of substantive
power), the Article I and Article II Vesting Clauses (which were contrasted to
argue for expansive executive power), the Article III Vesting Clause (which
they read to mandate the creation of lower federal courts), the Contracts
Clause (which they read to cover public as well as private contracts), the Impeachment Clause (which they read to cover both nonofficial and official acts),
and the “law of the land” provision (which they construed as a basis for judicial
review) gives effect to Morris’s—and the Constitution’s—words.
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INTRODUCTION
That instrument [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which write this letter.
—Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering 1
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the
pen of Mr. Morris; the task having, probably, been handed over to him by the chairman of the Committee, himself a highly respectable member, and with the ready concurrence of the others. A better choice could not have been made, as the performance
of the task proved.
—James Madison to Jared Sparks 2
Gouverneur Morris was probably the most brilliant member of the Pennsylvania delegation and of the convention as well. Sharp-witted, clever, startling in his audacity, and
with a wonderful command of language, he was admired more than he was trusted . . . .
—Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution 3

After more than three months of debate—including a month debating the
final draft of the Constitution—the delegates to the Constitutional Convention elected “a Committee of five to revise the style of and arrange the articles
agreed to by the House.” 4 The chair of the Committee asked delegate Gouverneur Morris to prepare a draft constitution, which Morris did over the course
of three days. With limited debate and minor changes, Morris’s draft was
adopted by the Convention and became the Constitution submitted to, and
ratified by, the states. 5

1.

Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in 3 THE REC419, 420 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press

ORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].

2. Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 498, 499.
3. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 21
(1913).
4. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547.
5. For discussion of the work of the Committee, see infra Section I.C. For the complete
text of the Committee’s report, see Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 590. For a photographic reproduction of the original report, see Committee of Style Report, AM. TREASURES, https://constitutioncenter.org/american-treasures/committee-of-style-report/kiosk [perma.cc/VCJ9-CX36]. In producing his record of the
Convention, constitutional historian Max Farrand assembled the previously adopted provisions
as they were referred to the Committee of Style. See Proceedings of Convention Referred to the
Committee of Style and Arrangement [hereinafter Convention Proceedings], in 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 565. The Appendix to this Article presents the text of the provisions
adopted by the Convention and referred to the Committee of Style alongside the Committee’s
revised text.
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Largely forgotten today, Morris had been a dominant figure at the Convention. He fought for a constitutional vision that largely anticipated the Federalist agenda in the early republic: he pushed for a national government with
expansive powers; he wanted a powerful executive who would be held accountable by a Congress with broad impeachment powers; he supported a
strong federal judiciary, including judicial review of federal and state legislation and the creation of lower federal courts; he pressed for strong protection
for private property; and he denounced slavery with more fierceness than any
other delegate to the Convention. 6
Morris’s forceful views and rhetorical gifts aroused the suspicion of his
contemporaries. During a House debate on the scope of the General Welfare
Clause in 1798, Congressman Albert Gallatin charged Morris with deceptively
(and subtly) changing the text of that clause. Gallatin accused Morris of converting a comma into a semicolon in order to convert a limitation on the taxing authority into a broad positive grant of power, but delegate Roger
Sherman caught the “trick” and restored the original punctuation. 7
Gallatin’s charge has been noted by a range of modern scholars, and it has
been discussed in the context of academic work on individual clauses. 8 Yet
both scholars studying the Convention and Morris’s biographers have either
ignored the charge or concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener. 9 Remarkably, no scholarly work has systematically compared the provisions referred to the Committee of Style with the draft the Committee produced.
Comparison of the document Morris and the Committee produced with
the text previously approved by the Convention reveals a series of crucial (if
typically subtle) changes, including changes to some of the most prominent
part of the Constitution. “We the People of the United States”—the opening
words of the Preamble and undoubtedly the most famous phrase in the document—was the Committee’s creation, as were the Preamble’s substantive
ends: “in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domes-

6. For Morris’s personal history, see infra Section I.B. For his views at the Convention,
see infra Part II.
7. For Gallatin’s charge, see 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379. For discussion,
see infra Section I.D.
8. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial
Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (noting charge); David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the
Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 252–54 (1995) (General Welfare Clause); Philip
Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 317 n.112
(same); ); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in
Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2003) (same); Vasan Kesavan & Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002) (New States
Clause); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1998) (Engagements Clause). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.
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tic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty . . . .” The Committee reinserted the
Contract Clause into the Constitution—it had been rejected on the floor—and
altered the clause’s scope, providing a textual basis for it to reach public contracts. It created the familiar structure of the Constitution: Article I (legislative), Article II (executive), and Article III (judicial). It differentiated the
Article I Vesting Clause from that of Article II and revised the Vesting Clauses
of Articles II and III. It altered, in important (though unobvious) ways, the
language of the law-of-the-land provision, the Engagement Clauses, the Qualifications Clause, the Impeachment Clause, the Census Clause, the Presidential Succession Clause, and the New States Clause. Finally, the Committee
removed the word “justly” from the Fugitive Slave Clause. 10
Morris’s contemporaries—apart from Gallatin—failed to recognize the
significance of Morris’s changes. Yet they were of immediate consequence.
During the great constitutional controversies of the Washington and Adams
administrations, Federalists repeatedly invoked language that Morris had
placed in the Constitution. Morris authored the constitutional text that Federalists invoked in the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Sedition Act,
the creation of the Bank of the United States, the presidential succession act,
state statutes repealing land grants, the Quaker antislavery petitions, and the
first impeachment case to be considered by the House and Senate, as well as
the early cases establishing judicial review. Most notably, Federalists read the
Preamble, now treated as hortatory or as a gloss on powers otherwise granted
Congress, as a separate (and capacious) grant of power.
Even though the Committee’s mandate was limited to style and arrangement, Morris covertly made fifteen substantive changes to the text. These
changes advanced ends that he had unsuccessfully fought for on the Convention
floor. The man who drafted the final version of the Constitution did not limit
his work to matters of style and arrangement. He was a dishonest scrivener.
The primary focus of this Article is historical. Part I discusses the Committee of Style, its membership, and its mandate as well as presenting a minibiography of Morris. Part I also discusses the scholarly consensus that as Professor Michael Klarman observes in his leading account of the origins of the
Constitution the Committee simply “put the finishing touches on the Constitution.” 11 Part II studies Morris’s constitutional philosophy (an almost unexamined topic) and highlights the ways he failed to achieve his goals during
floor debates before the Committee of Style began its work.
Part III is the heart of the Article. It discusses the fifteen substantive
changes Morris made and how they advanced goals that were central to his
constitutional vision. This Part also shows the role of those changes in early
constitutional debates. As the drafter for the Committee of Style, Morris
See infra Part III.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 188 n.* (2016).
10.
11.
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sought to shift meaning without being discovered by delegates who disagreed
with him. He later admitted to having covertly made substantive changes to
the Constitution’s provisions concerning the judiciary: “[I]t became necessary
to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others,
nor shock their selflove . . . .” 12 While this is the only substantive change he
confessed to having made, the same description is equally applicable to his
other changes. As a result, Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans alike were
able to rely on his text in the major constitutional debates of the early republic.
At the same time, Morris’s words were (unsurprisingly) more consistent with
the Federalist vision than with the Republican vision—Jeffersonian Republicans had to dismiss critical words as without substantive meaning or ignore
them altogether in order to advance their constitutional arguments. Finally,
Part III discusses modern interpretations of the clauses changed by Morris
and highlights how modern originalists have generally favored Republican
readings while disregarding Federalist readings.
Part IV discusses the implications of this historical research for modern
constitutional law. It first shows that recognizing Morris’s role as dishonest
scrivener offers a new justification for one of the primary objections to drafters’ intent originalism, namely, that there was no collective intent among the
drafters as to what constitutional clauses meant. The Part also shows that, even
though drafters’ intent originalism is now largely rejected as a matter of constitutional theory, it still shapes current conceptions of the original understandings of clauses revised by the Committee of Style, leading commentators
to rely on the debates at the Convention before the Committee began its work
while ignoring the actual text of the Constitution. The Part also looks at the
Supreme Court case law involving the Committee of Style. While the Court
has never recognized that the Committee systematically departed in substantive ways from text previously agreed to—since that fact has never before been
shown—a number of cases have asked the Court to decide whether to rely on
text submitted to the Committee of Style or to treat the Committee of Style’s
text (which is the ratified constitutional text) as controlling. Remarkably, with
only Justice Thomas dissenting, the Court has consistently either relied on the
text referred to the Committee or assumed that the text referred to the Committee has the same meaning as that of the ratified Constitution. This Part
explains why the first approach is inconsistent with democratic theory and the
second is at odds with the actual drafting history. From the standpoint of public meaning originalism, Justice Thomas’s approach is the correct one.
Finally, Part IV shows that Morris’s changes established the basis for the
Federalist Constitution. Morris crafted the Constitution to reflect his political
ideals: a national government of broad powers (beyond those enumerated in
Articles I and II), a strong executive, a broad conception of impeachment that
included impeachment for nonofficial acts, a strong judiciary (involving both
judicial review and a requirement that there be lower federal courts), and protection for public contracts against state interference. Furthermore, because
12.

Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420.
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of Morris, the Constitution did not embrace slavery as moral, and its text
could have prevented the creation of new slave states partitioned from existing
slave states.
Academics have long embraced the view that Hamilton and the Federalists practiced “loose construction” of the Constitution, whereas Madison and
the Republicans were “strict constructionists.” But at least with respect to the
crucially important parts of the Constitution revised by Morris, the Federalist
reading parsed the Constitution’s text more carefully than that of the Republicans. On point after point, the Federalist reading of the Constitution is truer
to Morris’s words. Or, to put it another way, the Federalist reading is more
faithful to the original understanding of the Constitution’s words.
I.

THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE AND MORRIS’S CONSTITUTION

This Part discusses the Committee of Style’s mandate, the selection of its
members, Morris’s biography, the questions about his integrity, and his role
as draftsman. It also discusses the Convention’s consideration of the Committee of Style’s draft constitution, with a focus on its review of the General Welfare Clause. Finally, it discusses the fact that modern scholars have failed to
recognize that Morris was a dishonest scrivener.
A. The Membership of the Committee
Although standard accounts of the Constitutional Convention highlight
the floor debates that led to the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifths
rule, much of the critical drafting at the Convention took place in the committees, of which there were a total of twelve. 13 The membership of the Committee of Style was unlike the membership of any other committee. Selected
by their fellow delegates, the Committee consisted of Alexander Hamilton, William Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris. 14 James
Wilson, although not a Committee member, worked informally with the Committee as it prepared its draft. 15 Uniquely among all the Convention’s committees, the membership of the Committee of Style was strikingly nationalist.
While Johnson has been categorized as a moderate nationalist, all the others—
Hamilton, King, Madison, Morris, and Wilson—were among the small group
of strongly nationalist delegates. 16 Indeed, these five were (along with Washington) not only members of the nationalist wing of delegates but were its

13. John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of
1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 174 (2006).
14. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 553.
15. See 3 id. at 170. For further discussion, see infra Section I.C.
16. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 186–87 (1985).
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leaders. 17 It was also strikingly a committee from the northern states—with only
one representative from the South (Madison) and no one from the Deep South.
The membership of the Committee reflected in part the change in who
was attending the Convention. As the Convention drew towards its close and
the adoption of the Constitution came to seem inevitable, delegates who were
ambivalent or hostile to the Constitution began to head home. Thirteen of the
fifty-five delegates were no longer attending in the last month, and the group
included some of the most forceful critics of proposals for a strong national
government. 18 Only one delegate who had been absent returned at the end of
the proceedings, the strongly nationalist Alexander Hamilton. 19
It reflected, as well, the process by which the Committee was selected. The
Convention had two different types of committees, and there were different
selection processes for the different types. 20 Virtually all the committees had
one member from each state and each states’ delegation chose its own representatives; the combination led to committees embodying diverse perspectives. 21 In contrast, the two drafting committees—the Committee of Detail
and the Committee of Style—each had only five members, which meant that
not all states were represented, and these committees’ members were chosen
by the votes of individual delegates (rather than having a state’s delegate chosen by the state’s representatives). 22 The combination of these factors produced a committee unlike any of its predecessors—weighted towards the
North and towards the nationalist wing of the delegates.
The prior drafting committee—the Committee of Detail—had presented
its report on August 6, 23 and its proposals had been subject to a series of
votes. 24 When the Committee of Style was elected on September 8 and given
17. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 57–58 (2018).
18. See 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 586–90 (noting attendance records); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 353 (2009).
19. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 202–03.
20. David O. Stewart, Who Picked the Committees at the Constitutional Convention?, J.
AM. REVOLUTION (Sept. 13, 2018), https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/09/who-picked-the-committees-at-the-constitutional-convention [perma.cc/33MM-JV9T]. I would like to thank Professor Stewart for writing this article, which he wrote in response to our discussions about how
the committees at the Convention were selected. For a competing view, see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 379 n.38
(1996) (arguing that each delegate voted as an individual for all committees). Both the Rakove
and the Stewart view lead to the same conclusion for the Committee of Style: delegates voted
individually to select the Committee members.
21. Stewart, supra note 20. Rhode Island did not send delegates, and two of New York’s
three delegates departed early (leaving Hamilton as the sole delegate; two delegates were necessary for a state to vote). BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 81, 202–03. Thus, the committees of eleven
represented each of the delegations that could vote.
22. Stewart, supra note 20.
23. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 177.
24. Id. at 193–95.
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responsibility for preparing for the delegates’ consideration a final draft, the
delegates did not formulate a charge for the Committee, but the various names
used to describe it reflect an understanding that its mandate was simply stylistic. According to the official Convention records, it was a committee “to
revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House.” 25 Madison
described it in similar terms in his notes: it was a committee “to revise the stile
of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House.” 26 Others
used different names. Using a shorter version of these formulations, the Convention’s secretary, William Jackson, called it the “Committee of revision,” 27
and Maryland delegate James McHenry referred to it in his notes as the committee “to revise and place the several parts under their proper heads.” 28 Following Madison’s notes and the Convention records, the Committee has come
to be known as the Committee of Style and Arrangement or, more briefly, the
Committee of Style. 29
B. Gouverneur Morris
When the Committee convened, Johnson, the chair, asked Morris (“with
the ready concurrence of the others,” Madison observed) to prepare a draft
Constitution. 30 As a strong nationalist, Morris had views in that area that
aligned with those of the other Committee members, and like most of the
Committee members, he came from a northern state. Given Morris’s strength
and experience as a wordsmith and legislative drafter and the respect in which
he was held, he was an obvious selection even among a very talented group.
But his reputation was complicated.
There is a great irony to Morris’s place in history: he is both largely forgotten and seemingly unforgettable. Even apart from his role at the Constitutional Convention, he led a life crowded with incident and work of profound
consequence. 31
Id. at 547.
Id. at 553.
1 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786–1870, at 193–96 (1894).
28. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 554.
29. For anyone interested in independently pursuing the Supreme Court’s treatment of
the Committee of Style through a database search, I note that, for some reason, the Supreme
Court has (erroneously) referred to the committee as the “Committee on Style” (ten times) more
than it has called it by its correct name of the “Committee of Style” (eight times). See Lexis search:
“committee pre/2 style” in cases/Supreme Court (conducted February 12, 2020).
30. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499.
31. Morris is the subject of four serious, relatively recent biographies (although the treatment in each of the Committee of Style is limited). See WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2003); RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN
REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2003);
JAMES J. KIRSCHKE, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: AUTHOR, STATESMAN, AND MAN OF THE WORLD
(2005); MELANIE RANDOLPH MILLER, AN INCAUTIOUS MAN: THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS
25.
26.
27.
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Gouverneur Morris—the name Gouverneur was his mother’s maiden
name 32—was a descendant of one of the wealthiest, most politically prominent
families in New York. 33 Trained as a lawyer, 34 he became politically active in
the movement for independence. In 1775, at twenty-three, he became a member of the New York Provincial Congress, 35 and in May 1776, he delivered a
lengthy oration arguing for independence. 36 In 1777, Morris was one of the
three principal drafters of the New York State Constitution (along with his
close friend John Jay and Robert Livingston). 37 That year, he was also elected
as one of New York’s representatives to the Continental Congress, where he
served for two years before being denied reelection. 38 From 1781 through
1784, he was the nation’s assistant finance minister, serving under his close
friend and future business partner Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance (no relation). 39 From 1784 to 1787, with the conclusion of the war, he
focused on his business activities, which were principally with Robert Morris. 40
Morris was physically unforgettable and had a vivid personality. Like
Washington, he stood over six feet tall, 41 and the two towered over most of
their fellow delegates. Indeed, the two men were of such similar size that the
sculptor Jean-Antoine Houdon used Morris as the model for Washington’s

(2008). Another study covers his life during the revolution and through ratification of the Constitution. MARY-JO KLINE, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE NEW NATION, 1775–1788 (1978). An
older biography covers his entire life but (despite its title) focuses on his public career. MAX M.
MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1970). Morris is also the subject of a popular biography that primarily focuses on his romantic relationships. HOWARD SWIGGETT, THE EXTRAORDINARY MR. MORRIS (1952). For an invaluable early biography
accompanied by primary source material, see 1–3 JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR
MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS (Boston,
Gray & Bowen 1832). President Theodore Roosevelt wrote an engaging biography which displays
a great deal of affection for his fellow aristocratic New Yorker. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1888). Morris’s principal writings have recently been
collected. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, TO SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: SELECTED WRITINGS
OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS (J. Jackson Barlow ed., 2012).
32. BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 1.
33. Id. at 1–8.
34. ADAMS, supra note 31, at 21–28.
35. KIRSCHKE, supra note 31, at 31–32.
36. Id. at 38. For the surviving (although incomplete) manuscript of the speech, see Gouverneur Morris, Oration on the Necessity of Declaring Independence from Great Britain (1776),
in MORRIS, supra note 31, at 13.
37. ADAMS, supra note 31, at 52, 78–88.
38. Id. at 95–122.
39. KIRSCHKE, supra note 31, at 113–58; see also CHARLES RAPPLEYE, ROBERT MORRIS:
FINANCIER OF THE REVOLUTION 236–40 (2010) (discussing the two Morrises’ work together in
the Finance Office).
40. See ADAMS, supra note 31, at 140–45.
41. BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 11.

12

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:1

body when he created the statues of Washington that now stand outside Independence Hall and the state capitol in Richmond. 42 By comparison, Madison was five feet four inches, 43 and Alexander Hamilton was five feet seven
inches. 44 Morris’s right arm was scalded as a result of a childhood accident,
and he had a peg leg. 45 It was rumored that his leg was shattered when he
jumped out of a window to avoid a jealous husband. 46 Although historians
attribute the injury to a carriage accident, Morris’s promiscuity has become
central to his historical reputation: one leading modern biography is subtitled
“The Rake Who Wrote the Constitution,” 47 a second has the subtitle “Man of
the World,” 48 and a third has seventeen entries under “romances” and none
under “Committee of Style.” 49 He was irreverent, witty, and gregarious, and
he had a gift for friendship. 50
Morris’s ability left a profound impression on his fellow delegates. In his
private character sketches of fellow Convention delegates, Georgia’s William
Pierce wrote:
Mr. Gouverneur Morris is one of those Genius’s in whom every species of
talents combine to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public debate:—He winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him
such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who
hear him. 51

Like Pierce, Madison and Hamilton both chose the same word to describe
Morris: they called him a “genius.” 52
Morris played a leadership role from the start of the Constitutional Convention. Before the deliberations began, Morris and fellow Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson worked closely with James Madison and the Virginia
delegation on the highly influential Virginia Plan, the strongly nationalist
draft constitution that Governor Edmund Randolph presented at the beginning of the Convention. 53 After Randolph presented the Virginia Plan, Morris
MILLER, supra note 31, at 91; BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 45.
GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 3 (2002).
MICHAEL E. NEWTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 196 (2015).
BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 62–63.
See ADAMS, supra note 31, at 127; BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 61–62.
BROOKHISER, supra note 31.
KIRSCHKE, supra note 31.
ADAMS, supra note 31, at 341.
See BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 221; MINTZ, supra note 31, at vii, 39–40, 62–66.
MINTZ, supra note 31, at 181.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris (Feb. 27, 1802), in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 544, 545 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977); Letter from James Madison
to Jared Sparks, supra note 2, at 500.
53. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 52–54, 86–87. Although a New Yorker, Morris lived in
Pennsylvania in 1787. His naming to Pennsylvania’s delegation was probably due to the urging
of his influential friend Robert Morris. See MILLER, supra note 31, at 59–61.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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rose to advocate for it, an apparently choreographed effort to build support for
the proposal at the Convention’s outset. 54 Morris went on to speak more than
any delegate—173 times. 55 He also proposed more resolutions than any other
delegate (39) and had more resolutions adopted than any other delegate (22). 56
Beyond his eminence at the Convention, Morris’s involvement in drafting
the New York Constitution of 1777 made him the logical choice to serve as
the Committee’s drafter. 57 Even apart from that experience, however, Morris
had a strong background as a drafter of legal documents. As a New York legislator, Continental Congress representative, and assistant superintendent of
finance, he had been called upon to write literally hundreds of reports and
statutes, including major documents such as Congress’s 1778 rejection of the
British peace commission’s proposal to end the war and grant America a
measure of self-rule. 58 At the Convention, Morris had already been enlisted to
prepare critical parts of the Brearley Committee report, which proposed many
changes to the constitutional text—including the creation of the electoral college—and which was the last committee report before the Committee of Style
began its work. 59
Morris’s eloquence was equally relevant to his selection as drafter. His
speeches at the Convention read differently than those of his fellow delegates.
In contrast to Madison and Wilson, who were typically dry and careful, Morris—to again quote fellow delegate Pierce—“winds through all the mazes of
rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and

54. Jack Heyburn, Comment, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson at the Constitutional
Convention, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 169, 175–76 (2017).
55. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 252 (1966). Wilson was the second most (168) and Madison the third most (161) frequent speaker. The fact that Morris was
the most frequent speaker was particularly noteworthy since he took three weeks off in the middle of the Convention to attend to business matters. By contrast, Wilson and Madison attended
every session. Id. at 164.
56. Keith L. Dougherty & Jac C. Heckelman, A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger
Sherman at the Constitutional Convention, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 300 tbl.1 (2006) (charting
motions made and passed at the Convention).
57. See ADAMS, supra note 31, at 78–86 (discussing Morris’s drafting of New York’s 1777
constitution).
58. See id. at 80, 105, 111, 113, 120, 134–35 (discussing Morris’s drafting of government
documents). Indeed, Morris’s most influential contribution to the English language is arguably
not “We the People of the United States,” see discussion infra Section III.A. As assistant superintendent of finance, Morris invented the word “cent” in connection with his plan that the nation’s monetary system be based on the decimal system. Morris also argued that the Spanish
term “dollar” should be the term adopted for the basic unit of currency. 1 SPARKS, supra note 31,
at 274–75; ROOSEVELT, supra note 31, at 102.
59. For notes from the debate over the Brearley Committee report, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 493–564. For Morris’s role as the drafter on the committee, see KIRSCHKE,
supra note 31, at 188 (arguing that it was “certain” that he wrote at least the passages on the
presidency).
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leads away the senses of all who hear him.” 60 The fact that he delivered the
eulogies of both Hamilton and Washington 61 reflected not just the closeness
of his ties to them but acknowledgement of his gifts as an orator. As historian
Richard Brookhiser recently observed, there were four great writers in the
Revolutionary generation—Morris, Jefferson, Paine, and Franklin. 62 Jefferson
and Paine were not at the Convention, and Franklin was in intellectual decline, so Morris’s selection as the Committee’s drafter was logical.
Perhaps the most striking recognition of Morris’s power with words is
that Hamilton asked Morris to join him in the writing of The Federalist. 63 Indeed, Hamilton turned to Madison only after Morris rebuffed him, which almost certainly makes Madison the most consequential backup choice in the
history of political theory. One such consequence was that The Federalist, for
all of its intellectual contributions and historical significance, lacks the rhetorical power and eloquence that Morris could have brought to the project. To
quote Brookhiser, “[T]he Federalist Papers [Hamilton, Madison, and Jay]
wrote are clear, earnest, and intelligent, often ringing, but they have made
their way without Morris’s sparkle.” 64 Thus, people in the Revolutionary era
and early republic repeatedly turned to Morris when words mattered.
Equally significant for Morris was words and precise word choice. A powerful example of his attention to language (as well as his capacity for deception) is the Territories Clause. Morris wanted to limit the number of new
states and their political power, and he covertly secured constitutional language to advance this end. Toward the end of the Convention, as the delegates
worked through the Committee of Detail’s draft and turned to its provision
on new states, Morris rose to propose a new clause:
The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the U.
States; and nothing in this constitution contained, shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims either of the U— S— or of any particular State. 65

While the clause was adopted without discussion of its import, Morris
saw its oblique language vesting in Congress the power to “make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the U. States” as profoundly consequential. In a letter to Henry Livingston
written at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, Morris boasted that he
had crafted the Territories Clause in such a way that it barred newly acquired

60. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 92.
61. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 939 (2004).
62. RICHARD BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON 106 (2011).
63. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 421 (“I was warmly pressed by Hamilton to
assist in writing the Federalist, which I declined.”).
64. BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 93.
65. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 466.
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territories from becoming states. Moreover, Morris admitted that he had hidden the clause’s meaning so that his fellow Framers would fail to realize what
the clause meant:
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it
would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in
our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article [of the Constitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly
expressed, a strong opposition would have been made. 66

So when Johnson selected Morris, he picked a drafter of substantial political experience, a leading voice at the Convention, someone whose great intelligence commanded respected, and someone who was both skilled with words
and who took words seriously.
At the same time, Johnson picked someone whose integrity was widely
questioned. “[T]he world in general allows greater credit for [Morris’s] abilities than his integrity,” Hamilton’s good friend John Laurens wrote to Hamilton in a 1779 letter. 67 Delegate William Pierce said Morris was “fickle and
inconstant.” 68 According to a confidential report prepared by the French embassy, Morris was “without morals, and, if one believes his enemies, without
principles.” 69 As the great constitutional historian Max Farrand observed, Morris “was admired more than he was trusted.” 70 Challenges to Morris’s integrity
and morality had several bases. His promiscuity appalled many of his fellow
delegates. 71 Others suspected him of enriching himself while serving as assistant superintendent of finance. 72 Perhaps most important, he was suspected
of having encouraged (unsuccessfully) a mutiny of the army’s officers in 1783
in the hope that the mutiny would force Congress to assert greater power. 73
Morris’s deceptive crafting of the Territories Clause suggests the challenges to his integrity were justified. It gives credibility to Gallatin’s charge
and warrants a close examination of his work as drafter.

66.

Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 FAR-

RAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 404.

67. Letter from Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton (Dec. 18, 1779),
in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 231 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
68. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 92.
69. Id. at 236 (my translation of the original French).
70. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 21.
71. See BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 127–29.
72. See ADAMS, supra note 31, at 116.
73. BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 71–72; DAVID HEAD, A CRISIS OF PEACE: GEORGE
WASHINGTON, THE NEWBURGH CONSPIRACY, AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
80–81 (2019); KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 27–28.
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C. Morris’s Draft and the Work of the Committee
We have limited historical information about the Committee’s deliberations. Unlike the Committee of Detail’s drafts, the Committee of Style’s drafts
were not preserved, and as Jared Sparks, Morris’s first biographer, wrote, Morris left “hardly a scrap of paper on the subject of the Convention.” 74 There are
no notes of the discussions. We do know, however, from letters written by
Morris and Madison that Morris was the Committee’s drafter. Madison described Morris’s work as stylistic, rather than substantive. Morris’s own account was similar, asserting that he had only tried to change the Constitution’s
meaning in one area. Yet each had reasons to state that Morris had not
changed the meaning of the text.
Morris addressed the work of the Committee in an 1814 letter to Timothy
Pickering. Morris’s letter began by dismissing the relevance of drafting history
for constitutional interpretation and instead championed a textualist approach: “[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting
its provisions. This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words,
with the general tenor and object of the instrument.” 75 Such an approach is
not surprising for someone who, as this Article shows, selected words to advance his own constitutional goals rather than those of the delegates as a
whole. He elevated text, rather than drafting history, because the text he drafted
departed from the expressed views of the Convention majority.
Morris then proclaimed that he had written the Constitution and that he
had been (largely) an honest scrivener, with the sole exception of the Constitution’s treatment of the judiciary:
That instrument was written by the fingers, which write this letter. Having
rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear as our
language would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates to the
judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had been maintained with so
much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrases,
which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their
selflove, and to the best of my recollection, this was the only part which
passed without cavil. 76

Madison described Morris’s role on the Committee of Style in a letter to
Jared Sparks from 1831. Sparks, as he was writing Morris’s biography, had
written to Madison to ask about what role Morris had played at the Convention. 77 Madison responded:
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly
belongs to the pen of Mr Morris; the task having, probably, been handed over

74. Letter from Jared Sparks to James Madison (Nov. 14, 1831), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 513, 514.
75. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420.
76. Id.
77. Letter from Jared Sparks to James Madison (Mar. 30, 1831), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 497.
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to him by the chairman of the Committee, himself a highly respectable member, and with the ready concurrence of the others. A better choice could not
have been made, as the performance of the task proved. It is true, that the state
of the materials, consisting of a reported draft in detail, and subsequent resolutions accurately penned, and falling easily into their proper places, was a
good preparation for the symmetry and phraseology of the instrument, but
there was sufficient room for the talents and taste stamped by the author on
the face of it. The alterations made by the Committee are not recollected.
They were not such, as to impair the merit of the composition. Those, verbal
and others made in the Convention, may be gathered from the Journal, and will
be found also to leave that merit altogether unimpaired.78

Madison is here both giving Morris credit for the drafting and treating his
contributions as merely stylistic. He underlined the word “finish.” At the end
of the letter, Madison portrayed Morris as someone willing to cede to the sentiment of the majority when he lost a debate:
It is but due to Mr Morris to remark, that, to the brilliancy of his genius,
he added, what is too rare, a candid surrender of his opinions, when the lights
of discussion satisfied him, that they had been too hastily formed, and a readiness to aid in making the best of measures in which he had been overruled. 79

This comment suggests that Morris was an honest scrivener bowing to the
decisions of the whole. The description of the Committee’s mandate in Madison’s notes characterized its role as a committee “to revise the stile of and
arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House” 80 and similarly
emphasized that the Committee’s work was about “style.”
Two other primary sources bearing on authorship are hearsay from nonCommittee members. One is the diary of Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale College. Stiles reported that he had been visited by Georgia delegate Abraham
Baldwin shortly after the Convention’s end. 81 Baldwin summarized the Convention’s proceedings and concluded with a discussion of the Committee of
Style’s work. According to Baldwin, “a Committee of 5 viz, Mess. Dr Johnson,
Governeur Morris[,] Wilson . . . reduced [the Constitution] to the form in
which it was published. Messrs Morris & Wilson had the chief hand in the last
Arrangt & Composition.” 82
In an 1828 letter to John Lowell, Timothy Pickering also reported that
Wilson had a limited role in the Committee’s work. Pickering wrote that Wilson had informed him that he reviewed the Committee’s final draft purely for
matters of style:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks, supra note 2, at 499.
Id. at 500.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 553.
3 id. at 168.
Id. at 170.
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In conversation with . . . [Wilson], above thirty years ago, he told me, that
after the entire instrument had been agreed on, in its existing form, the final
revision of it was committed to him in regard to grammatical accuracy or
correctness of style (such is the impression in my memory); certainly not to
introduce a single idea. 83

Stiles’s account is the only one that equates Wilson’s role with Morris’s. Moreover, it reports hearsay from a delegate who was not on the Committee (Baldwin) and who erred in listing the Committee membership (including Wilson
and omitting Madison and King). Pickering describes Wilson’s role as limited:
he gave the Committee report a final review when it had been completed to
check for “grammatical accuracy” and “correctness of style.” By contrast, both
Morris and Madison are clear that Morris was the drafter. Gallatin’s account
also implicitly identifies Morris as the drafter. 84
Madison’s and Morris’s letters share the common theme that Morris, as
drafter for the Committee, was simply making stylistic changes (with Morris
suggesting that the only time he had shifted the meaning of the Constitution
concerned the judiciary). Nonetheless, Morris made a series of subtle textual
changes of great import. So, why did Madison and Morris both minimize the
Committee’s work?
By the time Madison wrote his letter about the Committee in 1831, he had
largely broken with the constitutional jurisprudence he held at the time of the
Convention. In the 1790s Madison adopted a constitutional vision that involved a national government of limited powers and a constrained role for the
executive and the judiciary. 85 By providing support for a broad role for the
national government, a strong executive, and a powerful federal judiciary,
Morris’s changes contradicted Madison’s mature constitutional vision at each
point. In critical fights in the 1790s, Madison battled Hamilton and other Federalists about how to read the Constitution and advanced readings of the text
at odds with Morris’s constitutional vision. 86 Thus, Madison’s assertion that
Morris had only given the Constitution its “finish” reflected the way he had
come to read that text. Equally significant, Madison was in a real sense boxed
in. If Morris had written text that altered the Constitution’s meaning, Madison, as a Committee member, was either complicit in the change or had failed

83. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Lowell (Jan. 14, 1828), in SUPPLEMENT TO
MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317 (James H. Hutson
ed., 1987). In an earlier draft of this letter, Pickering wrote that Wilson “once told me, that after
all the articles and parts of it had been agreed on, arranged, and in its present form adopted
and fixed, its final revision, in regard to correctness of style, was committed to him.” See id. at
317 n.1. Later that year, Pickering made the same point in a letter to Chief Justice Marshall. See
id. (“[Wilson] once told me, that after the Constitution had been finally settled, it was committed to him to be critically examined respecting its style in order that the instrument might
appear with the most perfect precision and accuracy of language.”).
84. See supra text accompanying note 7; infra Section I.D.
85. See BROOKHISER, supra note 62, at 37–109.
86. See Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle over Republicanism and the
Role of Public Opinion, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405 (2004).
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to detect it. Both as a champion of a particular constitutional vision and as a
politician protecting his reputation and legacy, Madison had to treat Morris’s
changes as merely stylistic.
Morris also had reason to minimize his contributions. Morris could not
acknowledge that he had intentionally crafted text to change the Constitution’s meaning without undermining the legitimacy of his work. Such an acknowledgment would indicate that Morris’s changes were at odds with the
views of a majority of the Convention’s delegates and thereby undercut the
goals he wanted to advance.
The one area in which Morris acknowledged altering the Constitution’s
meaning was with respect to the judicial role, but this was also the one area in
which he had a record to contend with. In 1802, then-Senator Morris argued
that the Preamble was a constitutional bar to the Jeffersonian attempt to eliminate federal courts of appeals. 87 The Committee of Style’s Preamble was dramatically different than the Preamble that had been drafted by the Committee
of Detail; 88 Morris, in invoking the Preamble as supporting a strong federal
judiciary, relied on language he had drafted. 89 Similarly, in that speech he
looked to language from the Article III Vesting Clause that he had also
crafted. 90 Writing in 1814, Morris would therefore have found it hard to deny
that language he had crafted provided support for a strong federal judiciary,
since he had publicly relied on that language to support that view. But because
in no other case did Morris rely on his text to defend a view of the Constitution, he was free to claim that, except with respect to the judicial role, his drafting was purely stylistic.
A related question is whether Committee members other than Madison
were aware of Morris’s changes. There is no direct evidence indicating their
awareness of the changes. The most relevant indirect evidence concerns how
the Committee members construed the constitutional text they produced. The
historical record of how King and Johnson interpreted the Constitution in the
great debates of the early republic is limited: though both served in the Senate
after ratification, Senate debates of the period were not recorded. By contrast,
there is ample evidence of Wilson and Hamilton repeatedly drawing on subtle
changes made by the Committee. Wilson, as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, used Committee of Style language in asserting the power of judicial review, 91 states’ suability in federal court, 92 and the Contract Clause’s
coverage of public contracts. 93 Hamilton used Committee language in arguing
87.
88.
89.
90.
III.H.1.
91.
92.
93.

See infra text accompanying notes 331–332.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra text accompanying note 331.
See infra note 522 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Sections III.A,
See infra text accompanying notes 543–544.
See infra text accompanying note 335.
See infra text accompanying note 430.
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for judicial review and broad presidential power over foreign affairs, in supporting federal assumption of state government Revolutionary War debts, and (like
Wilson) in taking the position that the Contract Clause covered public contracts. 94
Both men may have independently arrived at these readings of the Committee of Style’s text. Alternatively, they may have become aware of these readings by participating in the drafting of the relevant constitutional provisions.
Thus, though the historical record does not reveal whether Morris acted alone
or whether others on the Committee were aware of the changes, if there was
complicity, Hamilton and Wilson were the Committee members most likely
to have been complicit.
D. The Convention’s Consideration of the Committee of Style’s Draft and the
Committee’s Punctuation of the General Welfare Clause
In any event, the Committee’s work was rapid. The Committee was selected on September 8. 95 On September 12, it delivered its report to the Convention. 96 The Convention spent three days reviewing the Committee’s draft
and discussing other matters (primarily the possibility of a Bill of Rights) before voting in favor of the Constitution on September 15. The weary delegates
quickly went through the document in order to bring the Convention to a close. 97
Madison’s notes of these discussions are cursory, and they reflect no
recognition by the delegates that the Committee had made substantive
changes. 98 The one change that led to limited discussion—though not about
the change itself—was the Committee’s inclusion of the Contract Clause.
While the clause had been voted down the only time it had been discussed on
the Convention floor, 99 no delegate mentioned that fact or that the scope of
the clause was different than the version previously considered. Elbridge

94. See discussion infra Sections III.A (suability of states), III.B (executive power), III.E
(Contract Clause), III.H.2 (judicial review), III.K (Engagements Clause).
95. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547.
96. Id. at 582.
97. For the records of the debates about the Committee of Style report, see id. at 609–649.
98. On the poor quality of Madison’s notes in the final weeks of the Convention, see
MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 141–
53 (2015). While Madison took rough notes during this period, he did not prepare his draft of
these debates until after the fall of 1789 and thus the records are “particularly unreliable.” Id. at
141. More generally, Professor Bilder convincingly argues that Madison’s revision of his notes
undermines their integrity as records of the debates, particularly with respect to Madison’s own
speeches. See id. at 179–201. For discussion of Bilder’s important book, see Jonathan Gienapp,
Notes on the State of the Constitution, 74 WM. & MARY Q. 145 (2017) (book review); Jack Rakove,
A Biography of Madison’s Notes of Debates, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 317 (2016) (book review).
99. See discussion infra Section II.D.
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Gerry suggested that the clause be extended to both the national government
and the states, but no one agreed with Gerry, and his motion was rejected. 100
Madison’s notes do not mention the only Committee change that was discovered and rejected: its altered punctuation of the General Welfare Clause
was noted, and the original punctuation was restored. The General Welfare
Clause, as it had been approved by the Convention before the Committee of
Style began its work, provided that “[t]he Legislature shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for
the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” 101 By contrast,
the Committee of Style’s draft gave Congress the power to “lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.” 102
In the version of the clause sent to the Committee, Congress is granted
the taxing power (and the power to impose duties, imposts, and excises) to
provide money to pay for “the common defence and general welfare.” Although there was some disagreement about how to read the clause, 103 the
standard understanding is that the reference to “the common defence and
welfare” was a limitation on the taxing authority, not a separate grant of congressional authority. Thus, to the extent that Congress otherwise has power to
legislate for the “common defence and general welfare,” the clause provided
Congress with a way to pay for relevant expenditures.
In the printed report of the Committee of Style, the comma that follows
the word “excises” in the provisions referred to the Committee became a semicolon. 104 While the Committee of Style’s version has some ambiguity, the
semicolon at the very least would have made possible the argument that the
language about the “common defence and welfare” should be understood as a
separate grant of power to Congress to legislate for “the common defence and
welfare.” Thus, Article I, Section 8 would have provided for three separate
grants of power to Congress: “[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises”; “to pay the debts . . . of the United States”; and to “provide for the

100. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 619.
101. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 569.
102. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 594 (footnote omitted).
103. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 268 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1941)
(rebutting Antifederalist argument that the clause “amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence or general
welfare”); 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 105 (1802) (statement of Sen. Baldwin) (“It had been contended
in the early years of the Government, repeatedly, and with much earnestness, that [the General
Welfare Clause] . . . authoriz[ed] Congress to build manufacturing towns, a National University,
and to carry on any pecuniary enterprises, with the public money; deliberate practice seems for
many years to have settled the construction that those words should not be considered as a distinct grant of power, but a limitation of the power . . . .”).
104. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 594.
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common defence and general welfare of the United States.” 105 In the version
of the Constitution that was finally adopted by the Convention, the semicolon
in the Committee of Style’s report had become a comma again. So, the ratified
Constitution has a comma, not a semicolon. 106
Morris never commented on the Committee of Style’s alteration of the
General Welfare Clause’s punctuation, but the revised punctuation accorded
with his belief that the General Welfare Clause should be a broad grant of
power. The relevant evidence comes from Maryland delegate James
McHenry’s notes of a conversation that he had had with Morris, Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts, and Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania shortly
before the Committee of Style began its work. The topic under discussion was
whether the national government had the power to construct piers. According
to McHenry’s notes, Morris told the others that he read the General Welfare
Clause as vesting that power in the national government but found that they
disagreed. 107 Thus, the punctuation change would have advanced the reading
that Morris (but none of the fellow delegates he was speaking to) wanted the
clause to have.
The punctuation shift became the subject of public notice because of Congressman Albert Gallatin’s 1798 speech, which took place as part of a debate
about the meaning of the General Welfare Clause. Gallatin, who had not attended the Philadelphia Convention, stated that “he was well informed that
those words had originally been inserted in the Constitution as a limitation to
the power of laying taxes.” 108 He added:
After the limitation had been agreed to, and the Constitution was completed,
a member of the Convention, (he was one of the members who represented

105. Id. For more on this reading, see MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 264–65; Amar, supra
note 8, at 286 n.25.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States”).
107. McHenry records that he told Morris, Gorham, and Fitzsimons that he favored adding a clause empowering Congress to erect piers. Gorham said that he opposed granting Congress such a power. Fitzsimons and Morris both said that they thought Congress should have
such a power, but Morris added that the new clause was unnecessary: “[I]t may be done under
the words of the I clause I sect 7 art. amended—‘and provide for the common defence and general welfare.[’]” 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 529. Professor Hoffer has argued that
Morris, working as member of the Brearley Committee, was “likely” responsible for the presence
of the General Welfare Clause in the Constitution even before the Committee of Style began its
work. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, FOR OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY: THE PREAMBLE TO
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73 (2013). Yet the phrase was used at the
Convention from the start. The Virginia Plan called for a government that would accomplish
the objectives of “common defence, security of liberty and general welfare.” See 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 20. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation enumerated the objectives
of “general welfare,” “common defense” and protecting “liberties.” See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III.
108. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379.
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the State of Pennsylvania) being one of a committee of revisal and arrangement, attempted to throw these words into a distinct paragraph, so as to create not a limitation, but a distinct power. 109

He is clearly referring here to Morris, the only Pennsylvanian on the Committee
of Style. (Wilson was not a member, although he reviewed the document.)
Gallatin concluded by observing that the ploy had proven unsuccessful
and the original language restored: “The trick, however, was discovered by a
member from Connecticut, now deceased, and the words restored as they now
stand.” 110 The heroic proofreader of Gallatin’s account was Roger Sherman,
the only member of the Connecticut delegation no longer living in 1798. 111
Madison discussed the punctuation issue at the end of his life, at a time in
which the question of whether the General Welfare Clause was a grant or a
limitation was again a topic of great moment. Madison wrote (but did not
publish) a memorandum about the clause’s meaning. He declared, “It was not
the intention of the general or of the State Conventions to express, by the use
of the terms common defence and general welfare, a substantive and indefinite power.” 112 He acknowledged that some published editions of the Constitution had a semicolon after the word “excises,” but he asserted that this was
a mistake. He wrote that the correct punctuation was a comma because the
engrossed copy of the Constitution, the copy of the Constitution sent by the
Philadelphia Convention to the Continental Congress, the copies of the Constitution sent by Congress to the states, and the surviving copies of the official
versions of the Constitution printed by the ratifying states all had a comma
after “excises.” 113
His memorandum then turned to the punctuation in the Committee of
Style’s report: “The only instance of a division of the clause afforded by the
journal of the Convention is in the draught of a Constitution reported by a
committee of five members, and entered on the 12th of September.” 114 Madison strikingly distanced himself here from the Committee of Style; he gave no
indication that he was one of its five members.
Madison’s memorandum dismissed the significance of the “division of
the clause”—that is, the break caused by the semicolon—in the Committee of
Style’s report. He noted that in the provision referred to the Committee of
Style, “the parts of the clause are united, not separated.” 115 The punctuation in
the Committee of Style’s draft “must have been an erratum of the pen or of

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 265.
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
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the press.” 116 As in his letter to Sparks about Morris’s contributions as the
Committee of Style’s drafter, Madison took the position that the Committee
did not try to change the substantive meaning of the Constitution. Thus,
where Gallatin saw a “trick,” Madison saw a transcription error.
E. Scholarship on the Committee of Style
Gallatin’s charge raises the question whether Morris was an honest scrivener. Remarkably, despite the fact that Gallatin challenged Morris’s integrity as
drafter more than two hundred years ago and the fact that there is (to put it
mildly) a substantial body of historical and legal scholarship closely probing
the Constitution’s text, there has not been a single study systematically examining the changes that Morris made as drafter for the Committee of Style.
The brief historical treatments of the Committee of Style’s revision of the
General Welfare Clause have split on whether Gallatin’s charge has merit. Professor David Engdahl dismisses Gallatin’s charge as “hearsay.” 117 Professor
Robert Natelson reaches the same result, observing that “[t]he story assumes
that Morris thought he was playing with fools, easily hoodwinked—at the

116. Id. The difference between a semicolon and a comma at the time of the ratification
was the same as it is currently, with a semicolon marking a stronger break than a comma. See
W.C. FOWLER, ENGLISH GRAMMAR: THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN ITS ELEMENTS AND FORMS
WITH A HISTORY OF ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 743 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1868) (“The
comma (,) denotes the smallest division in the construction of sentences on the printed
page . . . .”); id. at 749 (“The SEMICOLON is placed between the members of a sentence which are
not so closely connected as those which are separated by a comma.”); ALLEN FISK, MURRAY’S
ENGLISH GRAMMAR SIMPLIFIED 154 (Hallowell, ME, Glazier, Masters & Smith 1846) (“When a
longer pause than a comma is required, and yet the sense is incomplete, a semicolon may be
used . . . .”); see also James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s
Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1541 n.105 (2001) (“Grammarians from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries generally agree that the semicolon retains its original function in
conveying a pause somewhere between the comma and the colon.”). The case law was inconsistent on whether punctuation should be considered part of a statute. Compare Black v. Scott, 3
F. Cas. 507, 510 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1828) (No. 1,464) (“[I]n the printed code,
the comma is place[d] after the word, ‘curator’ . . . . I am, however, aware, that not much stress
is to be laid on this circumstance; and that the construction of a sentence in a legislative act does
not depend on its pointing.”), with Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 54 (1837) (“Punctuation
is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a writing; it may be resorted to, when all other
means fail . . . .”). For current academic debate about the comma–semicolon divide in the early
republic, compare Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 258–59 (2000) (arguing for
existence of a canon in which punctuation was not legally significant), with Pfander, supra, at
1541–42 (arguing for the significance of the different forms of punctuation). Clearly, however,
the Founders grasped the significance of the distinction between a comma and a semicolon. Both
Gallatin’s charge that Morris had dishonestly changed the punctuation of the General Welfare
Clause and Madison’s careful effort to show that the correct punctuation was a comma reflect
the recognition that this was a consequential matter.
117. Engdahl, supra note 8, at 252.
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Philadelphia convention, the ‘assembly of demigods!’ ” 118 But historian Forrest McDonald is convinced that Morris secretly changed the punctuation
when he found that McHenry and Gorham disagreed with his reading of the
General Welfare Clause. 119 The key for McDonald is his assessment of Morris
as a person: he was “audacious.” 120 The more important question, however, is
not whether Morris altered the punctuation of the General Welfare Clause to
advance a particular end, but whether there was a larger pattern of Morris
covertly making changes.
Recent years have seen a serious focus on the drafting history of the Constitutional Convention, including three important studies by David Stewart,
Richard Beeman, and Michael Klarman. But none of these studies even notes
the controversy about whether Morris attempted covertly to alter the Constitution’s meaning. They simply see Morris and the Committee as successfully
executing the important but nonsubstantive task of producing a coherent constitution from the Committee of Detail’s draft, the work of the five subsequent
committees, and the various floor votes over the previous month. David Stewart observes that “[the Committee of Style’s draft] had to be faithful to the
Convention’s actions. Morris could be trusted to do that.” 121 Morris had a “cooperative spirit,” 122 and he produced a “masterful final draft of the Constitution.” 123 The Committee “put the finishing touches on the Constitution,”
according to Michael Klarman. 124 The Committee “was working to provide
the ‘last polish’ to the document,” Richard Beeman reports. 125 Gallatin’s
charge is simply absent from the leading recent accounts of the Convention.
Three earlier historians of the Convention noted Gallatin’s charge, compared the Committee of Style’s draft with the provisions referred to it, and
pronounced Morris an honest scrivener. Each treatment, however, is conclusory and does not offer textual analysis to support its conclusion. In his important 1967 study, 1787: The Grand Convention, Clinton Rossiter reported:
Although Morris liked to think in later years, as did some of his enemies in
the Jeffersonian ranks, that he had taken certain ‘liberties’ in order to give
the national government even more strength and tone, the fact is that he was
a faithful servant of the committee and the committee of the Convention. 126

Natelson, supra note 8, at 28.
MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 265.
Id. at 272.
DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 233 (2007).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 180.
124. KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 189.
125. BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 345.
126. ROSSITER, supra note 55, at 228–29 (footnotes omitted).
118.
119.
120.
121.
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He concluded, “The report of the committee of style was an adroit and tasteful
rendering of the will of the Framers.” 127
In his history of the Convention, Max Farrand noted that “just a little suspicion attaches to the work of Morris in preparing this last draft of the constitution.” 128 But he compared the Committee’s draft with previously adopted
provisions and concluded that “no undue liberties had been taken.” 129 Similarly, in The Making of the Constitution, Charles Warren asserted that “the
Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of
substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport
to do so . . . .” 130
Morris has been the subject of four biographies in the past fifteen years.
Only one biographer, Richard Brookhiser, looks at the question whether Morris tried to alter the Constitution’s meaning as the Committee of Style’s
drafter. “Did the careful scribe try to smuggle in an argument for nationalism?” Brookhiser asks. 131 After noting Gallatin’s charge, Brookhiser dismisses
it out of hand: “At the time the charge was made, Sherman was dead, and
Morris was out of the country[.] Morris was not above sleight of hand, but he
made his convictions explicit elsewhere.” 132 Thus, Brookhiser concludes that
Morris did not try to change the Constitution’s meaning, although such manipulation would not have been out of character. The other three recent biographies of Morris by Professors Adams, 133 Kirschke, 134 and Miller 135 do not
note the charge at all.
While a number of law review articles have discussed the changes the
Committee made to a particular clause, and some have even noted Gallatin’s
charge, none of these articles has confronted the question of how, as a matter
of constitutional theory, the Committee’s changes should be viewed today. 136
Instead, articles have, without extensive (or in some cases any) analysis,
simply asserted one of three very different positions. Some articles point out
that the Committee’s mandate was limited to style and any substantive
changes should be disregarded. Others argue that regardless of whether the

127. Id. at 228. Rossiter noted the change in the Preamble and the introduction of the Contract Clause but found that neither reflected bad faith on Morris’s part. He argued that “We the
People of the states of . . .” became “We the People of the United States” out of concern that not
all states would ratify the Constitution. He noted that Morris opposed the Contract Clause and
suggested that King or Hamilton was responsible for its inclusion. Id. at 229–30.
128. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 182.
129. Id. at 181–82.
130. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 422 n.1 (1928).
131. BROOKHISER, supra note 31, at 90.
132. Id.
133. ADAMS, supra note 31.
134. KIRSCHKE, supra note 31.
135. MILLER, supra note 31.
136. For a list of these articles, see supra note 8.
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Committee exceeded its mandate, the ratified text of the Constitution should
be applied today because the ratified text was the text adopted by “We the
People.” Still others frame the provisions referred to the Committee of Style
as an interpretive gloss to the Committee’s proposals because the drafters assumed that the earlier proposal and the Committee’s text had the same meaning. 137 All these articles, however, view a particular change in isolation. None
has recognized that there are many changes and that they fit into a larger pattern. By contrast, this Article argues that Morris used his role as drafter to
reverse losses he suffered on the Convention floor and to write into the Constitution his vision of what the Constitution should entail.
To develop this argument, the next Part discusses Morris’s constitutional
vision and the extent to which the Constitution failed to embody that vision
before the Committee of Style began its work. The following Part then analyzes how the changes Morris made as drafter for the Committee of Style incorporated his positions into the Constitution’s text.
II.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION

Despite his central role at the Convention, Morris’s constitutional philosophy has received almost no scholarly attention. 138 This Part examines his

137. See discussion infra Part III.
138. The best study of Morris’s political philosophy is a short essay by Forrest McDonald
in an online publication. See Forrest McDonald, The Political Thought of Gouverneur Morris,
IMAGINATIVE CONSERVATIVE (May 18, 2013), https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2013/05
/political-thought-gouverneur-morris.html [perma.cc/C2A4-5PUP]. Morris’s constitutional
thought is also the subject of an unpublished doctoral dissertation. See Arthur Paul Kaufman,
The Constitutional Views of Gouverneur Morris (June 30, 1992) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University) (ProQuest). John Patrick Coby has recently argued that Morris’s political vision of the executive and his thinking about the division between the classes were similar
to Machiavelli’s. See John Patrick Coby, America’s Machiavellian: Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional Convention, 79 REV. POL. 621 (2017). Morris’s arguments at the Convention are surveyed in Heyburn, supra note 54. An important unpublished study, which extensively draws on
this Article, is Dennis C. Rasmussen, The Constitution’s Penman: Gouverneur Morris and the
Creation of America’s Basic Charter (Apr. 5, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). When published, it will be the first in-depth analysis of Morris’s constitutional thought.
Although her analysis is limited to questions involving property, Professor Jennifer Nedelsky
has written an excellent analysis of Morris’s thought in this area, contrasting it with Wilson’s
and Madison’s. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). The lack of attention to Morris’s thought is probably due in part to his failure to author major political writings—notably, he turned down the opportunity to join in the writing of The Federalist, see supra
text accompanying note 63—and in part to the assumption among scholars that Morris did not
have an overarching philosophy. See Coby, supra, at 626. Yet Morris’s speeches at the Convention reflect a coherent constitutional vision. Moreover, while his speeches demonstrate a range
of approaches—by turns witty, sarcastic, angry, and rhetorically powerful—he did not invoke
political thinkers at the Convention in the way that some delegates did. He wore his learning
lightly. At the same time, he clearly treasured books. According to president of Yale College Ezra
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speeches at the Convention to reveal his core principles. Morris was a strong
nationalist. He championed both a strong executive and a strong judiciary. He
stood apart from his fellow delegates in his devotion to the protection of private property, his elitism, and his opposition to slavery. He sought to limit the
political power of new western states. In addition to uncovering Morris’s constitutional vision, this Part shows that, before the Committee of Style began
its work, the provisions of the Constitution that had been adopted by the delegates dramatically differed from Morris’s goals in each area.
A. Nationalism
Throughout the Convention, Morris was one of the few forceful and consistent nationalist voices, and his conception of the proper scope of national
power was broad. 139 Morris favored a strong and supreme federal government, even taking the controversial position that the federal government
should possess the police power. By the time the Committee of Style began its
work, however, the draft constitution adopted by the Convention was far from
reflective of Morris’s nationalist values.
Where other delegates at the Convention spoke of themselves as representatives of their states, Morris (a New Yorker elected to represent Pennsylvania) proclaimed that he came “as a Representative of America . . . in some
degree as a Representative of the whole human race.” 140 He denounced those
who sought “to truck and bargain for [their] particular States.” 141 “State attachments, and State importance,” he declared, “have been the bane of this
Country.” 142 He was explicit that state interests must yield to national interests: “It had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the
nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views . . . . [P]articular States
ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it.” 143
At the start of the Convention, the Virginia Plan provided a broad grant
of power to the national government. It provided that
the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in

Stiles, Morris owned the second largest library in the country, surpassed only by Harvard College’s. Id. at 626 n.9. While scholars have generally decided that Morris does not merit study as
a political thinker, it is unquestionable that, at the very least, he owned a lot of books!
139. MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 186–87; GIENAPP, supra note 17, at 58.
140. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 529.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 530.
143. Id. at 552.
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all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Legislation . . . . 144

Morris rose to enthusiastically endorse this plan. He declared “that a Union of the States merely federal” would not accomplish the goals that the Articles of Confederation had sought to achieve, “namely common defence,
security of liberty, & genl. welfare.” 145 He asserted that “a national Government” should be created and that that it should “consist[] of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.” 146
He later sought to vest the national government with the power to “attend
to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture and manufactures, the
opening of roads and navigations, and the facilitating communications thro’
the U. States.” 147 This was a capacious conception of the scope of the national
government, particularly in its use of the word “police,” which meant, to quote
Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, “[t]he regulation and government of a city or country, so far as regards the inhabitants.” 148 No one else at the Constitutional Convention argued that the national government should have the “police” power.
To the extent that other delegates spoke of the “police” power, they discussed
it as a power of the states. 149
Morris’s fight for a strong national government continued until literally
the end of the Convention. The Convention’s last document was its letter, under Washington’s signature, transmitting to Congress the Constitution the
delegates had adopted. That letter was produced by the Committee of Style
and is in Morris’s handwriting. 150 It states: “In all our deliberations on this
subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence.” 151 Thus,
this letter, which Professor Daniel Farber has referred to as the Constitution’s

144. Id. at 21.
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id.
147. 2 id. at 342–43.
148. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan 1755).
149. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 476 (2004). Surveying the history of the Convention and ratification, Professor Barnett concludes that “examining the few instances where [the term “police”] was discussed reveals that it
referred originally to those powers not delegated to the federal government.” Id. While I disagree
with Professor Barnett because Morris’s usage was in reference to national power, his basic point
highlights the fact that Morris’s usage of “police” as a power of the national government was
unique.
150. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 183.
151. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 667.
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“cover letter,” 152 explicitly presented the Constitution as an act of “consolidation.” During the Convention, delegates repeatedly expressed their opposition
to “consolidation,” 153 and no delegate on the Convention floor used the word
“consolidation” positively. 154 Having fought throughout the Convention for a
strong national government, Morris used this sensitive word and reinforced the
reading that the document embraced his nationalist goals.
The provisions that the Convention adopted and that were referred to the
Committee of Style, however, were well short of Morris’s goals for the Constitution. The general grant of power featured in the Virginia Plan was replaced
with a list of enumerated powers. 155 In a similar vein, the Preamble presented
the Constitution as a document created by the people of the individual states:
We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, RhodeIsland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 156

Thus, as the Committee of Style began its work, the draft Constitution was
one that created a government of limited, enumerated national powers and that
was framed, by its preamble, as a creation of the people of the thirteen states.
B. The Presidency
With Wilson, Morris was the principal voice for a powerful president at
the Convention. Before the Committee of Style began its work, Morris had
made crucial gains toward creating a strong executive that he saw as imperative for efficient governance and checking Congress, but the text still fell short
of his vision.
While Morris was a consistent champion of a powerful executive, his position on impeachment shifted during the course of the Convention. He first
strongly opposed it, but later called for an expansive impeachment provision.
The text that the Convention sent to the Committee reflected a narrower conception of impeachment than the one Morris ultimately embraced.

152. Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 615 (1995).
153. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 90 (Dickinson) (“I dread a Consolidation
of the States[.]”); id. at 264 (Lansing) (“[T]he People . . . never will agree to a consolidation[.]”);
id. at 350 (Sherman) (“I . . . am agt. a consolidation . . . .”); id. at 490 (Bedford) (“[C]onsolidation . . . is out of the question . . . .”).
154. The Kindle version of Farrand’s Records is searchable. I have reviewed the various
usages of the word “consolidation” during the debates and none is positive.
155. See Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 569–71 (congressional powers).
156. See id. at 565 (Preamble).
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Presidential Powers

Shortly after the Convention, Morris wrote a letter explaining his expansive vision of the presidency:
The extent of our country, and the deliberative freedom of its legislative authority, require an active and vigorous executive. Every subordinate power
should be tied to the chief, by those intermediate links of will and pleasure,
which, like the elasticity of the arterial system, render sensible the pulsations
of the heart at the remotest extremities. 157

There were deep conflicts over the Presidency at the Convention. 158 Not
only did Morris confront delegates who favored a weak presidency, but the
weak-presidency champions were dominant for much of the Convention. The
idea that there would be one president was itself controversial. At least twelve
delegates believed that the presidency should be shared by several people, 159 and
the New Jersey Plan embodied this vision of a plural executive. 160
As of early August, the Constitution gave the president only two limited
powers, apart from his veto: “[the] power to carry into execution the National
Laws” and the power “to appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise provided
for.” 161 Moreover, the appointment power was limited because the
“cases . . . otherwise provided for” were significant: the Senate would appoint
judges. 162 Until early September, the Senate alone had the power to make treaties. 163 The idea of even a qualified veto was controversial, with Gunning Bedford opposing giving the president any veto power. 164 Perhaps most significant,
for most of the Convention the Constitution contemplated a parliamentary
system in which Congress had the power to select the president. 165

157. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to William Carmichael (July 4, 1789), in 2 SPARKS,
supra note 31, at 72, 73.
158. For an overview of the delegates’ creation of the presidency and the evolution of concepts of the office at the Convention, see RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 245–87. For an account of the
Convention’s decisions about the presidency that highlights Morris’s role, see RAY RAPHAEL, MR.
PRESIDENT: HOW AND WHY THE FOUNDERS CREATED A CHIEF EXECUTIVE 93–125, 281–84 (2012).
159. See MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 240, 240–41 n.48 (citing arguments at the Convention).
160. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 244 (stating that the “federal Executive” shall
consist of “persons”—the precise number of “persons” left blank).
161. Id. at 230 (Committee of the Whole agreement to the quoted text). This text was subsequently referred to the Committee of Detail for further consideration. See 2 id. at 132 (Wilson’s
notes of provisions referred to the Committee of Detail).
162. 2 id. at 134.
163. Compare id. at 183 (vesting treatymaking power in Senate), with id. at 540 (vesting
treatymaking power in president, with advice and consent of Senate).
164. See 1 id. at 106, 109.
165. For discussion of the evolution of the constitutional provisions on presidential selection, see RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 259–60, 264–65.
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Morris fought forcefully on each of those points. He argued that a
properly constituted presidency was crucial to “the efficacy & utility of the
Union among the present and future States.” 166 Morris also believed that the
size of the United States mandated a strong presidency: “We must either then
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient
vigor to pervade every part of it.” 167 The nation also needed a strong executive
as a check on Congress:
It is necessary then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of
the people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the
Great & the wealthy who in the course of things will necessarily compose—
the Legislative body. . . . The Executive therefore ought to be so constituted
as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people. 168

Morris and Wilson argued against congressional selection because it
would undermine presidential independence. Each pushed initially for the
president to be elected by popular vote. 169 When that failed, Morris proposed
the germ of what became the electoral college. 170 When the Brearley Committee (on which Morris served) presented a complete version of the electoral
college, Morris was the principal defender of the plan. 171 Morris wanted an
absolute presidential veto and initially opposed impeachment of the president
(though he ultimately changed his mind). 172 He opposed presidential term
limits and argued for either lifetime tenure or unlimited eligibility for reelection. 173 He wanted the president alone to appoint judges and “ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs.” 174
Morris articulated an expansive conception of presidential power. He
contended that the president should be responsible for “the discharge of military duties.” 175 His vision of domestic presidential powers was of unrivaled
breadth. He envisioned a cabinet—his term was “Council of State”—that
would “assist the President in conducting the Public affairs.” 176 It would include secretaries of commerce and finance, foreign affairs, war, marine, and

166. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 52.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also id. at 35–36 (voicing support for Madison’s statement about the importance of a strong presidency).
169. See 2 id. at 29–31 (arguing for popular election of the president); id. at 56 (same).
170. See id. at 403–04. On Morris’s plans for selection of the president, see ADAMS, supra
note 31, at 155–56, and STEWART, supra note 121, at 213.
171. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 497–502.
172. Id. at 68–69, 78–79.
173. Id. at 54.
174. Id. at 52.
175. Id. at 52–53.
176. Id. at 342.
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state; and the scope of their offices reflected both Morris’s hope for a strong
national government and a strong executive under the president’s direction. 177
While Morris, more than any delegate, was responsible for the fact that
the presidency was as powerful as it was before the Committee of Style began
its work, 178 that power was nonetheless limited. 179 The list of enumerated executive powers—not meaningfully different from the powers listed in the
Constitution as eventually adopted—was brief. Significantly, the text of the
Vesting Clause did not provide an obvious basis for recognizing presidential
powers beyond those specifically enumerated. It read: “The Executive power
of the United States shall be vested in a single person.” 180 The emphasis is on
who—one person, not several—rather than what power that person would
have. The text clarifies that there was to be one president, not the multiple
presidents many delegates had sought. And the text explicitly did not appeal
to the capacious British concept of the executive: its subject was “[t]he Executive power of the United States.”
2.

Impeachment

Though Morris championed a strong presidency, he also came to believe
that the possibility of impeachment was an important check. The critical debate for the evolution of Morris’s position occurred on July 20. Morris began
by arguing against impeachment for the president because it “w[ould] render
the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.” 181 But after listening
to Mason and Franklin’s arguments for impeachment, he decided impeachment was appropriate under certain circumstances: “[C]orruption & some
few other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but . . . the cases
ought to be enumerated & defined.” 182
But as the debate continued, he changed his position yet again, adopting
a more expansive view of impeachment. Madison reports:
Mr. Govr. Morris,’s opinion had been changed by the arguments used
in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if
the Executive was to continue for any time in office. Our Executive was not

177. Each department’s description reflects a wide scope of authority. For example, “[t]he
Secretary of foreign affairs . . . [would] attend to the interests of the U– S– in their connections
with foreign powers.” “[t]he Secretary of Commerce and Finance . . . [would] recommend such
things as may in his Judgment promote the commercial interests of the U.S.” Most capaciously,
the “Secretary of Domestic Affairs” would “attend to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture and manufactures, the opening of roads and navigations, and the facilitating communications thro’ the U. States.” Id. at 342–43.
178. See id. at 53.
179. See RAPHAEL, supra note 158, at 53, 74, 93–120 (discussing Morris’s contributions to
the evolving design of the presidency).
180. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 572.
181. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 64–65.
182. Id. at 65.
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like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his
trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger
of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst
it by displacing him . . . . The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable
for treachery; Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of
impeachment. 183

Similarly, Morris proposed that cabinet members should be impeachable “for
neglect of duty malversation, or corruption.” 184 Few delegates had such an expansive view of the grounds of impeachment.
Morris appears to have again argued for an expansive conception of impeachment in the final debate in the Convention on the topic, which took
place on September 8. Prior to that debate, the Impeachment Clause provided
that the Senate could convict for “Treason (or) Bribery.” 185 Mason proposed
on September 8 that the president also be impeachable for “maladministration.” 186 Madison argued against the term—“So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” 187 According to Madison’s
notes, Morris responded, “it will not be put in force & can do no harm—An
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.” 188
Morris’s statement, as recorded by Madison, is not a model of clarity. It
appears, however, that Morris supported using the term “maladministration,”
positing that it “can do no harm” because as a practical matter, maladministration would not be used as a basis for impeachment—“[i]t will not be put in
force.” The position that maladministration should be a basis for impeachment
is consistent with the approach in the New York Constitution of 1777, of which
Morris was a principal drafter. 189 Article 33 of that constitution provided that
officers could be impeached “for mal and corrupt conduct.” 190 It is also consistent with his proposal that other officers be impeachable for “malversion.” 191
Despite Morris’s support of “maladministration,” Mason withdrew the
term and substituted “other high crimes & misdemeanors.” As the clause was
submitted to the Committee of Style, it provided that the president “shall be
removed from his office on impeachment by the House of representatives, and
conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States.” 192

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id.
RAPHAEL, supra note 158, at 53.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIII.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 344.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575.
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C. The Judiciary
Morris was one of the principal advocates at the Convention for the creation of a strong national judiciary. As the Committee of Style began its work,
the Constitution did not reflect his views in two critical ways: Congress was
not required to establish lower federal courts, and the text did not give federal
courts the power of judicial review.
1.

Lower Federal Courts

The Convention’s deliberations reflected sharp disagreement among the
delegates on whether there should be lower federal courts. The Virginia Plan,
which Morris helped draft and which Randolph introduced, mandated their
creation. 193 John Rutledge, supported by Roger Sherman, countered that
lower federal courts would be an infringement on state authority, 194 and the
Rutledge-Sherman proposal providing that the Supreme Court would be the
only federal court was narrowly adopted. 195 Wilson and Madison then offered
a compromise under which Congress would have authority to establish lower
federal courts but would not be required to do so. Their proposal provided
“that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.” 196
This proposal—which has come to be known in both the scholarly literature
and the caselaw as the “Madisonian Compromise” 197—was adopted, eight delegations in favor, two opposed, and one divided. 198
Although Morris did not speak in this initial debate, he opposed a subsequent attempt by Pierce Butler and Luther Martin to revisit the Madisonian
Compromise and strip Congress of the power to create lower federal courts.
Randolph responded to Butler and Martin by asserting that “the Courts of the
States can not be trusted with the administration of the National laws.” 199
With its suspicion of state courts, Randolph’s statement reflected, not the
Madisonian Compromise, but his Virginia Plan’s mandate that Congress create lower federal courts. According to Madison’s notes, Morris was the next
speaker: “Mr. Govr. Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision.” 200

193. See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 21 (“Resd. that a National Judiciary be
established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen
by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour . . . .”).
194. Id. at 124.
195. Id. at 125.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39.
198. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125.
199. 2 id. at 46.
200. Id.
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Morris’s brief statement echoed Randolph’s position. The delegates reaffirmed the Madisonian Compromise, with no delegation voting against it. 201
Thus, the constitutional text referred to the Committee of Style when it
began its work gave Congress the power to create lower federal courts but did
not require it to do so.
2.

Judicial Review

During the Revolutionary era, there were a handful of state court cases
invalidating statutes, although in a number of these cases the exercise of the
power was controversial. 202 The Virginia Plan did not mention judicial review. 203 The delegates at the Constitutional Convention spent comparatively
little time discussing judicial powers, and the comments on judicial review
were scattered. Morris was a leading advocate for the power, and he expressed
his belief that federal courts would be able to hold both state and federal legislation unconstitutional and that judicial review was desirable.
Morris and Madison were the two delegates who spoke most often about
judicial review, each speaking three times. 204 Morris made his first statement
about judicial review in a speech opposing granting Congress a power to invalidate state legislation. He said that a negative was unnecessary because of
judicial review: “A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt.” 205 He later invoked judicial review when arguing that the
Constitution should be submitted to conventions rather than legislatures. He
said that if it were submitted to legislatures and not all approved it, courts
would find the Constitution “null & void” because the Articles of Confederation required legislative unanimity. 206 Finally, Morris asserted that a veto and
judicial review were necessary checks on Congress in the context of the debate
over an absolute executive veto that could not be overridden. 207
201. Id. at 40–41.
202. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455,
473–97 (2005) (discussing seven Revolutionary-era judicial-review cases).
203. The Plan, instead, had two textual provisions for overriding legislation (neither of
which were eventually adopted). It proposed a Council of Revision to serve as a check on congressional legislation, which was, to quote historian Richard Beeman, one of Madison’s “pet ideas.”
BEEMAN, supra note 18, at 90. The council would have been made up of “the Executive and a
convenient number of the National Judiciary.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 21. It
would have had the power to review and veto federal legislation, subject to congressional override. Id. In addition, Congress would have had the power “to negative all laws passed by the
several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.” Id.
204. Wilson spoke about judicial review twice; the other six delegates who mentioned judicial
review did so only once. See Treanor, supra note 202, at 469–70 (discussing statements).
205. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 28.
206. Id. at 92.
207. Id. at 299 (“He could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the Executive,
should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law.”); see also Letter from
Gouverneur Morris to Lewis R. Morris (Dec. 10, 1803), in 3 SPARKS, supra note 31, at 192, 195
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Despite the fact that there was more support for judicial review than opposition to it (at least among those who mentioned it) 208 and the fact that Morris, Madison, and Wilson—the three leading voices of the nationalist
delegates—all favored it, there was no provision that provided textual support
for the practice as the Constitution went to the Committee of Style.
D. Property
Morris fought forcefully for property rights at the Convention. Most of
the ideas he championed were rejected. At the same time, the most salient
protection for private property in the Constitution is the Contract Clause. But,
when a contract clause was proposed, Morris argued against it. Historians
have erroneously assumed that Morris was opposed to the idea of a contract
clause. Closer study, however, indicates he was sympathetic to the goals of a
contract clause, was only speaking against the particular proposal that had
been made, and, in fact, believed that public contracts, as well as private contracts, deserved constitutional protection.
1.

Morris’s Commitment to Property

Morris’s commitment to the protection of private property was profound.
He believed that the principal purpose of the state was protecting private
property. “Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value[] than property,” Morris observed, but he rejected that view. 209 “An accurate view of the
matter,” he declared, “would nevertheless prove that property was the main
object of Society.” 210
Morris, Madison wrote with more than a hint of sarcasm, did not “incline
to the democratic side.” 211 He “contended for certain articles, . . . which he
held essential to the stability and energy of a government, capable of protecting the rights of property against the spirit of democracy.” 212 But while Madison derided Morris as too protective of property interests, Morris had a
greater suspicion of the propertied than Madison. Madison believed that the

(“[T]he judges would, it was foreseen [at the Convention], resist assaults on the Constitution by
acts of legislation.”).
208. See Treanor, supra note 202, at 469–70.
209. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 533.
210. Id. For a comparison of the diverging views of Morris, Madison, and Wilson on the
protection of property that asserts that Morris was more protective of property than the other
two, see NEDELSKY, supra note 138, at 68–75, 92, 96.
211. Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks, supra note 2, at 499.
212. Id.
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wealthy, having acquired a level of resources sufficient to satisfy their own interests, would support the common good. 213 Morris believed that rich and poor
alike were motivated by economic self-interest and that the Constitution should
be constructed to protect against misrule by the wealthy as well as by those
without property. 214 Reflecting this concern about giving the wealthy too much
power, Morris’s advocacy of a strong executive was rooted in part in the expectation that the president would be “the guardian of the people, even of the
lower classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in
the course of things will necessarily compose—the Legislative body.” 215
Most of Morris’s focus at the Convention, however, was on protecting
property rights and the interests of the propertied. As a delegate, Morris made
five property-related proposals. He argued that only property owners should
be able to vote. If the propertyless were enfranchised, Morris forecasted that
“they w[ould] sell [their vote] to the rich who will be able to buy them.” 216 He
contended that the House and Senate should be able to establish property requirements for service in Congress, along with other conditions. 217 He proposed that senators serve for life, be unpaid, and represent property interests. 218
He argued that each state’s representation in Congress should be based on the
value of its property as well as its population. 219 Finally, he wanted a ban on
states’ ability to issue paper money, reflecting support for the interests of creditors over the interest of debtors, who favored an inflationary money supply. 220
Morris’s defense of property and other qualifications for representatives
and senators is particularly noteworthy since Morris’s position on qualifications was discussed by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack. 221 Morris
wanted “to leave the Legislature entirely at large” in choosing whether to add
requirements for service, but the majority of the delegates opposed his view. 222
The Convention ultimately rejected all of Morris’s proposals other than the
ban on states issuing paper money.

213. See NEDELSKY, supra note 138, at 50–52; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Property and the
Unwritten Constitution, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (1991) (reviewing JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990)).
214. See NEDELSKY, supra note 138, at 68–95.
215. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 52.
216. Id. at 202.
217. Id. at 250.
218. 1 id. at 513–14.
219. Id. at 533–34, 581–83.
220. 2 id. at 76.
221. 395 U.S. 486, 535–36 (1969); see discussion infra Section III.C.
222. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 250.
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The Contract Clause

In addition to these proposals championed by Morris, the Convention
considered one other major proposal concerning property rights—the Contract Clause. Morris’s position here is complicated. Morris made conflicting
statements about the desirability of a contract clause at the Convention, suggesting his support for such protection at one point, then speaking strongly
against a proposed contract clause at another. Morris’s true position has consequently been subject to misinterpretation, and scholars have suggested he
was opposed to such a clause. This view is incorrect. Morris believed in the
need to prevent state interference with contracts, and the Committee of Style’s
last-minute resurrection of the Contract Clause reflected his unwavering commitment to safeguarding property rights.
During the Convention, Morris gave a speech that seems to call for a constitutional bar on interference with contract rights:
Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people—a remission of debts and
similar measures, will at sometimes be popular, and will be pushed for that
reason . . . . It might be thought that the people will not be deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson. 223

Arguing for a strong check on legislation that provides for “a remission of
debts,” Morris appears to be calling for a contract clause. Reflecting on his role
at the Convention in 1814, Morris remembered that “[p]ropositions to countenance the issuance of paper money, and the consequent violation of contracts, must have met with all the opposition I could make.” 224 Again, this
statement suggests that he favored a contract clause.
Nonetheless, when Rufus King proposed a contract clause, Morris spoke
in opposition. According to Madison’s notes, as the Convention debated the
provisions restricting state governments, “Mr King moved to add, in the
words used in the Ordinance of Cong[res]s establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.” 225 King was apparently
referring to the contract clause of the Northwest Ordinance, which provided
that “no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that
shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously formed.” 226 Morris responded negatively to King’s proposal:
This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to bringing
actions—limitations of actions & which affect contracts—The Judicial power
of the U— S— will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 76.
3 id. at 419–20.
2 id. at 439.
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.a.
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within the State itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief
done among themselves. 227

While Wilson and Madison spoke on behalf of King’s contract clause proposal, Mason echoed Morris and voiced opposition, observing that “[t]his is
carrying the restraint too far” 228 and suggesting that states should have the
freedom to alter statutes of limitations. 229
After a number of other speeches, Rutledge proposed that a prohibition
on bills of attainder and a ban on retrospective laws be substituted for a contract clause. 230 Rutledge’s motion passed with seven states in favor and three
opposed. 231 The Contract Clause, once rejected, was not discussed on the floor
of the Convention again until the clause somehow reemerged in the Committee of Style’s draft. 232
While it has often been argued that Morris’s speech reflected opposition
to a contract clause, 233 that conclusion misconceives the nature of Morris’s
objection to King’s proposal. His earlier speech at the Convention attacking
state “remission of debts and similar measures” and his 1814 letter suggest
support for a contract clause. In opposing King’s proposal, Morris was not
objecting to a contract clause per se. He was instead arguing that the Northwest Ordinance went “too far.” The relevant text of the Northwest Ordinance is
broad in scope, covering legislation which “shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without
fraud, previously formed.” Morris’s objection to King’s proposal—and its coverage of state statutes that “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect
private contracts or engagements”—was that it was too open-ended, calling
into question “a thousand laws relating to bringing actions.” 234
Even more significant than their overlooking Morris’s view that the contract clause went “too far,” scholars have overlooked the situation in which
Morris would have thought the clause did not go “far enough.” The Northwest
Ordinance’s contract clause, by its terms, applied only to “private contracts or
engagements.” 235 While there was no discussion at the Convention of the applicability of the Contract Clause to bar revocation of state grants of corporate
charters, Morris had previously suggested that a state should not be able to
revoke a corporate charter as a matter of constitutional law.

227. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439.
228. Id. at 440.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. For discussion of the Committee of Style’s contract clause, see infra Section III.E.
233. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 272.
234. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 439.
235. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.a. For the full text of the provision, see text
accompanying note 412.
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Morris first advanced this argument before the Pennsylvania Assembly
when it was considering repealing the statute incorporating the Bank of North
America. The Bank was the brainchild of Robert and Gouverneur Morris. 236
It was privately funded (and Gouverneur Morris was a stockholder), 237 but
created pursuant to statutes of the Continental Congress and the Pennsylvania
legislature. 238 It was, in effect, the first national bank, and its notes circulated
as currency. 239 It was also controversial, and in 1785, the Pennsylvania Assembly moved to repeal the bank’s statute of incorporation. 240 Reflecting his belief
in the sanctity of corporate charters, Morris’s address to the legislature argued
that the repeal of the charter was unconstitutional because “rights acquired by
law can[not] be destroyed by law.” 241
Thus, Morris’s floor opposition to King’s proposed contract clause does
not show that he opposed the concept in principle. Although Morris thought
King’s proposed contract clause went “too far” by affecting statutes of limitation, he generally favored protecting contracts from state interference. And as
his defense of the Bank of North America shows, he also wanted that protection to include contracts to which the state was a party.
E. Slavery and New States
Two areas of central concern to Morris were slavery and the admission of
new states. Morris was the leading voice at the Convention denouncing slavery, and he was one of the principal voices urging limits to the political power
of new states. The two positions were linked. Although Morris’s elitism
spurred his concerns about giving new states equality with the original states,
he was also concerned that the new states would predominantly be slave states
and shift the balance of national power in favor of slavery.
1.

Slavery

An opponent of slavery throughout his career, 242 Morris was unquestionably the most forceful critic of slavery at the Convention. Only a handful of
his fellow delegates (primarily Luther Martin and Rufus King) expressed opposition to slavery.

236. RAPPLEYE, supra note 39, at 236–67.
237. KIRSCHKE, supra note 31, at 137.
238. 3 SPARKS, supra note 31, at 437.
239. ADAMS, supra note 31, at 132–33.
240. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA (1785), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 60, 60 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall
eds., 2007).
241. 3 SPARKS, supra note 31, at 438–39.
242. See ADAMS, supra note 31, at 81–82, 84 (discussing Morris’s unsuccessful efforts to
secure a provision in New York’s constitution ending slavery in the state).
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“[D]omestic slavery,” Morris declared, “was a nefarious institution—It
was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed.” 243 He bitterly denounced the Three-Fifths Clause, which dramatically increased representation in the House of states with large numbers of enslaved people. He said he
could not accept the Clause, even if the failure to include it in the Constitution
would lead the southern states to leave the Convention. 244 Madison reports
Morris asserting that he “was compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and he
must therefore do it to the former.” 245
In addition to attacking the Three-Fifths Clause, Morris tried to diminish
the slave states’ representation in the House through an amendment to the
provision concerning the size of congressional districts. When the Convention was debating a proposal stating that Congress shall “regulate the number
of representatives by the number of inhabitants . . . at the rate of one for every
forty thousand,” 246 Morris moved that the word “free” be inserted before “inhabitants.” 247 Attacking the unamended provision, he declared:
The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes
to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of
Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his
fellow creatures from their dearest connections & dam(n)s them to the most
cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection of
the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa or N. Jersey who views with a
laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. 248

Morris lost on each substantive provision concerning slavery. This meant
that before the Committee of Style began its work, the delegates had accepted
the Three-Fifths Clause, guaranteed that the importation of enslaved people
would continue until 1808, and adopted the Fugitive Slave Clause.
None of these clauses, however, used the word “slave.” The Three-Fifths
Clause spoke of “three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description.” 249 The Slave Trade Clause barred federal legislation prohibiting “[t]he migration or importation of such persons as the several States
now existing shall think proper to admit.” 250 And the Fugitive Slave Clause referred to “any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States.” 251

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 221.
1 id. at 588.
Id.
2 id. at 219 n.8.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571.
Id.
Id. at 577.
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These words allowed the drafters to avoid an explicit textual recognition
of slavery. The decision not to use the word “slave” was intentional. Even as
the Constitution protected slavery in a range of provisions, the word choice
reflected a recognition by many of the delegates that slavery was at odds with
basic moral and political principles. 252 James Madison declared during the
Convention that he “thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea
that there could be property in men.” 253 While Madison’s statement during
the Convention was framed as his personal view against use of the word, years
later he suggested that opponents of slavery were responsible for the exclusion
of the word “slave” from the Constitution. Some states “had scruples against
admitting the term ‘Slaves’ into the Instrument,” he wrote in 1819. 254 Regardless of whether the decision not to use the word “slave” reflected the concerns
of supporters like Madison or opponents, or some mix of both, the term was
not used and, as Madison’s statements show, the decision not to use it was a
considered one.
Nonetheless, as the Committee of Style began its work, there was one
point at which the constitutional text viewed slavery as “just”: the Fugitive
Slave Clause provided that enslaved people who had escaped “shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.” 255 As historian
Sean Wilentz has recently written:
To describe a person’s claim as just could also imply that the state laws establishing such a claim were just. To say that the person may or may not be
due the fugitive’s service or labor avoided that implication while it conveyed
uncertainty about the justice of the state law or laws in question. 256

The use of the word “justly” in the Fugitive Slave Clause was thus profoundly
significant. Elsewhere, the Framers struggled to avoid using the word “slave.”
In the Fugitive Slave Clause, they suggested that slavery was “just.”
2.

New States

Morris fought against giving new states full political equality with the
original thirteen. Morris argued for “irrevocably fixing the number of representatives” of the original states so as to guarantee their “prevalence in the
National Councils.” 257 Morris feared that “in time the Western people w[ould]
outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished therefore to put it in the power of

252. See SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING 96–98 (2018).
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 417.
3 id. at 436.
2 id. at 453–54 (emphasis added).
WILENTZ, supra note 252, at 111.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 533–34.
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the latter to keep a majority of votes in their own hands.” 258 When the Convention considered the Committee of Detail’s proposal that new states “be admitted on the same terms with the original States,” 259 Morris successfully
urged that the language be struck because “[h]e did not wish to bind down the
Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here stated.” 260
In justifying his position, he voiced concern about the quality of the leaders the new states would have: “The Busy haunts of men[,] not the remote
wilderness, was the proper School of political Talents.” 261 Madison sarcastically responded that Morris’s argument suggested that “he determined the
human character by the points of the compass.” 262
Critically, however, Morris was concerned not just that the new states
would align against the original thirteen but that they would become slave
states and align with the southern states against the northern states. Thus, his
apprehension about the new states was linked to his opposition to slavery. He
decried the fact that “Southn. Gentlem[e]n will not be satisfied unless they see
the way open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils.” 263 Morris
likewise lamented that “[t]here can be no end of [Southern states’] demands for
security” to protect their “interest” in slavery. 264 He even envisioned the southern states and the new states forming a coalition that would dominate the national government and threaten the interests of northern states:
If the Southn. States get the power into their hands, and be joined as they will
be with the interior Country they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain
for the Mississippi. . . . The interior Country having no property nor interest
exposed on the sea, will be little affected by such a war. He wished to know
what security the Northn. & middle States will have agst. this danger. 265

The stakes of the new-states issue were high for both opponents and defenders of slavery. In the wake of the Three-Fifths Clause and the Connecticut
Compromise, the North would have a slight advantage in both houses of Congress immediately after ratification. The seven northern states would have
thirty-five delegates, and the six southern states would have thirty. 266 The
North’s slim advantage in the House was understood to be temporary. It was
generally thought that the southern states would grow in population more

258. Id. at 571.
259. 2 id. at 454.
260. Id.
261. 1 id. at 583. Morris also argued, “The new States will . . . be little scrupulous of involving the Community in wars the burdens & operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime
States.” Id. at 533.
262. Id. at 584.
263. Id. at 604.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (listing representatives from each state prior to first census).
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rapidly than the northern states and that population growth in the territories
would also be more in the South than the North. As South Carolina’s Pierce
Butler observed, “The people & strength of America are evidently bearing
Southwardly . . . .” 267 Morris’s unsuccessful arguments that the majority of
representation should remain in the original thirteen states were meant to
counter these demographic trends.
One focal point of the debate about the representation to which new states
would be entitled was Randolph’s proposal for a census and a requirement
that representation in the House be adjusted in accordance with its findings. 268
Morris “opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.” 269 Morris “dwelt
much on the danger of throwing such a preponderancy into the Western
Scale, suggesting that in time the Western people w[ould] outnumber the Atlantic States,” and he urged that Congress retain the power to decide whether
to “readjust the Representation.” 270 Therefore, Morris’s support for the original thirteen states enjoying a permanent representational advantage over new
states, as well as his aversion to population-based reapportionment, reflected
a desire “to keep a majority of votes in [the North’s] own hands.” 271
While the census posed a threat to the North’s edge in the House, the potential admission of new states posed a threat to its edge in the Senate. In the
wake of the Convention’s adoption of the Three-Fifths Clause, Morris—originally one of the strongest critics of equal representation for the states—came
to support the Connecticut Compromise, declaring that “he shall be obliged
to vote for ye. vicious principle of equality in the 2d. branch in order to provide
some defence for the N. States.” 272 The Senate would be the bulwark against the
South—unless slave states were admitted in greater number than free states.
As previously discussed, Morris had been able to achieve a significant victory with respect to the admission of new states through the Territories
Clause. Although the victory was achieved through deception rather than the
force of the argument, the Territories Clause enabled Congress to permanently
govern newly acquired territory as territories rather than as states. 273 But as the
Committee of Style began its work, the provisions on slavery and the admission of new states reflected the Convention’s rejection of Morris’s positions.
*

*

*

This Part surveyed Morris’s positions on the issues that were most important to him at the Constitutional Convention and the status of those issues
267. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 605; see also KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 192
(discussing consensus about demographic trends).
268. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 570–71, 583–84.
269. Id. at 571.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 604.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.
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before the Committee of Style began its work. Morris championed a powerful
national government. He fought for a strong executive while defending a
broad conception of grounds for impeachment. He believed in the necessity
of judicial review and a strong federal judiciary, and he sought to oblige Congress to create lower federal courts. Because he saw the protection of private
property as the fundamental reason for government’s existence, Morris
wanted Congress to have the power to establish property requirements for
membership and the Constitution to prohibit state interference with both public and private contracts. He opposed slavery and wanted to check the political
power of new states. As the Committee of Style began its work, the Constitution fell short of his vision on each of these critical dimensions.
III. THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
This Part examines the provisions of the Constitution whose substantive
meaning was changed by the Committee of Style. These changes follow a uniform pattern. With each substantive change, Morris reversed a loss he suffered
during the Convention proceedings or advanced a position not reflected in
prior drafts of the Constitution. Morris’s changes expressed his vision of the
Constitution and provided textual support for positions that the Federalists
would champion in the early republic. He was, in effect, creating a Federalist
Constitution. But the changes were subtle, and those who held a competing
view would not have noticed them as the Constitutional Convention drew
rapidly to a close. During the constitutional debates of the early republic, Republicans could offer alternative readings of these texts. But as Republicans
advanced their readings, they frequently had to ignore some of Morris’s words
or dismiss them as simply matters of style. In addition to discussing how Morris’s textual changes advanced his constitutional goals and how the language
he drafted was construed in the early republic, this Part examines modern interpretations of the clauses Morris changed. Strikingly, courts and modern
originalist scholars have adopted Republican readings for the most part.
Let me add a brief comment on how this Article was developed. I first
paired the text referred to the Committee of Style with the text drafted by the
Committee on a chart similar to that in the Appendix, but lengthier. I then
studied the two texts to see where there were changes worth scrutinizing (such
as added, deleted, or substituted words and punctuation). I also read Morris’s
speeches at the Convention, Convention histories, and Morris’s biographies
to unearth his constitutional vision. Next, I tried to determine whether the
changes in text that seemed worth scrutinizing aligned with Morris’s constitutional vision. Finally, I examined how the relevant text was used in the major
constitutional debates of the early republic.
I did not begin this project with any presupposition as to whether Gallatin’s charge about the General Welfare Clause was well-grounded or
whether Morris tried to change the meaning of other clauses. Indeed, I have
written a number of articles arguing that Founding-era judges and political
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actors did not carefully parse constitutional text. 274 I was therefore surprised
to repeatedly find that the Committee’s subtle textual changes advanced goals
Morris unsuccessfully fought for on the Convention floor and that Morris’s
text figured prominently in the major early constitutional debates. Frankly,
the fact that both Morris and those construing the Constitution focused on
precise wording was an unanticipated discovery.
Some changes made by Morris and the Committee did not advance Morris’s constitutional goals (or, if they did advance Morris’s goals, I missed something, which is certainly possible). These changes seem purely stylistic and
without legal consequence or reflective of an attempt to be consistent in word
choice. 275 By contrast, the Presidential Succession Clause is an outlier in this
274. Treanor, supra note 202; William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487
(2007); William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 983 (2009).
275. For example, the deletion of “duly and” from the Take Care Clause was a stylistic
change because the revised language had the same meaning as the language sent to the Committee. Compare Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 574 (“[H]e shall take care that the laws
of the United States be duly and faithfully executed . . . .”), with Report of Committee of Style,
supra note 5, at 600 (“[H]e shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). See generally
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II,
132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2127 (2019) (suggesting the term was eliminated because it was “redundant”). The Committee also made several changes in the provisions concerning variations on
the words “Officer” and “Office” that deserve comment. In the Presidential Succession Clause,
it changed “officer of the United States” to “officer.” See discussion infra Section III.F. Compare
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 573 (empowering Congress to decide which “officer
of the United States” shall be in the line of presidential succession), with Report of Committee
of Style, supra note 5, at 599 (empowering Congress to decide which “officer” shall be in line of
succession). It also deleted “other” from the Impeachment Clause: the Committee changed “the
Vice President and other civil Officers” to “[t]he president, vice-president and all civil officers.”
Compare Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575, with Report of Committee of Style, supra
note 5, at 600. Finally, it slightly revised the language of the Religious Test Clause, removing the
words “the authority of.” Compare Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 579 (barring religious test for “any office or public trust under the authority of the United States”), with Report
of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603 (barring religious test for “any office or public trust
under the United States”). In a series of articles, Professor Seth Tillman explores the meaning of
the various constitutional provisions using variants on the word “officer,” and the Committee of
Style’s changes figure prominently in his analysis. For example, he argues that the Incompatibility Clause (which bars someone serving in Congress from being “appointed to any civil Office
under the Authority of the United States” and also bars someone who holds “any Office under
the United States” from serving in Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2) does not apply to the
president and therefore that someone could be, for example, both a senator and the president.
See Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture
on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2009). In
arguing that the president and vice president are not “Officers of the United States,” Tillman
highlights the Committee of Style’s deletion of the word “other” from the Impeachment Clause.
Id. at 121–22. He also draws on the Committee’s changes to support his position that the presidency is not an “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States],” the term used in the Foreign
Emoluments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emoluments Clause—Where the Bodies Are Buried: “Idiosyncratic” Legal Positions, 59 S. TEX. L. REV.
237, 263 (2017). Tillman’s thesis has been the subject of academic challenge, see Victoria Nourse,
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list: Morris made a change (revising the text so that it apparently enabled the
placement of congressional officers into the presidential line of succession)
that does not reflect an argument that he made at the Convention or a position
he held prior to the Convention. I have still included discussion of the Presidential Succession Clause because Federalists relied on his text in one of the
major constitutional debates of the early republic and because, given his care
with other texts, it seems likely that Morris intended a substantive change. All
the other changes discussed here advanced Morris’s constitutional vision.
A. The Preamble
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 276
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE

Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 26–28 (2018); resolution of this controversy is outside the scope of this Article. This
Article contends that Morris smuggled substantive changes into the Constitution relating to
goals he was unable to achieve on the Convention floor. Tillman’s thesis instead concerns technical changes using terms of art with accepted meanings that created a coherent framework of
office holding. The changes he describes are consistent with the mandate of a committee of style
and arrangement. There are other changes that the Committee made that, arguably, had substantive consequences but that I do not explore here because I did not see the change as made to
advance Morris’s constitutional vision or because the change seemed technical and uncontroversial. An example is the addition to the clause giving Congress the power to coin money of the
related power to “regulate the value thereof.” Compare Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5,
at 595 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o coin money, regulate the value thereof,
and of foreign coin . . . .”), with Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 569 (providing that Congress shall have the power “[t]o coin money; [t]o regulate the value of foreign coin . . . .”). Presumably, the prior draft—which gave Congress the power to regulate the value of foreign coin
but not of United States coin—reflected an unintentional omission that the Committee corrected. Congress’s power to regulate the value of coinage was not controversial. Even Jefferson
believed that the Confederation Congress should have that power. See PROPOSITIONS RESPECTING THE COINAGE OF GOLD, SILVER, AND COPPER (May 13, 1785), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 194, 194–98 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953) (discussing value to be assigned
coins). The most significant change made by the Committee that does not appear to have advanced some agenda of Morris’s is the change to the Pardon Clause, to which the Committee added
the phrase “offences against the United States.” Compare Convention Proceedings, supra note 5,
at 575, with Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 599. Taking an approach like the one
it would later adopt in Powell, in Ex parte Grossman the Court stated that “[i]t can not be supposed
that the Committee on Revision by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them,
intended sub silentio” to change the clause’s meaning. 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925).
276. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565.
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We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America. 277

The Committee of Style’s changes to the Preamble reframed the Constitution, converting it from a document establishing a confederation without
an overarching purpose to one creating a nation animated by powerful goals.
This new statement of the nation and its purposes, which reflected Morris’s
own views about the national government, had significant legal consequence
during the early republic. Today’s legal scholars and courts generally conclude
that the Preamble is not a grant of power and that it has “little or no legal value
or judicial usefulness” 278 or is at most a gloss on powers otherwise granted in
the Constitution. 279 However, Founding-era Federalists repeatedly relied on
the Preamble as a grant of power over the objections of their Republican opponents. Courts’ failure to recognize the Federalist approach to interpreting
the Preamble—an approach that was guided by Morris’s changes to the Preamble’s text—has consequences of the greatest significance.
Strikingly, the Convention records do not report any discussion about the
Committee of Style’s revised preamble. But Antifederalists bitterly attacked
the phrase “We, the People” in the state ratifying conventions. Since the debates in Philadelphia were secret, nonparticipants did not know about the
enumeration of states in the Committee of Detail’s preamble, but they were
aware of the opening provision of the Articles of Confederation, which declared the document to be the “articles of Confederation and perpetual Union
between the states of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.” 280 The Constitution’s formulation was dramatically different. “What
right had they to say, We, the people?” Patrick Henry angrily demanded. 281
“My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the
people, instead of, We, the states?” 282

277. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590.
278. John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble, 91 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2018); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
471 (2005) (“The modern Supreme Court has had almost nothing to say about the Preamble,
and modern law students likewise skate past this text with Olympic speed.”).
279. See AMAR, supra note 278, at 21–39.
280. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl.
281. 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 10, 10 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
282. Id.
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Scholars have repeatedly argued that, as Clinton Rossiter put it, “[w]e ought
not attach too much significance to this change.” 283 On August 31, shortly before the Committee of Style began its work, the Convention decided that the
new government would come into being if nine states ratified the Constitution. 284 Rossiter writes, “Since no one could tell for certain which states would
ratify and which would stall or even refuse flatly to join, the sensible course
was to leave out any mention at all of New Hampshire and her twelve sisters.”285
As a matter of drafting, however, one can easily frame options other than
“We the People of the United States” that would have accounted for the possibility that one or more states might not ratify the document. For example,
the essential formulation of the Committee of Detail’s preamble could have
been preserved by beginning the Constitution with the words: “We the People
of the States of the United States . . .” The selection of “We the People of the
United States” rather than such a plausible alternative suggests that Morris’s
“We the People of the United States” reflects a substantive vision.
Morris’s statements at the Convention reflect his belief that the Constitution should create a government for a unified nation rather than for a confederation of states. As he said at the Convention, rather than being a
representative of Pennsylvania, he was “a Representative of America.” 286 He
expressed his view of the framing in an 1802 Senate speech:
Never, in the flow of time, was there a moment so propitious, as that in which
the Convention assembled. The States had been convinced, by melancholy
experience, how inadequate they were to the management of our national
concerns. The passions of the people were lulled to sleep; State pride slumbered; the Constitution was promulgated; and then it awoke, and opposition
was formed; but it was in vain. The people of America bound the States down
by this compact. 287

As the last sentence suggests, for Morris, the opening words of the Preamble
reflected his conception of who the sovereign creators of the Constitution
were: the Constitution was the creation not of the people of the various states
acting in concert but of “[t]he people of America.” 288
Morris’s preamble not only changed who the authors of the Constitution
were but also announced their goals: “to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
283. ROSSITER, supra note 55, at 229; accord MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 280–81, 280
n.37; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 166 (1996) (noting that although its motivation was
unclear, “the committee of style cleverly avoided the difficulty” posed by the older formulation
of the preamble if a state did not ratify (quoting FARRAND, supra note 3, at 190–91)).
284. ROSSITER, supra note 55, at 229.
285. Id.
286. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 529.
287. 3 id. at 390, 391.
288. Id.
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promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity.” This listing was novel. The Committee of Detail’s preamble, by contrast, had not offered any statement of goals. 289 The final three goals
of Morris’s preamble—“provid[ing] for the common defence, promot[ing] the
general welfare, and secur[ing] the blessings of liberty”—were in the Virginia
Plan and were similar to those in the Articles of Confederation, although the
focus in the Articles was on the defense, security of liberty, and general welfare
of the states. But the second three goals—“to form a more perfect union, to
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity”—are not included in any of the
predecessor documents. The New Jersey Plan also spoke of “union,” but the
focus is dramatically different. The New Jersey Plan sought to maintain the
current arrangement—the “Preservation of the Union.” Morris’s goal is, very
literally, reformulation: “to form a more perfect union.”
Despite Morris’s additions to the Preamble, courts and scholars today
generally do not treat the Preamble as a source of substantive powers for the
federal government. This leaves the specifically enumerated grants of power
to Congress (or related powers that are implicit in those grants) as the only
arguable basis for assertions of national authority. Writing for the Court in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts
stated, “The Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.’ That is, rather than granting general authority to perform
all the conceivable functions of government, the Constitution lists, or enumerates, the Federal Government’s powers.” 290 Similarly, in Bond v. United
States, 291 the Court relied on the Marshall Court decisions in McCulloch v.
Maryland 292 and Cohens v. Virginia 293 for the proposition that the federal government lacked a “police power” and narrowly construed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 294 to avoid reaching local criminal
conduct. 295 The enumerated powers doctrine has also led to the invalidation

289. See 2 id. at 177. The Articles of Confederation proclaimed itself “a firm league of
friendship” entered into by the states for “their common defence, the security of their Liberties,
and their mutual and general welfare.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III. Following
the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan’s first article asserted that the “objects” of “Confederation” should be “common defence, security of liberty and general welfare.” 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 20. The first article of the New Jersey Plan announced its goals to be
“to render the federal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of Government, & the Preservation of the Union.” 3 id. at 611. Like the Committee of Detail’s plan, the third plan presented to
the Convention, Charles Pinckney’s, did not frame goals in its introductory article. See id. at 595.
290. 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
405 (1819)).
291. 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
292. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
293. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
294. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a).
295. See Bond, 572 U.S. at 854 (“For nearly two centuries it has been ‘clear’ that, lacking a
police power, ‘Congress cannot punish felonies generally.’ ” (quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. at 428)).
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of congressional legislation in important recent cases such as United States v.
Morrison, 296 United States v. Lopez, 297 and New York v. United States. 298
The conception of the Preamble as merely stylistic (or a gloss) also has
implications for judicial power. Judge Staton’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Juliana v. United States invokes the Preamble’s reference to “our posterity” as the basis for exercising judicial authority to protect
future generations against the harmful effects of climate change, 299 but I have
found no other modern cases that make a similar argument (and the Juliana
majority does not even rebut the dissent on this point).
The central authority for the proposition that the Preamble does not confer powers is Justice Joseph Story, who wrote in his Commentaries:
The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the
general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power
per se; it can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power
expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power,
when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them. 300

Citing Justice Story, the Supreme Court held in Jacobson v. Massachusetts that
the Preamble was not a grant of authority: “Although that Preamble indicates
the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power
conferred on the Government of the United States or on of any of its Departments.” 301
At least since Jacobson, the standard view has been that the Preamble is
not a grant of power, and when it has been discussed in the law-review literature, it has typically been treated as aspirational. Apart from the important recent work of Professors Mikhail 302 and Primus 303 and the (widely attacked and

296. 529 U.S. 598, 610, 627 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act).
297. 514 U.S. 549, 566–68 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act).
298. 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985).
299. 947 F.3d 1159, 1178 (9th Cir. 2020) (Staton, J., dissenting).
300. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 221, at 164 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
301. 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
302. John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1084–91 (2015); John Mikhail, The Necessary
and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1104–06 (2014).
303. Richard Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of
the United States, 117 MICH. L. REV. 415, 463–65 (2018).
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almost completely forgotten) older work of Professor William Crosskey, 304 academics have concluded that the Preamble was understood as either a rhetorical
flourish or a gloss on other powers at the time of the Founding. 305 But it is clear
from Justice Story’s Commentaries that he was not setting forth a universally
accepted position. He was taking a side in a debate. Admittedly, he asserts that
“[t]he preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the
general government, or any of its departments.” 306 But the previous sentence is:
“And, here, we must guard ourselves against an error, which is too often allowed
to creep into discussions upon this subject.” 307 Justice Story was attacking a position “too often heard.” And the history of the Preamble in the early republic
provides many examples of the Preamble being read as a grant of power.
While there was little discussion of the significance of the Preamble’s objects during the ratification debates, the most sophisticated Antifederalist
writer, Melancton Smith, recognized their importance and decried the Preamble in the essays he wrote under the pseudonym Brutus. 308 Smith attacked
the Preamble as conferring plenary power on the national government: “If the
end of the government is to be learned from [the Preamble’s] words, which
are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which
is embraced by any government.” 309 In writing his Federalist essays, Hamilton

304. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 365–66, 374–79, 393–401 (1953). On the controversy initially generated
by Crosskey’s book and the later disregard of the book by academics and courts, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–24 (1982) (“[Crosskey’s book]

has, with its brilliant and eccentric author, sunk beneath the waves of our constitutional consciousness.”).
305. See HOFFER, supra note 107, at 83–109 (discussing uses of the Preamble in the early
republic); Welch & Heilpern, supra note 278, at 1116–26 (discussing treatment of Preamble by
academics and courts). While Welch and Heilpern take issue with what they see as the disregard
of the Preamble, they do not see it as a grant of power. Akhil Reed Amar has made the most
prominent argument that the Preamble has legal weight, but in his view the Preamble has weight
as a gloss on other grants of power rather than as an independent source of power. See AMAR,
supra note 278, at 21–39, 471.
306. STORY, supra note 300, at § 221, at 164.
307. Id.
308. See Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, at xi–xxxii (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb
eds., 2009) (convincingly identifying New York politician Melancton Smith as the author of the
Brutus essays).
309. Essay No. XII (Feb. 7, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON
SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 308, at 239, 241; see also id. at 243 (“[I]f the spirit of this system is to
be known from its declared end and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish
all the powers of the state government, and to embrace every object to which any government
extends.”); George Clinton, Remarks Against Ratifying the Constitution (July 11, 1788), in 22
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2142, 2146 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler & Charles H. Schoenleber eds., 2008) (“The objects of
[the Preamble] . . . include every object for which government was established amongst men . . . .”).
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was generally very attentive to acknowledging and countering Brutus’s arguments. 310 He did not, however, rebut this argument. 311
Morris’s preamble was to play a central role in the major constitutional
debates of the early republic and, contrary to the standard position enunciated
in Jacobson, it served “as the source of . . . substantive power conferred on the
Government of the United States . . . [and] its Departments.” 312 During debates over presidential authority, slavery, establishing a national bank, the Alien and Sedition Act, the Judiciary Act, and federal court jurisdiction over
states, the Preamble was used for ends of fundamental importance to Morris.
The Preamble was first invoked as a grant of power during the first significant debate in Congress about the Constitution’s meaning—the 1789 debate about whether the president alone had the power to remove principal
officers. Congressman John Laurance invoked the Preamble as a basis for
presidential power: “Would a regulation” that reflected the view that Congress
had removal authority “be effectual to carry into effect the great objects of the
constitution?” the Congressman asked. 313 Invoking the Preamble’s General
Welfare Clause, Laurance said that measures inconsistent with the “carrying
of the constitution into effect, must be rejected as dangerous and incompatible
with the general welfare.” 314 In Laurence’s view, the Preamble granted authority to the president to remove executive officers.
The following year, Benjamin Franklin (Morris’s fellow Pennsylvania delegate) appealed to the Preamble as granting Congress the power to fight slavery in a letter to Congress on behalf of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.
Invoking the language of the Preamble, Franklin “observed, with real satisfaction, that many important and salutary powers [were] vested in [Congress]
for ‘promoting the welfare and securing the blessings of liberty to the people
of the United States.’ ” 315 Franklin urged Congress “to countenance the restoration of liberty to those unhappy men, who alone, in this land of freedom,

310. See William M. Treanor, The Genius of Hamilton and the Birth of the Modern Theory
of the Judiciary, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 464, 464–65 (Jack N. Rakove & Colleen A. Sheehan eds., 2020).
311. That said, Hamilton did argue that the Preamble met Antifederalists’ demands for a
Bill of Rights. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 103, NO. 84, at 558–59 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make
the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights . . . .”).
312. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
313. 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 909 (Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1992) [hereinafter DHFFC].
314. Id.
315. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1197–98 (1790); see John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power
of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 407, 429–30 n.95 (2019) (book review) (discussing petition’s use of the Preamble to
argue for abolition).
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are degraded into perpetual bondage” and to “step to the very verge of the
power vested in you for discouraging every species of traffic in the persons of
our fellow-men.” 316 For Franklin, the Preamble was a grant of power that Congress could draw on to combat slavery.
The Preamble also played a central role in the first great debate in Congress involving the scope of congressional authority—the debate about the
constitutionality of the legislation creating the Bank of the United States. A
review of the legislative record shows that most congressmen who spoke in
favor of the bill’s constitutionality invoked the Preamble.
Elbridge Gerry argued that the Preamble was a source of power that Congress could draw on to create a Bank of the United States:
The causes which produced the Constitution were an imperfect union, want
of public and private justice, internal commotions, a defenceless community,
neglect of the public welfare, and danger to our liberties. These are known to
be the causes not only by the preamble of the Constitution, but also from our
own knowledge of the history of the times that preceded the establishment
of it. If these weighty causes produced the Constitution, and it not only gives
power for removing them, but also authorizes Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying these powers into effect, shall we listen to the
assertions that these words have no meaning, and that this Constitution has
not more energy than the old? 317

In arguing for the Bank’s constitutionality, Gerry thus linked the Preamble
and Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to “carry[] [the
powers specified in the Preamble] into effect.” 318
Fisher Ames similarly argued that the Preamble “vested Congress with the
authority over all objects of national concern or of a general nature” and that
“a national bank undoubtedly came under this idea.” 319 So too John Laurance,
who—in keeping with his appeal to the Preamble during the removal-power
debate—declared that the “great objects of this Government are contained in
the context of the Constitution” and “inferred that every power necessary to
secure these must necessarily follow.” 320 Finally, Elias Boudinot also relied on
the Preamble as providing authority for establishing the Bank:

316. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1198 (1790).
317. Id. at 1950 (1791).
318. Id.
319. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 304, at 1313 n.30; see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1909 (1791)
(statement of Rep. Ames) (“The preamble of the Constitution warrants this remark, that a bank
is not repugnant to the spirit and essential objects of that instrument.”).
320. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1914–15 (1791). While Laurance does not specifically mention
the Preamble, it is clear from the context and his allusion to the “objects” of government that he
is referencing the Preamble. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 304, at 200. Moreover, James Jackson’s
response to Laurance’s argument makes it explicit that Laurance had referenced the Preamble:
[Jackson] adverted to the preamble and context of the Constitution, and asserted
that this context is to be interpreted by the general powers contained in the instru-
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Mr. B. then took up the Constitution, to see if [the power to incorporate
a bank] was not fairly to be drawn by necessary implication from those vested
by this instrument in the legislative authority of the United States. It sets out
in the preamble with declaring the general purposes for which it was formed:
“the insurance of domestic tranquillity, provision for the common defence,
and promotion of the general welfare.” These are the prominent features of
this instrument, and are confirmed and enlarged by the specific grants in the
body of it . . . . 321

Opponents of the Bank denounced this reliance on the Preamble. Madison’s attack was forceful: “The preamble to the Constitution, said he, has produced a new mine of power; but this is the first instance he had heard of, in
which the preamble has been adduced for such a purpose. In his opinion, the
preamble only states the objects of the Confederation.” 322 Other opponents of
the Bank similarly attacked the view that the Preamble was a grant of power.
William Branch Giles stated:
To establish the affirmative of this proposition, arguments have been drawn
from the several parts of the Constitution; the context has been resorted to.
“We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” &c. It has been remarked, that here the ends for
which this Government was established are clearly pointed out; the means to
produce the ends are left to the choice of the Legislature, and that the incorporation of a bank is one necessary mean to produce these general ends. It
may be observed, in reply, that the context contemplates every general object
of Government whatever . . . . 323

Michael Jenifer Stone crisply made the same point: “I would ask if there is any
power under Heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive limits
of this preamble.” 324 Edmund Randolph, attorney general during the Bank
controversy, similarly argued that the Preamble was hortatory:
The preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on, as a source of
power. To this it will be here remarked, once for all, that the preamble, if it
be operative is a full constitution of itself; and the body of the Constitution
is useless; but that it is declarative only of the views of the convention, which

ment. . . . The “general welfare” are the two words that are to involve and justify the assumption of every power. But what is this general welfare? It is the welfare of Philadelphia, New
York, and Boston; for as to the States of Georgia and New Hampshire, they may as well
be out of the Union for any advantages they will receive from the institution.

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1918 (1791).
321. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1921 (1791).
322. Id. at 1957.
323. Id. at 1939.
324. Id. at 1931.
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they supposed would be left fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such
is the legitimate nature of preambles. 325

The debate about the Bank of the United States thus prominently featured
a fight about whether the Preamble was a grant of power. Most of the Federalists who spoke in the House relied on the Preamble (among other grounds),
and the Republicans argued that the Preamble was not a grant of power. The
Federalists prevailed, which provides originalist support for reading the Preamble as a grant of power. 326
The congressional debates in 1798 about the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts echoed the Bank controversy: Federalists relied on the Preamble, and Republicans criticized that reliance. Responding to Albert Gallatin’s argument that Congress lacked authority to pass the Sedition Act,
Samuel Sewall referred to “the general nature of the Constitution itself, which
he drew from the preamble.” 327 Sewall quoted the Preamble and then observed,
“The Constitution, therefore, . . . in the outset, establishes the sovereignty of
the United States, and that sovereignty must reside in the Government of the
United States.” 328 Robert Williams, an opponent of the Sedition Act, forcefully
rejected Sewall’s view of the Preamble as a grant to Congress of broad powers:

325. Edmund Randolph, Enclosure: Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 12,
1791), in 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 1790 – M ARCH 1791, at 331, 335
(Jack D. Warren, Jr. ed., 1998).
326. The outlier among the Federalists was Hamilton. His defense of the Bank did not explicitly draw on the Preamble. It may be that he felt that he could do so because in Federalist 84
he had described the Preamble not as a grant of authority but as a reservation of “popular rights”
that made a Bill of Rights unnecessary. See supra text accompanying note 311. The closest Hamilton came to reading the Preamble as a grant of authority was in his 1791 Report on Manufactures, in which he justified the use of the taxing authority to provide bounties for manufacturers.
In discussing the use of “general welfare” in Article I, Section 8’s grant to Congress of a taxing
and spending authority, Hamilton wrote:
The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used; because it was not fit
that the constitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its revenues shou’d have
been restricted within narrower limits than the “General Welfare” and because this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.

Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures Communicated to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230,
303 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966). Peter Charles Hoffer argues that Hamilton read Article I’s “general welfare” clause expansively in light of the Preamble. See HOFFER, supra note 107, at 95. Even
here, however, Hamilton did not read the Preamble as a separate grant of authority. Rather, Hamilton glossed other uses of the phrase “general welfare” in the Constitution in light of the Preamble.
327. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1957 (1798).
328. Id.
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If the principle which the gentlemen from Massachusetts have drawn
from the preamble of the Constitution . . . be correct, it appeared to him unnecessary to have any other provision in the Constitution besides the preamble, as it may be inferred from that, that Congress has all power whatever. 329

The debate about the Preamble occurred again when Jeffersonian Republicans acted to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, which established the federal
circuit courts. Gouverneur Morris, now a senator from New York, argued that
the proposed legislation was unconstitutional. Morris relied on the Preamble
and the Judicial Powers Clause (which he also rewrote while serving on the
Committee of Style) 330 to make the case that Congress had a constitutional
obligation to establish lower federal courts. “To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to insure domestic tranquility,” he declared, “the Constitution
has said there shall be courts of the Union to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which the Union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be disturbed.” 331 Morris contended that federal courts strengthened union and
promoted tranquility and that eliminating duly established courts would be
unconstitutional. He closed his argument by invoking the Framers’ intent and,
implicitly, the goal of ensuring “domestic tranquility”:
The Convention contemplated the very act you now attempt. They knew also
the jealousy and the power of the States; and they established for your and
for their protection this most important department. I beg gentlemen to hear
and remember what I say: It is this department alone, and it is the independence of this department, which can save you from civil war. 332

Thus, Morris understood the Preamble to mandate Congress’s establishment
of lower federal courts.
The other notable use of the Preamble in the early republic was in
Chisholm v. Georgia. 333 Both Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay relied on the
Preamble to justify the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Georgia. Chief Justice Jay grounded that jurisdiction in the Preamble’s assertion that “the people
of all the United States” created the federal government “to establish justice.” 334 And Wilson construed the Preamble at length:
Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of the United
States did vest this Court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia. The

329. Id. at 1962.
330. See infra Section III.H.1.
331. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 78 (1802).
332. Id. at 87. Georgia senator Abraham Baldwin dismissed Morris’s reliance on the Preamble. Although he conceded that “[i]t had been contended in the early years of the Government, repeatedly, and with much earnestness that the preamble of the Construction was a grant
of powers,” Baldwin noted that that argument “occurred much less frequently [now] than formerly.” Id. at 105.
333. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
334. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
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same truth may be deduced from the declared objects, and the general texture of the Constitution of the United States. One of its declared objects is,
to form an union more perfect, than, before that time, had been
formed. . . . Another declared object is, “to establish justice.” This points, in
a particular manner, to the Judicial authority. . . . A third declared object is—
“to ensure domestic tranquillity.” This tranquillity is most likely to be disturbed by controversies between States. These consequences will be most
peaceably and effectually decided by the establishment and by the exercise of
a superintending judicial authority. 335

For Wilson, federal court jurisdiction over states is logically necessary because
of the Preamble. 336
Thus, the early history of the Republic shows that for the Federalists, the
Preamble was not simply a powerful statement of nationhood. They read it to
create presidential power to remove executive branch officials and congressional
power to charter the Bank and pass the Alien and Sedition Acts. They used it to
contend that Congress had an obligation to create lower federal courts and that
federal courts had jurisdiction in Chisholm. The Federalists believed the Preamble vested substantial legal power in each branch of the national government.
B. Three Articles for Three Branches and Three Vesting Clauses
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial
powers.
The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate
and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives, and a Senate.
The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person.
His stile shall be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his
title shall be, “His Excellency.”
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary,
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States. 337
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

335. Id. at 465 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted).
336. Wilson’s involvement with the Committee of Style’s work has already been discussed.
Jay was personally close to Morris, and the two had long worked together. Most notably, they were
two of the three principal drafters of the 1777 New York constitution. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. Thus, apart from simply their reading of the text, their understanding of the
Preamble may have grown out of work on the Committee (Wilson) or discussion with Morris (Jay).
337. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565, 572, 575 (Articles II, III, X, and XI).
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The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of
America.
The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. 338

Alongside the changes to the Preamble, the most obvious change made by
the Committee of Style was its restructuring of the provisions concerning the
branches of government into three parallel articles, conveying a sense of their
coequality. In addition to this structural change, the Committee modified the
Vesting Clauses for each branch of government. Its alteration of Articles I and
II’s Vesting Clauses has become one of its most legally consequential changes;
politicians, judges, and scholars closely parse Morris’s language to advocate
for their competing views on the scope of legislative and executive power. 339
But although modern participants in these debates give great weight to the
Vesting Clauses’ phrasing, they have largely failed to recognize that the Vesting Clauses were significantly changed at the last minute and that the changes
were not debated on the Convention floor. And even those who recognize the
Committee’s textual changes fail to grasp that those changes were substantive. 340
One of the most familiar aspects of the Constitution is its treatment of the
three branches in three parallel articles: Article I (legislative), Article II (executive), and Article III (judicial). Comparing the provisions produced by the
Committee with the original provisions shows that this division is wholly the
Committee of Style’s work. None of the state constitutions had that framework, nor did any of the various plans presented to the Convention such as
the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, and Pinckney’s Plan. The Committee
of Detail’s draft constitution began with an article stating that the “stile” of the
government should be “The United States of America” followed by a separation-of-powers article (Article II); the draft then wended its way through Congress’s powers (Articles III through IX) before treating the executive in Article
X and the judiciary in Article XI. 341
The parallel structuring of the three articles connotes parallel stature and
authority. While today that idea may strike us as commonplace, it was not
orthodoxy at the time of the Founding. The first state constitutions placed
overwhelming authority in the legislatures, as did the Articles of Confederation, which did not provide for a separate judiciary or executive. 342 The very
338. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590, 597, 600 (Article I, Section 1; Article II, Section 1; Article III, Section 1).
339. See infra notes 366–378 and accompanying text.
340. See infra notes 366–378 and accompanying text.
341. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565–76.
342. See ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 97 (4th ed. 1970) (describing the “ascendancy of legislature over
executive” found in early state constitutions).
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idea of the judiciary as a separate branch was contested: in British constitutional theory, the judiciary was part of the executive, 343 and that position had
adherents in the United States, including John Adams. 344 Though the arc of
constitutional development during the Revolutionary era bent toward greater
authority for the executive and the judiciary, the notion that the other two
branches were coequal with the legislature was novel. The Committee of Detail’s structuring—eight articles about Congress appearing before an article on
each of the executive and the judiciary—accords with the view that Congress
was preeminent and the other branches almost an afterthought. While there
were certainly stylistic reasons for reducing the ten original articles to three,
that simplification also reflected Morris’s desire to elevate the presidency and
the federal courts. It powerfully conveyed a vision of three coequal and independent branches.
If the structuring of three parallel articles for three branches has largely
symbolic import, the revisions to the Vesting Clauses’ language have had a
direct impact. Morris made three changes to the executive and legislative
Vesting Clauses that merit highlighting.
First, Morris dramatically, if subtly, reworked the Article II Vesting
Clause. The version referred to the Committee focuses on who has the executive power. Again, it may seem totally unremarkable today that one person
should have the executive authority, but, as has been noted, one of the major
debates at the Convention had been over whether multiple people or one person would wield the executive power. The Convention ultimately decided it
would be one person, and the version sent to the Committee underscores that
decision. “[A] single person” has “[t]he Executive power.”
The Committee of Style’s version shifts focus, and in shifting focus, it
shifts meaning. The clause now reads not as a definition of who the executive
is but as a grant of executive power to the president. The “president of the
United States of America” has “[t]he executive power.” From the early republic on, advocates of a powerful presidency have read the revised provision to

343. For discussion of the British conception of the judiciary as part of the executive and
the emergence of a separation-of-powers concept with three branches, see GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 159–60 (1998); Treanor, supra note
202, at 467–68. On Blackstone’s conception of the judiciary as part of the executive, see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *267. Locke’s view was similar to Blackstone’s, with government divided into the legislative, the executive (which included the judiciary), and the
federative (which involved dealings with foreign governments). See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT §§ 143–48, at 364–66 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
344. See John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOS. GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1766,
at 4, reprinted in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, SEPTEMBER 1755–OCTOBER 1773, at 164 (Robert J.
Taylor ed., 1977).
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reflect a broad grant of power. 345 It would have been much harder, as a textual
matter, to read the earlier version as broadly. 346
Second, Morris changed “[t]he Executive power of the United States” to
“[t]he executive power.” 347 Reference to the “United States” was dropped. This
permitted supporters of a powerful president to define the executive with reference to the British model—and to the King’s authority—in ways that they
could not have under the earlier text. 348
Third, Morris qualified the grant of authority to the Congress but not the
grant of authority to the president. The vesting provisions for the legislature
and the executive sent to the Committee of Style are parallel, but the Vesting
Clauses produced by the committee are not. While “ALL legislative power[]
herein granted” is vested in Congress, “[t]he executive power” is vested in the
president. 349 Congress receives the legislative powers “herein granted”; the
president receives executive powers without this limitation. 350
The argument that Article II’s revised Vesting Clause gives the president
all executive powers (other than those limited or delegated elsewhere in the
Constitution) made its appearance in the debate about the president’s constitutional authority to remove executive officers notwithstanding the Constitution’s silence on the issue. As with his references to the Preamble during that
debate, Fisher Ames invoked Morris’s Article II Vesting Clause to support his
argument that the president enjoyed the removal power. Ames observed that
the Constitution declares “that the executive power shall be vested in the president” and added that “[u]nder these terms all the powers properly belonging

345. See supra text accompanying notes 276–298.
346. Just as the Committee of Style’s changes increased executive power beyond the Committee of Detail draft, the Committee of Detail’s draft itself expanded executive power by adding
a vesting clause to the short list of enumerated powers arrogated to the executive before the
Committee of Detail began its work. See Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson’s Contributions
to the Construction of Article II, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 40–41 (2019).
347. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 597.
348. For an influential example of modern scholarship drawing on royal precedent, see
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE
L.J. 231, 252–56 (2001). For thoughtful critiques, see Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 560–71 (2004); Julian
Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1169, 1181–83 (2019).
349. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590, 597.
350. One qualification should be noted: Because the Constitution allocates to Congress
some traditional executive powers (such as the power to declare war) and a share in others (such
as the treaty-making power), even early proponents of a strong executive and their modern descendants recognize that the president does not have all executive powers. For discussion, see
infra Section III.B; Mortenson, supra note 348, at 1181–83 (discussing the “Royal Residuum”
theory of executive power); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 613–16 (2008) (discussing the Constitution’s departure from British precedent in treatymaking).
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to the executive department of the government are given, and such only taken
away as are expressly excepted.” 351
John Vining similarly declared that “there was a strong presumption that
[the president] was invested with [the removal power]; because, it was declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in cases where
it is otherwise qualified.” 352 George Clymer argued that “the power of removal
was an executive power, and as such belonged to the president alone, by the
express words of the constitution, ‘the executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States of America.’ ” 353
While he believed that the president had the removal power, Madison initially did not embrace the Vesting Clause argument to support his position but
advanced functional arguments. 354 Requiring senatorial advice and consent
for removal “would be found very inconvenient in practice” and would “tend[]
to lessen [the] responsibility” of the president over his subordinates, 355 he asserted. Madison only advanced the Vesting Clause argument on June 17, one
month after he first argued that the president had the removal power under the
Constitution. Referring to the Vesting Clause, Madison contended that requiring senatorial advice and consent for appointments was “an exception to
this general principle; and exceptions to general rules are ever taken strictly.” 356
Yet several congressmen explicitly rejected the Vesting Clause argument.
William Smith said that the Vesting Clause argument “proves too much, and
therefore proves nothing; because it implies that powers which are expressly
given by the constitution, would have been in the president without the express grant.” 357 Alexander White contended that “the [only] executive powers
so vested, are those enumerated in the constitution.” 358 James Jackson argued
that even if removal is an executive function, “it does not follow that it vests
in the president alone, because [the president] alone does not possess all executive powers.” 359
The disagreement about the meaning of the Vesting Clause was also central to the first great debate about the president’s foreign affairs powers: the
Pacificus-Helvidius debate between Hamilton and Madison about the constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation.
Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton appealed to the text of the Article II Vesting Clause to justify President Washington’s issuance of the Neutrality Proclamation. Like supporters of a presidential removal power, he argued that the
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

11 DHFFC, supra note 313, at 979.
10 id. at 728.
Id. at 738.
See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 348, at 549 n.17.
10 DHFFC, supra note 313, at 735.
11 id. at 896; see also id. at 922 (invoking the Vesting Clause).
Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 912.
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Vesting Clause gave the president all executive powers not withheld by specific constitutional provisions. 360 Quoting the Vesting Clause and the Constitution’s enumeration of executive powers, Hamilton argued that the
enumeration did not imply that the president was not fully vested with the
executive power: “It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to
consider this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the
more comprehensive grant contained in the general clause, further than as it
may be coupled with express restrictions or qualifications . . . .” 361 The only
limits on the president’s possession of executive powers were those the Constitution explicitly specified, such as its restriction on the president unilaterally exercising the treaty power.
Hamilton then advanced a second Vesting Clause argument—one not advanced in the removal debate:
The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in regard to
the two powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this inference. In the article which grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the
expressions are—“All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the UStates”; in that which grants the Executive Power the expressions are, as already quoted “The EXECUTIVE PO<WER> shall be vested in
a President of the UStates of America.” 362

Relying on Morris’s insertion of “herein granted” into the Article I Vesting
Clause, Hamilton thus argued that the absence of a similar qualification in
Article II’s Vesting Clause supported a broad understanding of the president’s
powers, a constitutional goal that both Hamilton and Morris shared. In contrast to Congress, which only possesses the powers Article I “herein grant[s],”
the president has all executive powers not expressly limited.
Madison’s response as Helvidius reflects a different view of the Vesting
Clause and the scope of executive power than Hamilton’s. Madison argued
that the power to proclaim neutrality fell within the legislative sphere because
it followed from the power to make war and to make treaties, both legislative
powers. 363 Despite the tension between Madison’s broad conception of the
scope of executive power in the removal debates and the narrow view in his
Helvidius essays, Madison explicitly reaffirmed his position on the removal

360. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in ALEXANDER
HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794, at 8, 12
(Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) [hereinafter PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS].
361. Id. at 12.
362. Id.
363. James Madison, Helvidius Number 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in PACIFICUSHELVIDIUS, supra note 360, at 55, 59–64. Madison observed that Hamilton’s vision of executive
power accorded with the views of Locke and Montesquieu—views he dismissed as “warped by a
regard to the particular government of England.” Id. at 58.
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power in his exchange with Hamilton. 364 He argued that removal is an executive power but that neutrality is not. 365
Morris had crafted language which shifted the meaning of the Vesting
Clause from identifying who would have the executive power (one president,
rather than several people sharing the office) to a grant of authority (the president received executive power). In the Helvidius-Pacificus debate, both Madison and Hamilton drew on Morris’s language and read the Article II Vesting
Clause as a grant of power. Their disagreement was over the scope of that
grant. Hamilton also relied on Morris’s insertion of “herein granted” into the
Vesting Clause of Article I. Although Madison did not address that textual
argument, it would be a mistake to see Hamilton’s argument as reflecting a
standard approach at the time of the Founding. I have not found any evidence
of anyone else (in the ratification debates or early constitution debates) making the “herein granted” argument as a basis for an expansive concept of executive power.
To sum up: Morris’s reformulation of the Article I and II Vesting Clauses
was consequential, and it played a critical role in the first two great debates
about the scope of executive power. His language provided the basis for a
broad reading of the executive power in the removal debate and by Hamilton
in the fight over the Neutrality Proclamation. At the same time, there was no
consensus about how to read the constitutional language. The removal debate
shows that there was disagreement about whether the Article II Vesting
Clause provided the president with powers greater than those in the specifically enumerated grants. And the Pacificus-Helvidius debate shows that, while
both Hamilton and Madison read the Article II Vesting Clause as a grant of
executive power to the president, there was disagreement between them as to
the scope of executive power.
Morris’s language has been central to modern debates about executive
power, but there has been no recognition that he changed the Constitution’s
meaning. Thus, modern advocates of broad executive powers have strongly
relied on Morris’s Article II Vesting Clause language and the presence of
“herein granted” in Article I but not Article II. The landmark modern case is
Myers v. United States. 366 In finding that the president’s removal power could
not be limited by Congress, Chief Justice Taft read the executive Vesting Clause
as granting the president all executive powers (except for those textually
placed elsewhere): “It would not consist with the rules of sound construction,
to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the

364. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1451, 1507 (1997) (“Madison’s argument in the
Helvidius letters is in tension with, but is not necessarily inconsistent with, his argument for a
presidential removal power derivable from the Vesting Clause.”).
365. Madison, supra note 363, at 55, 62–63.
366. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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more comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or limitations . . . .” 367 He then contended that the
difference between the two Vesting Clauses reinforced that reading: “The different mode of expression employed in the Constitution, in regard to the two
powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this inference.” 368
Taft’s approach has a range of modern analogues. Justice Scalia’s dissent
in Morrison v. Olson begins by observing that “[t]he principle of separation of
powers is expressed in our Constitution in the first section of each of the first
three Articles.” 369 He then highlighted the fact Congress has only legislative
powers “herein granted,” while the president has all executive powers. 370 The
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) torture memo of 2003, 371 the substantial body
of unitary executive scholarship, 372 and Justice Thomas’s recent opinion concerning the presidential recognition power in Zivotofsky v. Kerry 373 similarly
rely on the language of the Vesting Clauses in Articles I and II.

367. Myers, 272 U.S. at 138.
368. Id.
369. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
370. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697–98.
371. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns.,
to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Def. 4–5 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter OLC
Torture Memo], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf [perma.cc/54XP-FXGU].
372. Proponents of the unitary executive approach believe the president has all executive
powers except those expressly limited and they understand those powers broadly. See, e.g.,
SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 35–42, 61, 66–68 (2015); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1196
(1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 565 (1994); Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 364, at 1453–55; Christopher S. Yoo,
Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,
1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 65 (2004); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2005) (reviewing HAROLD J.
KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 348. For a critical discussion of the literature, see Nourse, supra note 275.
373. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“By omitting the words ‘herein granted’ in Article II, the Constitution indicates
that the ‘executive Power’ vested in the President is not confined to those powers expressly identified in the document.”). There are different approaches to the unitary executive theory and in
particular to whether the president’s executive power trumps otherwise applicable law under
certain circumstances. See John Harrison, The Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive
Power, 126 YALE L.J.F. 374 (2017).
Unlike most advocates of the unitary executive theory, Professors Calabresi and Prakash
recognize that the “herein granted” language was added at the last minute by the Committee of
Style and never debated. Yet they argue that the addition did not alter the Constitution’s meaning,
because the idea that the president received all executive powers while Congress received only
enumerated legislative powers was already implicit in the text. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 372, at 576 (“Presumably, the change induced no debate or discussion precisely because it
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Proponents of a limited conception of executive power have advanced a
position on Morris’s changes that mirrors that of unitary-executive advocates.
As the critics argue for a limited conception of executive power, they also contend that Morris and the Committee of Style did not change the Constitution’s
meaning. Thus, Professors Lessig and Sunstein argue that “the Vesting Clause
“says who has the executive power; not what that power is.” 374
Champions of the limited view of executive power have repeatedly dismissed the phrase “herein granted” as without substantive meaning. For instance, Professors Sunstein and Lessig assert that
the addition of “herein granted[]” . . . was made at the last moment by the
Committee on Style, a committee without the authority to make substantive
changes. The change induced no debate at all; this suggests that the framers
saw it as having an effect as slight as we argue it should have. 375

In his dissent in Myers, Justice McReynolds wrote: “The words ‘herein
granted’ were inserted by [the Committee of Style] . . . and there is nothing
whatever to indicate that anybody supposed this radically changed what already had been agreed upon.” 376 And according to Professor Martin Flaherty,
“Given the amorphous nature of executive authority during this era, it is implausible that the popular understanding of Morris’s Executive Power Clause
was in any way different from the Convention’s understanding of Wilson’s
earlier version.” 377 Commenting on the Committee of Style’s addition of
“herein granted,” Professor Monahan observes: “[T]he ‘legislative history’ of
the difference in language . . . provides no basis for ascribing any importance
to this difference.” 378 “The difference . . . may well have been accidental,” 379
Professor David Currie suggests.
Thus, advocates of a broad conception of executive power and advocates
of a limited conception alike rely on Morris’s text, and neither see him changing the Constitution’s meaning. But early debates about the meaning of the
Constitution show that Morris’s revisions gave advocates of a powerful executive the language they relied on, even as the opponents of this view advanced
a competing view of that text.

so thoroughly conformed to the Convention’s understanding about the difference between the
Article I and the Article II and III Vesting Clauses.”); see also PRAKASH, supra note 372, at 81
(arguing that the addition of “herein granted” to Article I’s vesting clause “did nothing more
than clarify the legislative power” and that “[n]o such limitation was added to Article II”).
374. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (1994).
375. Id. at 48–49.
376. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 231 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
377. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1791 (1996).
378. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22
(1993).
379. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 1793–1795, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996); see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 348, at 554.
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C. Qualifications Clause
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL
Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the Age of twenty
five Years at least; shall have been a Citizen in the United States for at least
three Years before his Election; and shall be, at the Time of his Election, a
Resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.
The Legislature of the United States shall have Authority to establish such
(uniform) Qualifications of the Members of each House, with Regard to
Property, as to the said Legislature shall seem (proper and ⟨fit⟩) expedient. 380

PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twentyfive years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least
seven years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, an
inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen. 381
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of
twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall
be chosen. 382

Morris’s reframing of the Qualifications Clause so that it set forth specific
disqualifying characteristics (rather than prerequisites for membership) represents an attempt to give Congress the power to impose additional requirements (like property qualifications) on officeholders. The change can easily be
read as simply stylistic, but Morris had the substantive goal of altering the
clause’s meaning to advance his larger project of protecting private property. 383
The Committee of Detail’s proposals—the first versions of the Qualifications Clause quoted above—gave Congress the power to establish property
requirements for membership, alongside explicit age, citizenship, and residency requirements. Madison and Franklin argued against giving Congress
the power to establish such property requirements. 384 Morris, taking a diametrically opposite position, “moved to strike out ‘with regard to property’ in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.” 385 Morris would have given
Congress the power to add whatever limitations it wanted: “The Legislature of
the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 164, 165 (Articles IV and VI).
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565 (Article IV, Section 2).
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590 (Article I, Section 2, Clause a).
On Morris’s attempts to protect property rights, see Section II.D.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 249.
Id. at 250.
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of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.” 386 Morris’s proposal was rejected, 387 and the Convention voted to remove the Committee of Detail’s provision giving Congress
the power to impose property qualifications for membership. 388 The only substantive change in the first proposal was that the citizenship requirement was
increased from three years to seven years in response to a successful motion
by Mason and Morris. 389
Morris subtly changed the Qualifications Clause while serving on the
Committee of Style. He converted a series of positive requirements (“Every
Member of the House of Representatives shall be . . .”) into a series of disqualifying attributes (“No person shall be a representative who shall not . . .”).
Nearly two centuries later, the House of Representatives argued in Powell v.
McCormack that this negative formulation enabled it to add requirements for
service in the House beyond citizenship and age. 390 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Warren dismissed this contention:
[R]espondents’ argument misrepresents the function of the Committee of
Style. It was appointed only “to revise the stile of and arrange the articles
which had been agreed to . . . .” “[T]he Committee . . . had no authority from
the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted
by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so; and certainly the Convention
had no belief . . . that any important change was, in fact, made in the provisions as to qualifications adopted by it on August 10.” 391

Rather than apply the language of the ratified Constitution, Warren treated the
language referred to the Committee of Style as controlling. An irony is that Warren observed that only one delegate “noted his opposition” to taking the ability
to add additional requirements for membership away from Congress: Morris. 392 Warren dismissed Morris as the outlier, failing to recognize that Morris
was the one who wrote the final text.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Powell’s interpretation of the Qualifications Clause in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. 393 Thornton presented the
question whether Arkansas could impose term limits on members of the
House of Representatives. As the House did in Powell, in Thornton the state
argued that the negative phrasing of the Qualifications Clause “suggests that
386. Id. at 248 n.6.
387. Id. at 250. The printed journal recorded a slightly different vote: four ayes and six
noes. Madison recorded Delaware as voting against the Morris plan; the journal records Delaware as not voting. Id.
388. Id. at 251.
389. Id. at 216.
390. 395 U.S. 486, 537–38 (1969).
391. Id. at 538–39 (citation omitted) (quoting 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 553,
and WARREN, supra note 130, at 422 n.1).
392. Id. at 536; see discussion infra Section IV.B.
393. 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8 (1995).
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they were not meant to be exclusive.” 394 The Thornton Court reviewed Powell’s
examination of the drafting history, including the Convention’s rejection of
Morris’s proposal that the House be able to add qualifications. 395 It found that
treatment of the history convincing: “We thus conclude now, as we did in Powell, that history shows that, with respect to Congress, the Framers intended the
Constitution to establish fixed qualifications.” 396 With respect to the negative
phrasing issue, the Court cited the segment of the Powell opinion on the Committee of Style and stated: “This [negative phrasing] argument was firmly rejected in Powell, and we see no need to revisit it now.” 397
The Qualifications Clause is a case study consistent with a recurring pattern involving Morris’s changes. Morris’s revisions to the Qualifications
Clause represented both an attempt to reverse a loss on the Convention floor
(concerning the text of the clause) and an attempt to advance a larger constitutional goal important to him (the protection of private property). Morris’s
negative phrasing did not make clear that additional requirements could be
added. But it created ambiguity where none had existed before—which is why
the House and the State of Arkansas were able to press their argument that
qualifications could be added. Yet the Court decided to disregard Morris’s—
and the Constitution’s—text. It treated the Committee’s mandate as limited
to matters of style and therefore gave legal effect to the text referred to the
Committee rather than the Committee’s text.
D. Enumeration Clause
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The proportions of direct taxation [and representation] shall be regulated by
the whole number of free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths
of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except
Indians not paying taxes) which number shall, within three years after the
first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such manner as the said Legislature shall direct. 398
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration
shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Thornton, 514 U.S. at 815 n.27.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 792–93.
Id. at 816 n.27 (citation omitted); see discussion infra Section IV.B.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571 (Article VII, Section 3).
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United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner
as they shall by law direct. 399

The significant change between the two versions is the committee’s addition of an “actual enumeration” requirement. This language was not discussed
at the Convention. We have no direct evidence of why Morris added it, but at
the Convention he opposed both the constitutional requirement that representation in the House be revised in accordance with population changes and
the requirement of a census. 400 While he was unsuccessful in these efforts, the
“actual enumeration” language advanced the same underlying goals at the
core of his constitutional vision: limiting the power of new states and weakening the slave states.
In the late eighteenth century, there were two ways to assess population:
actual counting of individuals and assessment based on educated estimates.
Before the “actual enumeration” requirement was added, the constitutional
text would have permitted either methodology. “[A]ctual enumeration” requires counting. 401
Without a census to rely on, delegates to the Constitutional Convention
assigned the initial number of seats each state would have in the House based
on estimates of their population. It was a contentious process, particularly because the decision affected the balance of power between northern and southern states. Morris was intimately involved in these discussions, having chaired
the committee that first examined the question. 402 Ultimately, the Convention
fixed on an allocation under which thirty-five representatives would be from
the seven northern states and thirty from the six southern states. Of the thirty
southern representatives, eight would be from the Deep South (Georgia and
South Carolina). 403
Those numbers were revised after the 1790 census. After the first census
was conducted, Washington wrote to Morris bemoaning that “the real number will greatly exceed the official return.” 404 Although Washington was disturbed by this result, Morris would not have been.

399. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590–91 (Article I, Section 2, Clause b).
400. See Section II.E.2; Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571.
401. See Thomas R. Lee, The Original Understanding of the Census Clause: Statistical
Estimates and the Constitutional Requirement of an “Actual Enumeration,” 77 WASH. L. REV.
1, 18–32 (2002).
402. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 540 (Morris’s proposal for committee); id. at
542 (named to committee); id. at 559 (committee chair). For further discussion, see Vile, supra
note 13, at 160–61.
403. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (listing number of representatives by state).
404. Letter from George Washington to Gouverneur Morris (July 28, 1791), 8 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 22 MARCH 1791–22 SEPTEMBER 1791, at 381, 384 (Mark A. Mastromarino ed., 1999).
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Given the general consensus among the Founders that population growth
would be to the South and West, 405 the first census might have been expected
to result in increased representation of the South (and particularly of the Deep
South). Precisely the opposite happened. The census of 1790 produced slightly
increased representation of the North and occasioned a sharp decline in representation from the Deep South. 406 Most notably, although the overall number of representatives increased by more than 60 percent, Georgia lost a
seat. 407 Thus, Morris’s adding the “actual enumeration” requirement advanced his goals: the difference between the delegates’ estimate of representation and the actual census indicate that “actual enumeration” led to the
undercounting of population in the frontier areas in the South and the West
whose political power he wished to diminish.
While the goals that Morris fought for at the Convention would suggest
he sought to make a substantive change when he added the phrase “actual
enumeration,” the Supreme Court took the opposite interpretive approach in
Utah v. Evans, 408 assuming consistency, not change. Evans was the Court’s
most recent encounter with the question whether to follow the ratified text or
the text referred to the Committee of Style. Utah argued that the Census Bureau’s use of sampling violated the constitutional requirement of “actual enumeration.” 409 In holding that sampling was permissible, Justice Breyer stressed
the fact that the words “actual enumeration” were added by the Committee of
Style:
[T]he Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which,
in revising the language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Although
not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee
of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning” of the
draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Hence, the Framers
would have intended the current phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the substantive equivalent of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants]
shall . . . be taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” And the Committee of Style’s phrase offers no linguistic temptation to limit census methodology in the manner that Utah proposes. 410

Breyer employed a strong presumption that the words used by the Committee of Style did not alter the meaning of the words used by the Committee

405. See supra text accompanying notes 266–267.
406. See Off. of the Historian, Representatives Apportioned to Each State: 1st to 23rd Census, 1790–2010, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://historycms2.house.gov/Institution
/Apportionment/state_apportionment [perma.cc/E9VS-PSXU].
407. Id.
408. 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
409. Evans, 536 U.S. at 473.
410. Id. at 474–75 (citations omitted). Justice Breyer also had another ground of decision,
holding that sampling was “actual Enumeration.” Id. at 475–76.
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of Detail. The result was that the Committee of Style’s text, rather than being
closely parsed by the Court, was understood as not changing the meaning of
the Committee of Detail’s text.
In dissent, Justice Thomas attacked the idea that the Committee of Style
should be treated as having a limited mandate:
Carrying the majority’s “argument to its logical conclusion would constrain
us to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where
the Committee of Style added an arguable substantive word. Such a result is
at odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee’s version,
and with the well-established rule that the plain language of the enacted text
is the best indicator of intent.” Rather than rely on the draft, I focus on the
words of the adopted Constitution. 411

Justice Thomas is alone in taking this approach. The Court has either disregarded the Committee of Style’s language (as in Powell) or strongly presumed that the Committee of Style’s language meant what the previously
adopted text meant (as in Evans). But with respect to his addition of “actual
enumeration,” Morris was likely trying to do precisely what the Court majority in both Powell and Evans presumed was not happening: he wanted to
change the clause’s meaning.
E. Contract Clause
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787)
[I]n the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory,
that shall, in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts
or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously formed. 412
PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
No State shall coin money; nor emit bills of credit, nor make anything but
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts; nor pass any bill of attainder
or ex post facto laws; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into
any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of nobility. 413
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing but
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor pass any bill of attainder,

411. Id. at 496 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted)
(quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224, 231–32 (1993)).
412. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.a.
413. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 577 (Article XII).
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nor ex post facto laws, nor laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor grant any title of nobility. 414

Morris had been the preeminent defender of property rights during the
Convention debates. He proposed limiting the franchise to property owners,
empowering Congress to establish property qualifications for membership in
the House and Senate, and barring compensation for senators. 415 By contrast,
Morris’s position on the Contract Clause was more complicated. Though
Morris had made the argument that government modification of public contracts was unconstitutional when Pennsylvania was considering cancelling a
corporate charter, at the Convention he opposed adding a contracts clause
modeled on the Northwest Ordinance’s to the Constitution. 416
Of all the clauses in the Committee of Style draft, the Contract Clause may
be the most puzzling. Every other change made by the Committee of Style
reflected a reworking of text previously approved by the Convention. But the
only time the Contract Clause had been considered by the Convention, it was
voted down. Nonetheless, the clause reemerged and appeared in a modified
form in the Committee proposal.
Historians and legal scholars have made two claims about this turn of
events. The first aims to explain why Morris went from opposing a proposed
Contract Clause to writing one into the Constitution. It posits that one of
Morris’s fellow Committee members (King, Hamilton, or de facto committee
member Wilson) must have persuaded Morris to include the Contract
Clause. 417 The second is an explanation of how a provision rejected by the
Convention majority ended up in the Committee’s draft. It argues that the
Committee dishonestly changed the Constitution’s substance. 418
Neither argument, however, withstands close scrutiny. Morris’s argument
that it would be unconstitutional for the Pennsylvania legislature to revoke the
Bank of North America’s charter shows that he favored prohibiting state interference with contracts, including public contracts. 419 There was thus no
need for fellow Committee members to convince him that a clause barring
state interference with contracts was a good idea.
It is also unlikely that the Committee would try to sneak a clause rejected
by the Convention delegates into its draft constitution. The other delegates
would not have missed the Committee’s addition of a clause that they rejected.

414. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 596–97 (Article I, Section 10) (footnote
omitted).
415. See supra text accompanying notes 182–196.
416. See supra Section II.D.
417. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 272–73.
418. Id. at 272; ROSSITER, supra note 55, at 228–30; see also NEDELSKY, supra note 138, at
299 n.141 (suggesting Wilson “likely . . . inserted such a clause”).
419. See supra text accompanying notes 225–238.
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And Morris’s changes to the constitutional text were mostly subtle (except for
the revisions to the Preamble) and lacking in obvious substantive import.
Significantly, the Convention records provide indirect evidence that the
delegates adopted a contracts clause at some point before the Committee of
Style began its work. The day after the Convention rejected the Contract
Clause, John Dickinson noted that because the term “ex post facto” applied
only to criminal cases, “some further provision” would be necessary to “restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases.” 420 In other words,
Dickinson informed the delegates that a contract clause was necessary because
the ban on ex post facto legislation they had already adopted would not prevent state interference with contracts. While Madison reports no further discussion of the Contract Clause prior to the work of the Committee of Style,
Dickinson’s speech almost certainly prompted both discussion of (either not
recorded by Madison or taking place off the Convention floor) and agreement
on a contract clause.
The Committee of Style’s draft departed in three ways from the Northwest
Ordinance’s contract clause. First, the Committee’s clause is narrower in one
way: “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts” becomes “laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts.” Morris had objected to King’s proposal as “going too far. There are a thousand laws relating
to bringing actions—limitations of actions which affect contracts . . . .” 421 Both
removing the phrase “in any manner whatever” and substituting “altering or
impairing” for “interfere with or affect” seem to address this concern and to
limit the open-ended nature of the clause.
Second, and more significantly, Morris removed the word “private.”
“[I]nterfere with or affect private contracts or engagements” becomes “altering
or impairing the obligation of contracts.” The change appears intentional: it
supported the clause’s application to public contracts, which was consistent with
the position that Morris took in suggesting that the Pennsylvania legislature
could not constitutionally revoke the charter of the Bank of North America. 422
Third, while the Northwest Ordinance by its terms applies only to “previously formed” contracts, the Contract Clause is not limited to previously
formed contracts. This change was to be consequential when Chief Justice
Marshall (unsuccessfully) argued that the Contact Clause applied prospectively (specifically, to bankruptcy legislation) in Ogden v. Saunders. 423 While
there is no evidence that Morris would have wanted the clause to have prospective application, given his concern with protecting private property it
seems likely that he would have viewed the question as the Chief Justice did—
and therefore that Morris’s omission of “previously formed” was intentional.

420.
421.
422.
423.

2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 448–49.
Id. at 439.
See supra text accompanying notes 236–241.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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At least according to Madison’s notes, there was almost no discussion of
the clause on the Convention floor after it was proposed by the Committee.
The words “altering or” were dropped without recorded discussion. 424 Elbridge Gerry, the only speaker to discuss the clause, moved that the clause
apply to the federal government as well as the states, but no one seconded his
motion. After Gerry’s unsuccessful motion, the Convention adjourned. When
they reconvened the following day, they moved on to other topics. That is the
only record we have of the Convention’s consideration of the Committee of
Style’s proposal. 425
There was little discussion of the clause during the ratification debates.
Antifederalists Patrick Henry 426 and James Galloway 427 suggested that the
clause might reach contracts between the states and private individuals. By
contrast, Antifederalist delegates to the Convention like George Mason and
Luther Martin did not explicitly address whether the clause applied to public
contracts. 428 In general, when Federalists discussed the clause, they spoke of
its application to private contracts; Convention delegate William Davie was
the only Federalist to state clearly that the clause “refer[red] merely to contracts between individuals.” 429
Nonetheless, in the years following the Convention, two Committee of Style
members stated that the clause reached public contracts. In Chisholm v. Georgia,
Justice Wilson opined that the Contract Clause applied to public contracts:
What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State
might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling judiciary power? We
have seen, that on the principles of general jurisprudence, a State, for the
breach of a contract, may be liable for damages. 430

424. Compare 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 619 (reporting the approved text of
the Contract Clause and noting that it had been “altered” from the prior version), with Report
of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 596–97 (presenting Contract Clause reported by the
Committee of Style).
425. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 619.
426. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 474 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 2d ed. 1836)
(“The expression includes public contracts, as well as private contracts between individuals.”).
427. 4 id. at 190–91 (“That clause of the Constitution may compel us to make good the
nominal value of these [public] securities.”).
428. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 16
(1938). Scholars have debated whether these statements implicitly reflect the understanding that
the Contract Clause was limited to private contracts or whether they are simply silent on the issue.
Compare id. at 12–16 (arguing that statements reflect understanding that the clause was limited to
private contracts), with JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 20 (2016) (contending that statements “cast [no] light on the subject”).
429. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 350.
430. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Alexander Hamilton, in the opinion he wrote for property owners who
held land pursuant to the contested Yazoo land grant from Georgia, took the
same position. Hamilton argued that the Georgia legislature’s statute overturning its prior land grant was unconstitutional under the contract clause
because public contracts fell within the ambit of the clause:
Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a state or an individual, is virtually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted
against the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that
taking the terms of the constitution in their large sense, and giving them effect
according to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, the revocation of
the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia, may justly be considered as
contrary to the constitution of the United States, and, therefore, null. 431

Similarly, in his jury charge in the case of Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance,
former Convention delegate Justice William Paterson declared that a state
statute repealing a land grant “impairs the obligation of a contract, and is
therefore void.” 432 And when Chief Justice Marshall applied the Contracts
Clause to a land grant in Fletcher v. Peck, 433 his opinion was consistent with
the opinions of Hamilton, Wilson, and Paterson. 434
Focusing on the absence of the word “private” in the Contract Clause,
Douglas Kmiec and John McGinnis have argued that Fletcher is consistent
with the original understanding of the clause. 435 Making that textual argument
as well as pointing to the evidence of Hamilton, Wilson, and Paterson’s statements, Professor James Ely has reached the same conclusion. 436
This is, however, a minority view. In his classic study The Contract Clause
of the Constitution, Benjamin Wright argues that the the Contracts Clause was
originally understood to apply only to private contracts. Wright’s argument
rests on the view that the Constitution’s language was modeled on the Northwest Ordinance. 437 Pulitzer Prize historian Leonard Levy similarly declares
that the Court “transmogrified” the Contract Clause by departing from the
clearly established original understanding that the Contract Clause applied

431. 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 430, 431 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph
H. Smith eds., 1980).
432. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 320, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1019 (Paterson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa.
1795) (No. 16,857).
433. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
434. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 137–39.
435. Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 538–39 (1987).
436. ELY, supra note 428, at 19 (“I wish to challenge this conventional wisdom and to propose . . . that the contract clause could fairly be construed to safeguard both private and public
contracts from state abridgement . . . .”).
437. See WRIGHT, supra note 428, at 4–8, 27–34; see also ELY, supra note 428, at 19
(“Wright and others appear to proceed on the problematic assumption that the clause was
simply intended to replicate the earlier provision in the Northwest Ordinance.”).
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only to private contracts in Fletcher. 438 That view continues to hold sway.
Thus, Professor Bradford Clark wrote in the Harvard Law Review in 2010 that
“the clause was generally understood to apply only to private contracts between individuals, not to a state’s own contracts” and that it “was modeled on
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.” 439
The Contract Clause, then, fits into the pattern we have seen previously:
the Committee of Style’s draft departed from prior language (the Northwest
Ordinance’s contract clause) in ways that reflected Morris’s views. In the years
after ratification, members of the Committee (and, once again, Wilson and
Hamilton) drew on the clause to advance views that they shared with Morris.
Nonetheless, leading academic commentators have read the clause by focusing on the Convention debates before the Committee began its work, rather
on the text and the way it was construed in the early republic.
F. Presidential Succession Clause
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act
as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President
and Vice President; and such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. 440
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
[T]he Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until
the disability be removed, or the period for chusing another president arrive. 441

When rearranging the Constitution’s text on presidential succession,
Morris changed “officer of the United States” to “officer.” While other changes
made by Morris and the Committee of Style have had more impact on our
constitutional history, this is one of the changes that has received the most
scholarly attention (although the fact that Morris was the author of the change
has once again been ignored). 442 In part, that attention reflects the significance
438. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 132 (1988).
439. Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1817, 1907 (2010); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 545 & n.257 (1997).
440. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 573 (Article X, Section 1).
441. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 598–99 (Article II, Section 1, Clause e).
442. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Essay, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 115–16, 118–19 (1995); John F. Manning, Response
Essay, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48
STAN. L. REV. 141, 142–45 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, Response Essay, The Political Question of
Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 158–59 (1995); Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
959, 1019–22 (2010); Tillman, supra note 275, at 111 n.117; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
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of the text. Depending on how the clause is read, the statute that places the
speaker of the House second in the line of presidential succession after the vice
president may be unconstitutional. 443 And in part it presents an intellectual
puzzle for originalists, since the text that was referred to the Committee of
Style and Madison’s reading of the text proposed by the Committee of Style
point to one understanding of who can succeed the president, whereas the text
of the Succession Clause and the First Congress’s interpretation of it in light
of other constitutional provisions point to another.
Until late in the Convention’s proceedings, the Constitution did not provide for a vice president. The draft Constitution provided that the president
was to be succeeded by the president of the Senate up to the end of August. 444
Morris objected to this proposal and suggested that the chief justice should be
the presidential successor. He did not offer an explanation, but in the same
speech, he referenced his proposal that the chief justice be part of the president’s cabinet, which suggests that his preference for the chief justice stemmed
from his belief that the chief justice might counsel the president and be part
of his cabinet. 445 Madison followed Morris and also objected to the designation of the Senate president, although it was not because of the possibility that
the chief justice would be in the cabinet. 446 Since the delegates were contemplating a new election if a president died, Madison argued that if the president
of the Senate were acting president, the Senate “might retard the appointment
of a President in order to carry points whilst the revisionary power was in the
President of their own body.” 447
The delegates returned to this clause after they had decided to create the
vice presidency. Randolph then proposed what is, in substance, the first Succession Clause above—in which Congress has the power to establish which
“officer of the [United States]” shall succeed the president and vice president. 448 The one difference between the Randolph proposal and the clause referred to the Committee of Style is that, in Randolph’s proposal, the
designated “officer of the [United States]” would have served “until the time
of electing a President shall arrive.” 449 Madison objected that the language
“would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election.” 450 He
proposed the substitute language “until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” Morris seconded the proposal, which narrowly
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113,
1207–08 (2003).
443. See 3 U.S.C. § 19.
444. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 186.
445. Id. at 427.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 535.
449. Id.
450. Id.
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passed—six states to four, with one state divided. One ground for objection
was that Congress should not be limited to selecting only “officers of the
[United States]” to fill the vacancy. 451 “They wished it to be at liberty to appoint others than such,” Madison observes in his notes. 452 He does not indicate who voiced this objection, although presumably Morris was not among
this group since he had seconded Madison’s proposal.
The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 provides that sitting
members of Congress cannot hold “any Office under the United States.” 453
The standard reading is that because of the Incompatibility Clause, members
of Congress are not “officers of the United States.” 454 Thus, if the terminology
in the two clauses are read to have consistent meanings, as the Succession
Clause was submitted to the Committee of Style, Congress was empowered to
place members of the executive and judicial branch in the line of presidential
succession, but not members of Congress.
But Morris’s beliefs at the time may not have aligned with this textual inference, as he seems to have believed members of Congress would be in the
presidential line of succession. Shortly after the delegates voted to adopt the
language concerning presidential succession and “officer[s] of the United
States,” in a debate concerning who would preside over the Senate, Morris observed that “[i]f there should be no vice president, the President of the Senate
would be temporary successor.” 455 Although Morris did not develop this statement (or, at least, Madison did not record any further explanation), Morris appears to have believed that, if something happened to the vice president, the
president of the Senate would become the “temporary” vice president. 456
When Congress passed the first Succession Act in 1792, it placed the president pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker as next in the line of succession following the vice president. 457 During the debate over the statute, a
number of Republican congressman unsuccessfully argued that, as a constitutional matter, members of Congress could not be in the line of succession because they were not “officers.” Jonathan Sturges declared that he “could not
find that the Speaker of the House, or President of the Senate pro tem. were
officers of the Government in the sense contemplated by the Constitution.” 458
William Branch Giles agreed: “The characters referred to he did not think

451. Id. (cleaned up).
452. Id.
453. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
454. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 442, at 115, 118–19; Manning, supra note 442, at
142; Calabresi, supra note 442, at 159; Goldstein, supra note 442, at 1020.
455. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 537.
456. See Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1703, 1707 n.15 (1988) (reading this statement of Morris’s to mean that if the vice president
were to die, the president of the Senate would be next in the line of succession).
457. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
458. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 281 (1791).
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were officers.” 459 Madison had the same view of the presidential Succession
Clause, observing in a letter that Congress “certainly err[ed]” and “it may be
questioned whether [the Speaker and president pro tempore] are officers, in
the constitutional sense.” 460
Madison and the other Republicans seem to have read “officer” as having
the same meaning as “officer of the United States,” even though the Committee of Style had deleted “of the United States” from the clause. They imposed
a restriction on who was an “officer” that neither the final provision itself nor
related provisions of the Constitution imposed. Indeed, a couple of representatives read the Constitution as if the Committee of Style had not altered the
clause. Alexander White “observed[] that the Constitution says the vacancy
shall be filled by an officer of the United States. The President, pro tempore, of
the Senate[] is not an officer of the United States.” 461 Similarly, in contending
that the secretary of state should be first in the line of succession, William
Loughton Smith noted that “by the Constitution, the vacancy is to be filled
with an officer of the United States. This narrows the discussion very
much.” 462 Both White and Smith asserted that “of the United States” was part
of the clause, even though that language had been removed.
In contrast, Federalist congressman took the position that the speaker and
the president pro tempore were “officers” within the meaning of the Constitution and could thus be placed in the line of succession. Elbridge Gerry, defending the bill, asked: “[I]f [the Speaker] is not an officer, what is he? [Gerry]
then read a clause from the Constitution, which says that the House shall
choose their Speaker and other officers.” 463 Theodore Sedgwick was surprised
to hear the idea controverted, believing it was clear that the Speaker of the
House and the president pro tempore of the Senate were officers. “In common
parlance he was sure there was no difficulty in the matter.” 464
Originalist scholars have disagreed about how to read the clause. Professor Akhil Amar and Dean Vikram Amar, who have written the leading essay
arguing that the current succession statute is unconstitutional, contend that
“[t]here is considerable historical evidence that the Constitution’s drafters
used the term ‘Officer’ in the Succession Clause as shorthand for ‘Officer of

459. Id.
460. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 235, 235–36 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
461. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1854 (1791).
462. Id.
463. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 281 (1791).
464. Id. For discussion of the debate about the first succession bill, see JOHN D. FEERICK,
FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 57–62 (1965).
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the United States.’ ” 465 They note the Committee of Style’s change but dismiss
it as irrelevant. 466
In support of the competing view that members of Congress can be placed
in the line of succession, Dean Manning has countered that the Committee of
Style’s language should be given effect because it is the text that was ratified:
[E]ven if the Committee of Style acted ultra vires by making substantive
changes to the text, the ratifiers accepted them. . . . [T]he natural import of the
text submitted to the States would be . . . that the unrestricted term “Officers”
is broader than the phrase “Officers of the United States.” Thus, the drafting
history does not provide a convincing textual argument for reading the Succession Clause to exclude members of Congress from the line of succession. 467

The change that Morris made here is unlike the other changes surveyed
in this Article, which clearly advanced goals that Morris had unsuccessfully
fought for. That is not the case here. At the same time, examination of related
arguments Morris made at the Convention suggest that he would have favored
giving Congress the power to place congressional officers in the line of succession (which is what the revised text did). Morris had originally favored the
chief justice succeeding the president, but that was at a stage in the proceedings when the chief justice would have been (if Morris had his way) in the
presidential cabinet. That rationale disappeared when Morris’s proposal that
the chief justice be in the cabinet was not accepted.
Since his earlier rationale for favoring the Chief Justice no longer applied,
Morris may have changed the text because he thought the line of succession
should be opened up. He generally favored giving Congress discretion to
frame rules—as with his Preamble or his Qualifications Clause, which gave
the House and the Senate power to establish requirements for membership—
and that position suggests that he would have favored giving Congress wide
discretion in framing the line of presidential succession. Moreover, his statement on the Convention floor about the president of the Senate being in the
line of succession suggests that he read the pre-revision text to permit congressional members to be in the line of succession. The Committee of Style
revision would then have been consistent with his overarching belief in the
importance of congressional discretion, and it would have strengthened the
reading he already gave to the Succession Clause.
Alternatively, this change may have been a drafting error or, as the Amars
suggests, “officer” may have been a “shorthand” for “officer of the United
States.” But Morris was consistently a careful drafter, which suggests that the
change was intentional and that he meant to include members of Congress as
potential officers in the line of succession.

465. Amar & Amar, supra note 442, at 116.
466. See id. (“A later style committee deleted the words ‘of the United States,’ but no evidence suggests that this style change was meant to change meaning.”).
467. Manning, supra note 442, at 144–45.
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It is also noteworthy that, in the debates about the Presidential Succession
Act, the Federalist congressmen read “officer” to mean “officer,” whereas Republicans read “officer” as meaning “officer of the United States.” Historians
and legal scholars have repeatedly concluded that the two parties’ constitutional positions were driven by partisan interests: Republicans wanted Jefferson (the secretary of state) to be first in the line of succession after the vice
president, while Federalists wanted the Federalist president of the Senate to
have that position. 468 But this is not a convincing explanation: the Federalists
could have advanced their partisan interests by fighting to place Hamilton (the
treasury secretary) in the line of succession after the vice president. The fight
over succession is, however, consistent with a deeper difference in constitutional interpretation: In this instance as in others, the Federalists carefully
parsed constitutional text, whereas Republicans engaged in looser construction. Although they clearly did not want to elevate Jefferson, Federalists may
also have used the tighter construction here, not for partisan reasons, but because they had a consistent interpretive approach.
G. Impeachment Clauses
During the Convention debates, Morris initially opposed presidential impeachment, but he changed his mind and ultimately championed expansive
grounds for impeachment. 469 The impeachment provision referred to the
Committee was not as broad as Morris wanted, and in the Committee report
he revised the text to expand the grounds for impeachment and bring it closer
to the conception he had unsuccessfully argued for.
While Morris did not prevail in the floor debates about the scope of impeachment, he did successfully place the trial of the impeached official in the
Senate. On the Committee, he inserted language to consolidate his win by
making clear that the Senate was the only possible forum for trial.
1.

High Crimes and Misdemeanors

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
[The president] shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the
House of representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery
or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States . . . . 470

468. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 142 (1997); Amar & Amar, supra note 442, at 132; Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 459–60 (1949).
469.
470.

See supra Section II.B.2.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575 (Article X, Section 2).
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REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall
be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 471

Morris dropped the phrase “against the United States” from the Impeachment Clause. “[O]ther high crimes and misdemeanors against the United
States” became simply “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The question
whether this change was legally consequential played a central role in the debate about whether the impeachment of President Clinton for acts not related
to his exercise of office was constitutionally permissible, 472 and it has been raised
more recently with respect to President Trump (although it was not at issue
in his impeachment trial). 473 The issue is whether the Constitution’s language
makes impeachable activity that is criminal (or not criminal but wrong in some
significant way) but that is not related to the president’s performance in office. 474 Thus, scholars have debated whether lying to a grand jury about an affair
or financial crimes related to business activities would be impeachable. 475
The dominant view among academics is that the change in language should
be ignored and the clause should be read as if it still contained the “against the
United States” language. As Professor Cass Sunstein has recently written:
Was the deletion designed to broaden the legitimate grounds for impeachment? That is extremely unlikely. As its name suggests, the Committee on
Style and Arrangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny
that it made some substantive changes), and it is far more likely that this
particular change was made on grounds of redundancy. 476

Professor Jack Rakove, another leading adherent of this view, observes
that Morris was a champion of a strong executive and an opponent of impeachment; as a result, the Committee of Style’s change should not be understood to increase the range of impeachable offenses. 477 This approach, which
has been called the “executive function” approach, contends that, despite the

471. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 600 (Article II, Section 4).
472. See Jonathan Turley, Congress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives
in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 735, 737 (1999).
473. See, e.g., ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHMENT 4–5 (2017).
474. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 122–23 (2017); Andrew
Kent, Congress and the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927,
1996 (2019).
475. See LICHTMAN, supra note 473, at 46–47; Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 687 (1999); Turley, supra note
472, at 746–47; Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other
Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1795–96 (1999) [hereinafter Turley, Executive
Function Theory]; Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a
Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 100 (1999).
476. SUNSTEIN, supra note 474, at 48.
477. Rakove, supra note 475, at 687 n.25.
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change in language, the president can only be impeached for acts related to
the exercise of his office, not for personal acts. 478 Like Rakove, Professor Jonathan Turley, the leading voice on the other side of the originalist debate during the Clinton impeachment (although the leading academic opponent of
President Trump’s impeachment), has acknowledged that Morris “represented the original extreme wing on impeachment, opposing any impeachment for the chief executive.” 479 Turley is unable to explain why Morris might
have made the change, but Turley’s broader conception of the clause focuses
on both the ratified text and history. 480
What these accounts both miss is that, as discussed above, 481 Morris
changed his mind about impeachment. He initially opposed it but ultimately
favored a broad conception of impeachable offenses:
He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would
say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst it by displacing
him. . . . [He] ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery[,] Corrupting
his electors, and incapacity . . . . 482

Morris’s statement suggests that he did not remove “against the United
States” because it was redundant. Rather, he had a capacious view of when
impeachment was appropriate, including circumstances like “incapacity” and
“Corrupting his electors” that could fall outside the ambit of acts as president;
while “high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States” is typically
read as limited to official acts, the deletion provided textual support for making impeachable “high crimes and misdemeanors” that did not arise from acts
as president.
A related question raised by the change in the text is whether it was designed to make “maladministration” impeachable, an outcome Morris favored. 483 Madison’s notes are often read as reflecting a compromise: Mason
proposes maladministration; Madison objects that this would give Congress
unconstrained ability to remove from office a president it disagreed with;
Morris defends “maladministration”; Mason yields to Madison and offers

478. The term “executive function” is Professor Jonathan Turley’s (although he is a critic
of this approach). Turley, Executive Function Theory, supra note 475.
479. Id. at 1814.
480. Id. at 1813–14.
481. See supra Section II.B.
482. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 68–69.
483. He spoke on behalf of Mason’s proposal that “maladministration” be grounds for impeachment. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 550. When an earlier impeachment clause
had been under consideration, he had argued that officers should be impeachable for “malversation,” id. at 344, and the New York Constitution of 1777 (of which he was one of the principal
drafters) made “mal and corrupt conduct” impeachable. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIII.
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“high crimes and misdemeanors” as a narrowing substitute. 484 The problem
with this account is that, according to Blackstone, maladministration is one
example of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” 485 Thus, under one view Mason
“snookered” 486 Madison—expanding the scope of the clause while pretending
to narrow it.
At the same time, the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors against the
United States” suggests a narrowing construction of the clause. The phrase
“against the United States” implies that the scope of the term would be independently determined in the United States without relying on British precedent. While maladministration might be impeachable in Great Britain, the
House and Senate might determine that it was not a “high crime[] and misdemeanor[] against the United States.” In contrast, Morris’s deleting “against the
United States” textually supports continuity with British precedent. Thus,
Morris’s removal of the phrase strengthened the textual argument that a president could be impeached for maladministration and for acts outside the scope
of his office.
The controversy over how to read the Impeachment Clause—and the type
of activities that were impeachable—was central to the first impeachment under the Constitution and only impeachment of the Federalist era, that of Republican senator William Blount. Blount was charged by the House with
conspiring to launch a military attack against Spain in order to win the Louisiana territories and Florida for Great Britain. 487 In the Senate, defense counsel
Alexander Dallas mounted a series of jurisdictional arguments, including the
argument that only acts committed by an officer in his official capacity could
be the basis of impeachment: “[O]fficial offences and offenders were alone
contemplated.” 488 House manager James A. Bayard, a Federalist, responded
with an appeal to text: “[T]here is not a syllable in the Constitution which
confines impeachment to official acts . . . .” 489 The Senate ultimately acquitted
Blount, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. 490 Blount had made a series of other
jurisdictional arguments in addition to his argument about the scope of impeachable offenses, including that senators are not “civil officers” within the
meaning of the Impeachment Clause and that he could not be impeached
since he had resigned from office. 491

484. Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595,
630 (2010).
485. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121.
486. Neil Kinkopf, The Scope of “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” After the Impeachment
of President Clinton, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 201, 209.
487. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 156 (1998).
488. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2269 (1799).
489. Id. at 2261.
490. Id. at 2319.
491. See id. at 2269, 2278.
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The Senate resolution does not state which jurisdictional ground (or
grounds) it relied on, and scholars have argued about what the basis of the
decision was, with many contending that the decision reflected a determination that a Senator is not impeachable. 492 Moreover, even as Blount was acquitted, there had been significant support for conviction, with a majority of
Federalist senators voting against Blount. 493 The critical point is that there
were competing readings of the text, and once again the Federalist position
was to parse the text closely.
2.

Trial by the Senate

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeachments . . . . 494
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. 495

Unlike his other changes, Morris added the word “sole” not to overturn a
defeat but to consolidate a victory. Morris had prevailed in the relevant floor
vote. Madison had argued that, after impeachment by the House, trial should
be by the Supreme Court. According to Madison, if trial was by the Senate, the
president “was made improperly dependent.” 496 Pinckney agreed with Madison and was also concerned that trial in the Senate would “render[] the President too dependent on the Legislature.” 497 Morris countered that “[t]he
Supreme Court were too few in number and might be warped or corrupted.” 498 Morris prevailed by a vote of nine to two. 499
This clause was at issue in United States v. Nixon. 500 Former judge Walter
Nixon argued that the Supreme Court could review his Senate trial despite the

492. See Benjamin Cassady, “You’ve Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine”: Why the Disqualification Clause Doesn’t (Always) Disqualify, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209, 220 (2014) (arguing
members of Congress are not impeachable); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Let Me Be Blunt: In Blount,
the Senate Never Said that Senators Aren’t Impeachable, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 33, 35 (2014)
(rejecting this view); Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & the Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 75–76 (2014) (finding the view that senators are not
impeachable “reasonable”).
493. Brian C. Kalt, Presidential Impeachment and Removal: From the Two-Party System to
the Two-Reality System, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 6 n.24 (2019).
494. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 572 (Article IX, Section 1).
495. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 592 (Article I, Section 3, Clause e).
496. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 551.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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Impeachment Clause’s provision making the Senate the “sole” trial authority. 501 According to Nixon, the Committee of Style adding the word “sole” was
a “cosmetic edit” without substance. 502 The opinion found against the judge
on several grounds. Significantly, it relied on the Powell Court’s accepting that
“the Committee of Style had no authority from the Convention to alter the
meaning of the Clause,” 503 but it also stated that “we must presume that the
Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the
Framers meant in their unadorned language.” 504 The Court assumed that the
two versions of the clause have the same meaning. 505 Between all the changes
Morris made as the Committee’s drafter, this is the one instance in which this
assumption is consistent with the Convention votes: Morris had won, and he
was trying to clarify the text so that it did not permit a reading inconsistent
with his victory.
Adding “sole” closed off the argument that there could be other venues
for the trial. Madison’s proposal that the Supreme Court try the case was not
clearly barred by the Committee of Detail’s language, but it was clearly barred
by the new language. The Committee of Style’s language made the clause for
the Senate parallel with the clause for the House, which provided that the
House “shall have the sole power of impeachment.” 506 The change reinforced
the point that the Senate alone could try the cases. Had the change not been
made, the difference between the two clauses would have made possible the
argument that other venues for the trial were possible (since “only” the House
could impeach but there was no similar statement about the Senate). Morris
revised the constitutional language so that his victory on the floor would not
be subsequently undercut.
H. The Federal Judiciary
The one area in which Morris admitted having used his role on the Committee to deceptively change the Constitution’s meaning was in his treatment
of the judiciary (although he did not specify what exactly he had done). 507
During the floor debates, Morris had been a fierce advocate of a strong federal
judiciary. The provisions referred to the Committee were at odds with his views
in two ways: Congress was not required to establish lower federal courts (although it was allowed to do so), and the text did not give federal courts the

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Nixon, 506 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 231.
Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538–39 (1969)).
Id.
See infra Section IV.B.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 591.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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power of judicial review. 508 In both areas, Morris changed the text to advance
his goals.
1.

Judicial Vesting Clause

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary,
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States. 509
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. 510

Morris’s crafting of three parallel articles with three (largely) parallel
Vesting Clauses has already been discussed. It reflected his desire to elevate
the judiciary (and the executive) to equal stature with Congress. 511 He also
made a substantive change to the Article III Vesting Clause, and that change
bore on the creation of lower federal courts.
After the question of whether to empower Congress to create lower federal courts divided the Convention, the Madisonian Compromise empowered
Congress to create lower federal courts but did not require it to do so. The
compromise provided “that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.” 512 In explaining this language, Wilson and Madison said
it gave Congress “discretion . . . to establish or not establish” lower federal
courts. 513 The Committee of Detail then wrote the language quoted above,
which also reflected the Madisonian Compromise’s vesting Congress with the
discretion to create (or not create) lower federal courts. 514 On the Committee
of Style, Morris wrote text to reverse this decision. Consistent with his commitment to a strong judiciary and national power, he devised language best read to
mandate that Congress create lower federal courts. 515 Congress’s power to “constitute[]” lower courts “when necessary” became language that can be read as
a mandate to “ordain and establish” inferior courts “from time to time.”
In the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, Madison contended that the
Constitution permitted Congress to empower state courts to act as federal

508. See supra Section II.C.
509. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575 (Article XI, Section 1).
510. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 600 (Article III, Section 1).
511. See supra Section II.C.
512. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125. For prior discussion of the Madisonian
Compromise, see supra text accompanying notes 173–176.
513. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 125.
514. See Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575.
515. See supra text accompanying notes 170–176.
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courts. 516 But Morris had drafted text that was repeatedly invoked as mandating the congressional obligation to create lower federal courts. William Smith,
the “primary spokesperson for the federalists,” 517 argued that the word “shall”
and the text as a whole mandated creating lower federal courts:
The words, “shall be vested,” have great energy, they are words of command;
they leave no discretion to Congress to parcel out the Judicial powers of the
Union to State judicatures . . . .
Does not, then, the constitution, in the plainest and most unequivocal
language, preclude us from allotting any part of the Judicial authority of the
Union to the State judicature? 518

Egbert Benson denounced a proposal that would have given lower federal
courts only the admiralty jurisdiction as inconsistent with the Constitution’s
text. “It is not left to the election of the Legislature of the United States whether
we adopt or not a judicial system like the one before us; the words in the constitution are plain and full, and must be carried into operation,” Benson remarked. 519 Elbridge Gerry declared: “You cannot make Federal courts of the
State courts, because the constitution is an insuperable bar . . . . We are to administer this constitution, and therefore we are bound to establish these
courts, let what will be the consequence.” 520 And Fisher Ames once again read
Morris’s text in accordance with their shared constitutional vision. Opposing
a motion that would have barred creating lower federal courts, Ames expressed the conclusion
that offences against statutes of the United States, and actions, the cognizance whereof is created de novo, are exclusively of federal jurisdiction . . . .
These, with the admiralty jurisdiction, which it is agreed must be provided
for, constitute the principal powers of the district[] courts. 521

Most tellingly, Morris read his own text to require establishment of lower
federal courts. During the debate over the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801,
then-Senator Morris and then stated that the Article III Vesting Clause
amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. . . . In declaring
then that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress shall
ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not
the express words, of the Constitution. The Convention in framing, the

516. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 812–13 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also William A.
Fletcher, Lecture, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Meaning of
the Word “All” in Article III, 59 DUKE L.J. 929, 942–43 (2010).
517. Fletcher, supra note 516, at 941.
518. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 818–19 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
519. Id. at 835.
520. Id. at 860.
521. Id. at 839.
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American people in adopting, that compact, did not, could not presume, that
the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do. 522

The delegates had agreed to a compromise under which Congress did not
have to create lower federal courts. As Morris’s view of the text indicates, however, he had written language that was read by a range of political leaders (including himself) to mandate creating lower federal courts. In following the
Madisonian Compromise, the Court and leading commentators have relied on
the debates and failed to see that Morris changed the text and that he and other
Federalists read this text in a way at odds with the Madisonian Compromise.
The leading exponent of reading this text as requiring the creation of
lower federal courts was the constitutional historian Julius Goebel. In his 1971
account of the historical antecedents of the Supreme Court, Goebel wrote:
The effect of eliminating the words “as shall, when necessary” was to deprive
Congress of power to decide upon the need for inferior courts and so to give
full imperative effect to the declaration that “The judicial power . . . shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts . . . .” That the Committee intended to convey the sense of an imperative is apparent from the
choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary constitutional vocabulary—“ordain and establish”—to direct what Congress was to do. 523

522. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 79 (1802). For discussion, see Michael G. Collins, Article III
Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 63.
523. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 247 (1971). Two well-known arguments that appear
similar to Goebel’s but that are in fact dissimilar should be noted. Justice Story in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee found a constitutional mandate to establish lower federal courts, but Story did
not base his position on the language Goebel (“may from time to time”) construed. 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304 (1816). Justice Story’s conclusion was based on the observation that “[i]f congress
may lawfully omit to establish inferior courts, it might follow, that in some of the enumerated
cases the judicial power could nowhere exist.” Id. at 330. Similarly, Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205
(1985), argues for a broad range of cases in which federal jurisdiction is mandated but denies
that Congress must create lower federal courts. Id. at 206 (“Thus, following Hart, I seek to establish that the Framers did not intend to require the creation of lower federal courts; but, following
Story, I shall show that they did require that some federal court—supreme or inferior—be open,
at trial or on appeal, to hear and resolve finally any given federal question, admiralty, or public
ambassador case.”).
Professor James Pfander’s reading of the Article III Vesting Clause is closer to Goebel’s.
“To ‘ordain,’ ” Professor Pfander writes,
means to invest with official power and to “establish” means to erect or settle permanently. The combined requirements of investiture, creation, and permanent settlement
seemingly refer to the creation of a distinctive set of new federal courts, rather than to the
re-designation or appointment of an existing state court.

James E. Pfander, Essay, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 203 (2007). Under Pfander’s reading
of the clause, Morris converted language of discretion to language mandating “the creation of a
distinctive set of new federal courts.” Id.
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Goebel’s argument that Congress had a constitutional obligation to create
lower federal courts under the Judicial Vesting Clause has been the subject of
overwhelming criticism. Some scholars disagree with Goebel because they
read the text of the clause differently. “[I]t remains to be seen that the words
‘ordain and establish’ are significantly more imperative than the phrasing of
the original draft,” Professors Redish and Woods contend. 524 But the principal
criticism of Goebel’s reading is that it is inconsistent with the Madisonian
Compromise. For example, Professor Robert Clinton writes:
Goebel’s claim seems insupportable insofar as it suggests the tacit adoption
by the Committee of a mandatory obligation by Congress to establish inferior federal courts. Such a conclusion is contradicted by the almost unquestioned adherence of the Convention to the Madisonian compromise and the
limited charge of the Committee of Style “to revise the style of and arrange
the articles agreed to by the House.” 525

Professor David Engdahl argues that “Goebel’s attribution of deft sleight-ofhand to subvert the June 5th compromise dishonors the Style Committee
members and supposes the other delegates fools.” 526
Like these academic commentators, the Supreme Court’s leading
originalists have also assumed that the Article III Vesting Clause embodies the
Madisonian Compromise. Writing for the Court in Printz v. United States,
Justice Scalia observed that “[i]n accord with the so-called Madisonian Compromise, Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court, and made the creation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress.” 527 And in upholding
a jurisdiction-stripping statute in Patchak v. Zinke, Justice Thomas, writing for
a plurality of the Court, found that congressional statutes stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction were constitutional because of the Madisonian Compromise. 528 “[T]he so-called Madisonian Compromise,” he stated, “resolved the
Framers’ disagreement about creating lower federal courts by leaving that decision to Congress.” 529
524. Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction
of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 61 (1975);
see also Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV.
17, 34 n.47, 68–74, 88 (1981) (accepting Madisonian Compromise and criticizing Goebel).
525. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest
for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 794 n.169 (1984) (quoting 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 547); accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1217 (1988) (“Although some Nationalists have argued
that this language requires the creation of lower federal courts and their investiture with sweeping jurisdiction, this view is implausible in light of the Madisonian Compromise.”).
526. David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch,
1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 105 n.109.
527. 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
528. 138 S. Ct. 897, 903, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion).
529. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906.
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What the Court and the leading scholarly voices have missed, once again,
is that here (as elsewhere) Morris’s goal was not to comply with the Convention’s decisions but to overturn them. In arguing that the Article III Vesting
Clause is inconsistent with the Convention’s prior decision, even Goebel failed
to recognize that the Committee’s changes were part of a broader pattern of
revisions by Morris.
2.

Law-of-the-Land Provision

PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the
authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States,
and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall
be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the constitutions or laws of
the several States to the contrary notwithstanding. 530
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 531

Because the Constitution does not explicitly state that federal courts have
the power to invalidate federal statutes, the popular view—most prominently
associated with Alexander Bickel—is that judicial review was not part of the
original understanding and was created out of whole cloth in Marbury v. Madison. 532 Because judicial review is thus thought to operate outside of the original constitutional framework established by “We the People,” for Bickel and
others the conflict between judicial review and popular governance gives rise
to the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” 533 As Professor Barry Friedman observes, “The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ . . . has been the focal point of
modern constitutional scholarship.” 534
This account overlooks a great deal. There was a significant body of judicial-review caselaw before the Constitutional Convention, the overwhelming

530. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575 (Article VIII).
531. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603 (Article VI).
532. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (2d ed. 1962) (“If any social progress can be said to have been ‘done’ at a
given time and by a given act, it is Marshall’s achievement. The time was 1803; the act was the
decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison.”).
533. See id. at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force
in our system.”).
534. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998).
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majority of delegates at the Convention who spoke about judicial review were
in favor of it, judicial review was endorsed during the ratifying debates, and
state and federal courts frequently exercised the power in the years before
Marbury. 535 Because of these factors, the conventional view among academics
is that judicial review was established before Marbury. 536
It is also generally accepted by academics that the text of the Constitution
does not provide a basis for judicial review by federal courts of federal statutes. 537 This standard understanding, however, overlooks the “law of the land”
language that Morris added to the Constitution. Challenging the conventional
wisdom, a handful of scholars have recently recognized that the law-of-theland provision authorizes federal courts to review federal statutes for constitutionality. 538
The history of the law-of-the-land language follows what should now be
a familiar pattern. Morris (and others who also served on the Committee of
Style) supported judicial review on the Convention floor, but the text referred
to the Committee did not explicitly provide for judicial review. 539 By adding
the law-of-the-land formulation to the Supremacy Clause, Morris and the
Committee revised the text in a way that advanced their ends. Committee
members Hamilton and Wilson subsequently drew on this language in contending that the Constitution provided for judicial review.
The relevant clause in the Committee of Detail’s draft had mandated that
state courts be governed by the federal constitution: “[T]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens
and Inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in
their Decisions.” 540 The exclusive focus is on the states and their courts. The
Constitution is “the supreme law of the several States.” The Committee of

See Treanor, supra note 202 (discussing origins of judicial review).
See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF
CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 38–59 (2019); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 124–27 (2004); SYLVIA
SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 6, 37–38 (1990); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5, 87–88
(2001); Treanor, supra note 202.
537. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 79–84 (1991); John O. McGinnis, The Duty of
Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 857–59 (2016); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation
in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 429 (1998); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16–22.
538. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 907 (2003). Prakash and Yoo also see Article III, Section
2 as a textual basis for judicial review. See id. at 901–02.
539. See supra Section II.C.2.
540. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 169.
535.
536.
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Style dramatically altered the sentence’s import by providing that “this Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land.” Both federal and state
judges must now review statutes for consistency with the federal constitution.
Committee of Style members played a crucial role in establishing the lawof-the-land provision as the basis for judicial review. In Federalist 16, Hamilton stated that judges had the power to pronounce a statute “contrary to the
supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and void.” 541 In Federalist 33, he
stated that congressional statutes “which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers . . . will [not] become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely
acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such.” 542
James Wilson also invoked the law-of-the-land provision as the basis for
judicial review in his lectures on the law. He stated that when a congressional
statute was “manifestly repugnant to some part of the constitution,” a federal
court would have “the right and . . . the duty” to invalidate it because the rules
given by the “supreme power of the United States . . . [are] the law of the land”
and “contradictory rule[s]” by “subordinate power[s] . . . [are] necessar[il]y
void.” 543
Wilson deployed this same line of argument as a Supreme Court justice.
In 1792, the Supreme Court first confronted the question of whether to enforce an unconstitutional statute in Hayburn’s Case. Riding Circuit, Wilson,
along with Justice Blair and Judge Peters, invoked the law-of-the-land provision as support for their decision to refuse to follow the Invalid Pensioners
Act. 544 The law-of-the-land provision also was critical to another important
pre-Marbury judicial-review case, Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance. Justice Paterson, a former Convention delegate, told the jury that the Constitution

541. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 103, NO. 16, at 100 (Alexander Hamilton). For discussion of Hamilton’s views, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116
YALE L.J. 502, 554–55 (2006).
542. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 103, NO. 33, at 201–02 (Alexander Hamilton). While
Hamilton in Federalist 33 does not explicitly discuss judicial invalidation of unconstitutional
statutes, it is implicitly embraced—particularly in light of Hamilton’s argument for judicial review of congressional statutes in Federalist 78. See Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319, 331 & n.84 (2003).
543. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 329–30 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). For
discussion of Wilson’s position, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall,
James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 164–65 (2003).
544. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411 n.† (1792) (“This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound,
by oath or affirmation, to support.’ ”). For discussion of Justice Wilson’s opinion in Hayburn’s
Case, see Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 527, 533–34; Treanor, supra note 202, at 533–38.
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contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land;
it is paramount to the power of the legislature . . . .
....
. . . [I]f a legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle . . . it will be
the duty of the court to adhere to the Constitution, and to declare the act null
and void. 545

And although it does not play a central role in the decision, the law-of-theland provision was similarly invoked by Chief Justice Marshall in his final argument in Marbury:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned;
and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 546

Once again, commentators have failed to recognize either how Morris
changed the meaning of the text or how the modified text was read in the
Founding generation. While the conventional wisdom among academics is
that the constitutional text does not provide a basis for judicial review of federal statutes by federal courts, Morris’s changes to the Supremacy Clause provided that very basis, and Hamilton, Wilson, Paterson, and Marshall all read
the law-of-the-land language as justifying judicial review.
I.

Slavery and New States

Morris was the most vocal opponent of slavery during the Convention
debates. 547 Though he was unsuccessful in opposing the Three-Fifths Clause
on the Convention floor, 548 Morris kept up his antislavery campaign as a
member of the Committee. As already noted, Morris slyly inserted language
in the Territories Clause that could be used to keep potential slave states in
permanent territorial status. 549 Morris made two other changes to weaken
slavery’s constitutional footing. First, he altered the language of the Fugitive
Slave Clause to remove the Constitution’s one textual endorsement of slavery
as moral. Second, he subtly changed the language of the New States Clause in

545. Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308–09, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1014–
15 (Paterson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857).
546. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (emphasis omitted).
547. For discussion of Morris’s opposition to slavery at the Convention, see supra Section
II.E.1.
548. See supra notes 244–245 and accompanying text.
549. See supra Section II.E.2.
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a way designed to provide a textual basis for keeping potential slave states
from achieving statehood.
1.

Slavery and the Fugitive Slave Clause

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
If any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States shall escape into another State, He or She shall not be discharged from such service
or labor in consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State to which
they escape; but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor. 550
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping into another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be discharged
from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labour may be due. 551

Because the constitutional provisions concerning slavery were fiercely
scrutinized by proslavery delegates, Morris was constrained in editing those
provisions. Yet he managed to make one subtle but significant change.
Like the Three-Fifths and the Slave Trade Clauses, the Fugitive Slave Clause
did not use the word “slave.” 552 The Fugitive Slave Clause instead referred to
“any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States.” 553 The absence of the word “slave” from these provisions reflected a conscious choice. 554
Despite the drafters’ conscious refusal to use the word “slave,” the Fugitive Slave Clause originally provided that a captured slave “shall be delivered
up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.” 555 The use of the word
“justly” implied that the ownership of an enslaved person was “just.” 556 This
was the only point in the text of the entire Constitution that referred to slavery
as just or moral.
As it emerged from the Committee of Style, the Fugitive Slave Clause provided that a captured slave “shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labour may be due.” 557 Morris had eliminated the word
“justly.” The change was profound. As historian Sean Willentz has recently

550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 577 (Article XV).
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 601–02 (Article IV, Section 2).
See supra text accompanying notes 249–251.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 577.
See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text.
WILENTZ, supra note 252, at 106.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
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written, “The committee’s revision . . . removed the possible implication that
there was justice in slavery.” 558
When the Convention delegates reviewed the Committee of Style’s provision, they did not discuss the change and its significance. Madison’s notes
indicate that the only part of the clause that the delegates debated was the use
of the word “legally.” Madison reports that speakers (whom he did not name)
“thought the term ⟨legal⟩ equivocal” and that it “favor[ed] the idea that slavery
was legal in a moral view.” 559 As a result, the phrase “under the laws thereof”
was substituted for the word “legally.” 560
The word “legally” (which Morris and the Committee of Style added as
they removed the word “justly”) does not connote morality in the same strong
way as the word “justly.” Nonetheless, the delegates’ argument against “legally”—that it should be removed because it suggested that “slavery was legal
in a moral view”—means that the two words suggesting slavery’s morality
were removed from the Constitution.
These changes proved consequential. During the antebellum period,
while some abolitionists such as William Garrison attacked the Constitution
as a proslavery document, other abolitionists argued that the Constitution did
not sanction slavery. 561 It was, according to Frederick Douglas, “a glorious liberty document.” 562 By removing the Fugitive Slave Clause’s implicit linkage of
slavery and morality, Morris’s elimination of the word “justly” made that argument possible.
2.

New States Clause

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but no new
State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of the
present States, without the consent of the Legislature or such State as well as
of the general Legislature. Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of

558.
559.
560.

Id. at 111.
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 628.
Id. The substitution produced the final version of the Fugitive Slave Clause:

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service
or Labour may be due.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
561. See WILENTZ, supra note 252, at 225–26, 229–30.
562. Id. at 227 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July? (July
5, 1852), in THE SPEECHES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 88 (John R. McKivigan, Julie Husband &
Heather L. Kaufman eds., 2018) (cleaned up)).
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two or more States or parts thereof without the consent of the Legislatures
of such States as well as of the Legislature of the United States. 563
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new
state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor
any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states,
without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of
the Congress. 564

Morris did not want new states created in the West to have greater political power than the original thirteen states, both because he thought representatives of the western states would be poorly prepared for leadership and
because he worried that adding new states would tip the balance of national
power in favor of slavery. 565 Intending to bar the creation of new states from
territories, Morris revised the Territories Clause in such a way that the other
Framers did not realize the clause’s meaning when they adopted it. 566
Morris’s revision of the New States Clause advanced these same ends by
prohibiting the creation of new states from current states. The previous version of the New States Clause permitted new states to be created within the
territory of existing states if the state legislature and Congress approved. 567
Morris changed the provision so that new states could never be created from
the boundaries of existing states, making the language about permission from
the state legislature and Congress inapplicable to the creation of new states
from land within existing states. 568
The independent clause “no new State shall be hereafter formed or erected
within the jurisdiction of any of the present States without the consent of the
Legislature or such State as well as of the general Legislature” 569 became the
independent clause “no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state.” 570 The provision about formation of new states
through legislative and congressional consent now applies only to the formation of new states “formed by the junction of two or more States or parts
thereof.” 571 As with the General Welfare Clause, Morris converted a comma

563. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 578 (Article XVII).
564. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 602 (Article IV, Section 3).
565. See supra text accompanying notes 257–265.
566. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.
567. For the relevant debate, see 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 454–55.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 458.
570. LUTHER MARTIN, THE GENUINE INFORMATION DELIVERED TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF MARYLAND RELATIVE TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL CONVENTION
LATELY HELD IN PHILADELPHIA, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 19, 72 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
571. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 465.
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into a semicolon to change constitutional meaning. 572 Read carefully, Morris’s
version prohibits creating a new state through partition, regardless of the affected state’s or Congress’s approval.
A literal reading of Morris’s text would have barred the admission of the
slave state of Kentucky (which was formed out of Virginia) and Tennessee
(which was formed out of North Carolina). But the free state whose admission
was on the horizon—Vermont—was not, as of 1787, a part of another state. It
was an independent republic. 573 Kentucky and Tennessee, but not Vermont,
were “within the jurisdiction of any other state.” 574 The balance of free states
would increase by one, rather than decrease by one. Morris’s textual revision
was remarkably elegant.
In contrast to this subtle reading of the New States Clauses, both Madison
and Luther Martin read the provision to permit the creation of states through
partition. 575 These were the only two comments about the clause in public
writings from the ratification debate, and no one addressed the clause at a state
ratifying convention. 576 Not only is there little evidence from the ratification
debates, but this evidence is of particularly limited value because Madison was
the only supporter of the Constitution opining on the clause’s meaning and
his readings of the constitutional text repeatedly contradicted those the Federalists would employ in the early republic.
The strongest evidence that the clause was understood to permit partition—the Madisonian reading—is the admission of Kentucky as the fifteenth
state in 1792 (following Vermont’s admission the previous year). Kentucky
was formed out of Virginia with the Virginia legislature’s consent; the congressional statute authorizing Kentucky’s admission referenced Article IV,
Section 3; 577 and President Washington urged Kentucky’s admission. 578 The
records of the congressional discussions indicate that no one raised the constitutional issue one way or the other. Thus, Kentucky became a state through
partition, and no one objected.
Tennessee’s admission followed a different path, which may have been
adopted to allay concerns about the constitutionality of Kentucky’s admission.
572. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
573. My reading is that Vermont was admitted pursuant to the first clause of Article IV,
Section 3 (and, as a result, that New York’s approval was unnecessary). The Supreme Court has,
however, reserved the question of whether Vermont was admitted under that clause or under
the second clause of Article IV, Section 3. See Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 606–
08 (1933).
574. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
575. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 103, NO. 43, at 281 (James Madison) (referring to “[t]he
particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its
consent”); MARTIN, supra note 570, at 72.
576. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 364–68.
577. See Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189.
578. See Second Annual Address of President Washington (Dec. 8, 1790), in 1 THE STATE
OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790–1966, at 5 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967).
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Rather than authorizing Tennessee’s creation from within its boundaries, North
Carolina ceded the area that was to become Tennessee to the United States in
1790, and it was governed as a territory for six years. 579 Tennessee was finally
admitted as a state in 1796. 580 According to Kesavan and Paulsen’s study of the
New States Clause, the fact that Tennessee was not directly created through
the partition of North Carolina “casts some doubt upon the interpretation of
the second clause that permits the admission of new breakaway States into the
Union with the consent of their parent States and of Congress.” 581
At first glance, the question of how to construe the clause would seem of
only antiquarian interest. As Kesavan and Paulsen phrase it, the issue is
whether Congress made a constitutional “mistake[]” in admitting Kentucky
(formed out of Virginia), Maine (formed out of Massachusetts), and West Virginia (formed out of Virginia). 582 Given the long-settled recognition of these
partitions, the dislocation involved in reuniting the states, and the ambiguity
of the text, there has been no push among other academics or political actors
to reunite the divided states.
Yet the issue does have modern significance. The congressional statute
admitting Texas gives it the right to divide into four states. 583 After Kesavan
and Paulsen wrote a law-review article noting this power and suggesting that
Texas seize upon it, 584 the issue has received playful attention, with Malcolm
Gladwell devoting a podcast to the legal research. 585 There has also been a political movement to divide California into three states, with a petition to effect
partition gaining enough signatures in 2018 to be placed on the ballot. 586
The limited scholarly literature on the partition question follows familiar
lines. Kesavan and Paulsen conclude that partition is constitutionally permissible because they see the text as ambiguous, the drafting history supports partition, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon holds that the Committee
of Style had no power to change constitutional meaning. 587 Similarly, Dean

579. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at 378.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 380.
582. Id. at 297, 363.
583. Texas Annexation Resolution, S.J. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 5 Stat. 797, 798 (1845).
584. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Essay, Let’s Mess with Texas, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1587 (2004).
585. Malcolm Gladwell, Divide and Conquer: The Complete, Unabridged History of the
World’s Most Controversial Semicolon, REVISIONIST HIST., https://revisionisthistory.com/episodes/21-divide-and-conquer [perma.cc/UZL4-NVSK].
586. Sophia Bollag, Opponents Sue to Nix Ballot Measure to Split California in 3, CHI. SUNTIMES (July 10, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2018/7/10/18387673/opponentssue-to-nix-ballot-measure-to-split-california-in-3 [perma.cc/5PYH-3S84]. The California Supreme Court blocked the initiative for procedural reasons. See Planning & Conservation League
v. Padilla, No. S249859, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 6817 (Sept. 12, 2018).
587. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 442, at 1206–07; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 8, at
392–95.
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McGreal writes: “We should not read the Committee’s change to alter the
Clause’s meaning. . . . They were called the Committee of Style—and not the
Committee of Substantive Revisions—for a reason: Their role was to clean up
the document’s style.” 588
Unlike the other textual changes surveyed in this Article, this one did not
generate Federalist arguments. I have not found any evidence of anyone arguing against Kentucky’s admission on constitutional grounds, although constitutional concerns about partition may explain Tennessee’s circuitous path to
statehood. But once again, a close reading of the text—one that attends to the
punctuation—leads to a different outcome than the conventional understanding; here, it would bar partition.
J.

Engagements Clause

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE
All debts contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the authority of Congress shall be as valid against the United States under this constitution as under the confederation. 589
REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF STYLE
All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of
this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the confederation. 590

Consistent with his support for a strong national government, Morris was
a forceful advocate for federal assumption of all Revolutionary War debts. On
August 22, he proposed a provision stating, “The Legislature shall discharge
the debts [and] fulfil the engagements ⟨of the U. States⟩.” 591 While his motion
was successful, the Convention soon backtracked. Mason objected to the provision imposing an obligation to repay all debts: “The use of the term shall will
beget speculations and increase the pestilent practice of stock-jobbing.” 592
Supporting Mason, Randolph proposed the language noted above. 593 Randolph’s proposal passed, ten states in favor and one against, with only Morris
speaking against the proposal and with only Morris’s Pennsylvania voting
against Randolph’s proposal. 594

588. Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2411 (2001).
589. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571 (Article VII, Section 1).
590. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603 (Article VI).
591. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 377.
592. Id. at 413.
593. Id. at 414 (“All debts contracted & engagements entered into, by or under the authority of Congs. shall be as valid agst the U. States under this constitution as under the Confederation.”).
594. Id.
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Morris’s language for the Committee did not overturn the Convention’s
decision that repayment was not mandatory. He did, however, neatly expand
the scope of the clause in an important way. The previously adopted language
authorized assumption of debts incurred only “by or under the authority of
Congress.” 595 Implicitly, that language did not allow assumption of state debts
unauthorized by Congress. But the Committee of Style’s language—covering
debts incurred “before the adoption of this Constitution”—allowed Congress
to assume state debts, regardless of whether those debts had been previously
authorized by Congress. 596 As treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton used
this power to assume state Revolutionary War debts, regardless of whether
they had been authorized by Congress, and Federalist members of Congress
agreed that the Constitution gave the national government this power. 597
*

*

*

While the Committee of Style’s mandate was, as its name suggests, limited
to style, as the Committee’s drafter Gouverneur Morris covertly challenged
the results of the Convention’s prior proceedings and revised a striking number of fundamentally important constitutional provisions in order to advance
his constitutional agenda. He wrote text that expanded national authority,
broadened presidential powers, provided the basis for judicial review, mandated the establishment of lower federal courts, increased the national government’s ability to assume state debts, barred states from interfering with
their own contracts, expanded the range of actions that could warrant presidential impeachment, threatened to prevent the admission of the slave states
Kentucky and North Carolina, enabled Congress to add prerequisites for service in Congress, required “actual enumeration” of people when the census
was conducted, and removed the Constitution’s recognition of the ownership
of enslaved people as “just[].” He also wrote text that gave Congress the power
to enact legislation to promote the general welfare, although this “trick,” unlike the others, was discovered and the earlier language restored.
Morris placed language in the Constitution that Federalists (including Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson) repeatedly relied on in the great constitutional debates of the early republic. At the same time, Republicans also made
textualist arguments that interpreted Morris’s text. Apart from his revival of
the previously rejected Contract Clause, Morris did not write text that clearly

595. Id. at 408.
596. Pfander, supra note 8, at 1291–93 (quoting Report of Committee of Style, supra note
5, at 603).
597. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 206–14 (2003); 2
ANNALS OF CONG. 1316 (1790) (statement of Rep. Clymer) (“[A]ssumption of the State debts
appeared to him a measure of a federal complexion . . . .”); id. at 1318 (statement of Rep. Sherman) (arguing that assumption is constitutional because state “debts are to be looked upon as
the absolute debts of the Union”); id. at 1324 (statement of Rep. Gerry) (arguing for the constitutionality of assumption of the state debts).
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transformed constitutional meaning. But Morris’s language was more consistent with the readings Federalists advanced. Republicans repeatedly had to
ignore or minimize words added by Morris, whereas Federalists were able to
employ close readings of the constitutional text. Nonetheless, in area after
area, the Republican readings have been accepted by the Supreme Court and
leading academics as reflecting the original understanding.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE’S CHANGES
Recognizing Morris’s changes has important consequences for modern
constitutional law. First, it provides important support for a central critique
of traditional originalism by revealing a new problem with the search for collective intent: the Constitution’s drafter, rather than crafting text that reflected
the Convention’s decisions, wrote language that advanced his own goals. The
text does not reflect the delegates’ collective intent.
Second, this Article’s history is relevant to a series of important modern
controversies. From the vantage point of original public meaning, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly erred in recent cases involving Committee of Style language, by either dismissing the ratified constitutional text or assuming that the
Committee of Style’s language had the same meaning as the language previously
adopted by the Convention. Of the Court’s members, only Justice Thomas has
recognized that, from the perspective of the public meaning originalist, the
Court’s role is to interpret the ratified text, which is to say Morris’s text. Thus,
for a public meaning originalist, Justice Thomas’s approach is the correct one.
The Federalist readings of the text Morris drafted are sufficiently powerful
such that a public meaning originalist should reject the mainstream view that
the Republican readings best reflect the original understanding of the constitutional text. Indeed, in most cases, the Federalist reading is not simply a plausible competing reading but the superior reading of the text, because the
Republican readings cannot fully explain the Constitution’s text.
A. Drafters’ Intent Originalism
When the modern jurisprudence of original understanding emerged in
articles like then-Professor Robert Bork’s 1971 Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems 598 and Justice Rehnquist’s The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 599 and in Professor Raoul Berger’s book Government by Judiciary, 600 original understanding was conceived of as Framers’ intent, with a
principle focus on drafters’ intent—what the delegates to the Philadelphia
598. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
599. William H. Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693 (1976).
600. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).
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Convention meant when they wrote the constitutional text. 601 While these
writings offered a critique of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence and an alternative to it, drafters’ intent jurisprudence was not created in the 1970s but
reflected an established approach to interpreting the Constitution. For example, in both Myers v. United States 602 and Powell v. McCormack 603 the
Court looked to drafters’ intent as a basis for interpreting constitutional text.
Indeed, the Powell Court appealed to drafters’ intent as a basis for dismissing
the significance of the changes made by the Committee of Style. 604
Drafters’ intent originalism has been forcefully criticized. Some critiques
go to the legitimacy of originalism as an interpretive methodology. 605 For example, critics have focused on the dead-hand problem presented by a decision
made by those no longer alive and by a process from which women, enslaved
people, Native Americans, and (in some states) people without property were
excluded. 606 They have also argued the methodology is inappropriate because
of the frequent sparseness of the historical record, 607 the failure of originalism
to recognize reliance interests and established practices, 608 the bad results it
can produce, 609 and the fact that the Founders often did not confront issues of
contemporary importance. 610
But two critiques have been addressed not to the originalist enterprise as
a whole but to drafters’ intent specifically. They reflect internal critiques in
which drafters’ intent is challenged as being inconsistent with the premises of

601. For a good history of modern originalism that discusses the rise of a jurisprudence of
Framers’ intent and the eventual shift to public meaning originalism, see Kesavan & Paulsen,
supra note 442, at 1134–48.
602. 272 U.S. 52, 109–10 (1926).
603. 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).
604. See supra text accompanying notes 277, 395–397.
605. The literature here is enormous. For some of the important discussions of these critiques (some accepting the critiques and others challenging them), see Daniel A. Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Jamal Greene, Rule
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1684–90 (2016); Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1987);
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127
(1998); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165,
192–96 (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085,
1102–05 (1998); Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
780, 792–97 (2014).
606. Greene, supra note 605, at 1685.
607. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (1986).
608. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN L. REV. 703, 712–
13 (1975).
609. Id.
610. Farber, supra note 605, at 1093.
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originalism. In The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 611 Professor Jefferson Powell argues that the original interpretive understanding was that
drafters’ intent was not controlling. The second critique, associated with Professor Paul Brest, 612 is that the search for a collective intent of the drafters must
fail because individual drafters understood the text in different ways or had
“no intent or an indeterminate intent” with respect to a given clause’s meaning. 613 In other words, the drafters did not have a shared understanding of
what the words meant.
These critiques have won wide acceptance among originalists and led to
“new originalism,” 614 which involves a reconceptualization of the originalist’s
goals. As Professor Cass Sunstein recently noted, “[p]ublic meaning originalism is the dominant approach” to original understanding. 615 The new
originalist seeks to recover the original public meaning of the text (rather than
drafters’ intent or ratifiers’ intent). In Professor Larry Solum’s influential formulation, the search for public meaning is the search for “the communicative
content of the constitutional text[, which] is determined by the semantic
meaning of the text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional communication.” 616 The core insight of new originalism is that the
democratic legitimacy that underlies originalism requires giving effect to the
decision of “We the People” in adopting the Constitution. “We the People”
adopted the intent of neither the drafter nor the ratifiers; “We” adopted a system of constitutional government created by particular words as those words
were understood at the time of ratification.
The history of the Committee of Style bolsters the originalist case for public meaning originalism, as opposed to drafters’ intent originalism, because it
adds a new dimension to the critique of the search for collective intent. The
problem with determining collective intent is not simply that the legislative
process—given its focus on compromise and masking disagreement, as well

611. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
612. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
613. Id. at 214.
614. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (advancing a conception of new originalism and portraying it as consistent with living
originalism).
615. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1674 n.13 (2018).
616. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 474 (2013). For a critique of Professor Solum’s approach grounded in an “original methods”
originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009)
(“We find no support for constitutional construction . . . at the time of the Framing.”).

October 2021]

The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener

107

as its inability to anticipate future issues—does not lead to collective understanding (the problem that Brest and others have identified). 617 Rather, the
problem is also that in a series of critical cases the person who wrote the text
consciously sought to advance a constitutional vision that was different than
that of a majority of his fellow delegates: Morris had lost fights on the Convention floor and sought to reverse those decisions.
My point here is not that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the drafter’s intent (that is, Morris’s intent). Giving effect to the subjective intent of the drafter is at odds with the majoritarian premises of originalism.
But recognizing what Morris did—and the way in which Republicans and Federalists then battled over the meaning of his text—reveals a new reason why the
search for collective constitutional meaning is illusory: Morris wrote the Constitution’s text hoping to change the text’s meaning while using sufficiently opaque
words so that his fellow delegates would not notice the change.
But while the history presented in this Article strengthens one of the major arguments against drafters’ intent originalism, to a remarkable extent the
caselaw and scholarship discussed here evidence the striking, continuing influence of drafters’ intent originalism, despite it having been largely discredited. As will be discussed in more detail in the next Section, the modern
Supreme Court caselaw considering whether to give effect to Committee of
Style text is split between cases wholly disregarding changes contained in that
text and cases adopting a strong presumption that the text reflects the prior
drafting history. In one of the most salient constitutional law cases of recent
years, Printz v. United States, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, assumed
that the Constitution reflects the Madisonian Compromise, even though Morris’s text departed from it. 618 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice
Thomas made the same assumption in Patchak v. Zinke. 619 And as discussed
in the previous Section, a veritable who’s who of leading constitutional scholars, including Cass Sunstein, Jack Rakove, Akhil and Vikram Amar, Martin
Redish and Curtis Woods, David Currie, Saikrishna Prakash, Martin Flaherty,
Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan, Richard Fallon, and Larry Lessig have
all misunderstood the Constitution’s text because they posit that changes made
by the Committee of Style were either ultra vires or purely stylistic. Drafters’
intent originalism has been discredited as a jurisprudential approach, but in
practice both leading academics and the Court have continued to rely on that
approach when they are interpreting text drafted by the Committee of Style.

617.
618.
619.

See, e.g., Brest, supra note 612, at 214, 229.
521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997).
138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (plurality opinion).
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B. Relevance of the Committee of Style’s Text to Current Controversies
This Article has revealed a series of textual readings that reflect Morris’s
goals and that were employed by Federalists in early constitutional controversies. It has uncovered the Federalist Constitution. 620 But these readings are
consistently at odds with the mainstream academic view of the original meaning of the text. Thus, Federalists read the Preamble as a substantive grant of
authority to both courts and Congress, but the conventional view is that it was
purely stylistic or, at most, a gloss on Article I’s grant of powers to Congress.
Similarly, the dominant views among academics are that the Contract Clause
did not cover public contracts, that there was no constitutional requirement
for the establishment of lower federal courts, that there is no textual basis in
the Constitution for judicial review of congressional statutes, and that the Impeachment Clause does not extend to nonofficial acts.
In each case, however, Federalists read the clause in a way that is different
than the conventional modern views of the original understanding. And while
the punctuation of the New States Clause would seem to indicate that states
like California and Texas cannot be divided, no scholar has reached that conclusion. In each of these instances, scholars read the Constitution as if the
Committee of Style had not changed the text.
There are two instances in which there is some support among academics
for the Federalist view as reflecting the original understanding, although there
is also support among academics for the Republican position. Many (pro-executive) scholars 621 (as well as the Court in Myers and the Office of Legal
Counsel in its 2003 torture memo) have relied on the presence of “herein
granted” in the Article I Vesting Clause to support a broad reading of executive power. 622 But numerous other prominent scholars have dismissed the significance of this phrase, treating it as simply stylistic and crediting it with no
substantive significance. 623
A similar point can be made about the word “officer” in the Presidential
Succession Clause. Some scholars, following Madison and the Republicans,
have read the phrase as if it were still “officer of the United States” (as it was
before the Committee of Style began its work). Others have argued that “officer” means “officer,” as the Federalists did. 624 The question then becomes
what relevance this history has for resolving current controversies.
This Section first looks at the approach the Court and commentators have
employed when the Committee’s language departed from previously adopted
text, then discusses what approach courts should take.

620. The following two paragraphs summarize the conclusions of supra Part III.
621. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 371, at 570–71.
622. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 138 (1926); OLC Torture Memo, supra note
371, at 4–5. A separate question is how broadly the “executive power” was understood to be at
the time of the Founding. See supra Section III.B.
623. See supra notes 374–379 and accompanying text.
624. See supra Section III.F.
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Supreme Court Case Law and Academic Commentators on the
Committee of Style

In the past half century, the Supreme Court has heard four cases in which
a party claimed that the Committee of Style’s changes to text that the Convention had previously approved were without legal significance. Though the
Court agreed in each case, its decisions reflected two different approaches:
disregarding the changes entirely or presuming that the changes were not substantive. Academics have largely followed the second path, presuming that the
changes were not meant to alter the meaning of the relevant provisions. Neither is a sound basis of decision for a public meaning originalist. From the
perspective of public meaning originalism, the correct approach is that taken
by Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas appropriately focuses on the text of the
Constitution. Even though no justice has agreed with him, Thomas’s approach
is truest to public meaning originalism’s central tenet that the role of courts is
to apply the text that “We the People” adopted.
The leading Supreme Court case reflecting the first approach—disregarding the Committee of Style’s revisions—is the 1969 decision Powell v. McCormack. 625 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren disregarded the
Committee of Style’s text, stating that “[t]he Committee . . . had no authority
from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as
voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so.” 626 Similarly, in the 1995
decision U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Justice Stevens cited Powell and
stated, “This argument [the appeal to the Committee of Style text] was firmly
rejected in Powell, and we see no need to revisit it now.” 627
The Court’s approach in Powell—with its focus on drafters’ intent and
disregard of text—is not surprising. The opinion was written before originalists turned away from drafters’ intent. The only surprise is that the appeal to
originalism came from Chief Justice Warren, who was not generally an
originalist. 628 In light of the widespread acceptance (even among originalists)
of Brest’s and Powell’s critiques by 1995, however, it is more surprising that
Justice Stevens relied on this approach in Thornton in 1995.

625. 395 U.S. 486 (1969); cf. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925) (dismissing idea
that the Committee intended to change the clause’s meaning “sub silentio”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 390–391.
626. 395 U.S. at 538–39 (citation omitted).
627. 514 U.S. 779, 792 n.8, 816 n.27 (1995) (citation omitted).
628. Warren famously dismissed the relevance of original understanding in Brown. See
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (“[W]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868 . . . .”).
Powell was not, however, the only opinion in which Warren drew on original understanding.
There was at least one other such decision. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (discussing original understanding of Eighth Amendment); see also Greene, supra note 605, at 1670 (“Chief Justice Warren—Powell edition—is a model originalist.”).
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In any case, the reliance on drafters’ intent reflected in both decisions is
inconsistent with the majoritarian premise that lies at the heart of originalism’s appeal: When the state conventions ratified the Constitution, they
adopted the text before them, not the drafting history that remained secret
until Madison’s notes were published in 1840. For a public meaning originalist, the dismissal of the Constitution’s text in Powell and Thornton was a clear
mistake. To disregard the ratifiers’ decision is to disregard what “We the People” decided. Text trumps secret history.
The two other Supreme Court cases did not simply dismiss the Committee’s text but instead adopted a strong presumption that the Committee of
Style’s text meant the same as the text referred to the Committee. In Nixon v.
United States, the Court found that the addition of the word “sole” to the Impeachment Clause did not alter the clause’s meaning. 629 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[A]ccepting as we must the proposition that the Committee of Style had no
authority from the Convention to alter the meaning of the Clause, we must
presume that the Committee’s reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language. That is, we must
presume that the Committee did its job. This presumption is buttressed by
the fact that the Constitutional Convention voted on, and accepted, the
Committee of Style’s linguistic version. We agree with the Government that
“the word ‘sole’ is entitled to no less weight than any other word of the text,
because the Committee revision perfected what ‘had been agreed to.’ ” Second, carrying Nixon’s argument to its logical conclusion would constrain us
to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where the
Committee of Style added an arguably substantive word. Such a result is at
odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee’s version, and
with the well-established rule that the plain language of the enacted text is
the best indicator of intent. 630

There is a significant shift in focus from Powell here. In Powell, the Court
treated the language sent to the Committee of Style as dispositive. In Nixon,
in contrast, the Court parses the Committee of Style’s text (which had been
adopted by the Convention) and rejected the idea “that the second to last draft
would govern in every instance where the Committee of Style added an arguably substantive word.” 631 Rather than disregarding the Constitution’s text,
the Court embraced the presumption that the text sent to the Committee and
the Committee’s proposal have the same meaning.
In Utah v. Evans, the Court’s most recent confrontation with the Committee of Style, the Court again adopted the presumption approach. 632 The
question before the Court was whether the Census Bureau’s use of sampling

629.
630.
631.
632.

506 U.S. 224 (1993).
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231–32 (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
536 U.S. 452 (2002).
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violated the “actual enumeration” requirement of the Census Clause. 633 Justice
Breyer stated:
[T]he Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which,
in revising the language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Although
not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee
of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning” of the
draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Hence, the Framers
would have intended the current phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the substantive equivalent of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants]
shall . . . be taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” And the Committee of Style’s phrase offers no linguistic temptation to limit census methodology in the manner that Utah proposes. 634

Here, again, the Court embraced a presumption. The fact that the Committee was not empowered to change the Constitution’s meaning “strongly
suggest[ed]” that that Committee’s text had “a similar meaning” to the previously adopted text. There was “no linguistic temptation” to read the Committee’s text as having a different meaning from the previously approved text.
This reliance on drafting history as a gloss on the constitutional text is consistent with one strand of public meaning originalism, a strand embraced by
Justice Scalia. While Justice Scalia famously rejected the use of legislative history, 635 he repeatedly used the drafting history of the Convention as evidence of
what the words of the Constitution meant at the time of ratification. 636 Indeed,
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Nixon. 637

633. Evans, 536 U.S. at 457.
634. Id. at 474–75 (first alteration added) (citations omitted).
635. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388–91 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 482, 493
n.6 (1998); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 39–40
(1998); Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 963 n.4 (1997); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465,
480–81 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
636. See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) (Elections
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (Elections
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340–41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Case or Controversy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
For further discussion of Justice Scalia’s use of the constitutional drafting history and his rejection of statutory legislative history, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 442, at 1119–20; William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (1998).
637. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Justice Scalia did not join the majority
in Evans. He wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing. See Evans, 536
U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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When construing text drafted by the Committee of Style, many of the
leading works of scholarship surveyed in this Article have embraced the presumption evidenced in Nixon and Evans. Cass Sunstein thus finds that the
Committee’s deletion of the phrase “against the United States” from the Impeachment Clause was without legal significance. 638 And he and Professor
Lessig take a similar approach in concluding that the addition of “herein
granted” to the Article I Vesting Clause did not expand executive power. 639
Professor Amar and Dean Amar read the Presidential Succession Clause as if
the words “of the United States” had not been deleted. 640
Professor Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan offer the most sustained
treatment of this presumption as a guide to interpretation. 641 They contend that
the draft of the Constitution referred by the Framers to the Committee of
Style [should have] the status of a committee report—it is authoritative evidence of legal meaning, but not legal authority. Thus, when the text of the
Constitution is unambiguous, it trumps the “second-to-last” draft of the
Constitution, as is the case in statutory interpretation; but when the text of
the Constitution is ambiguous, its meaning may be informed by the Constitution’s “committee report.” Indeed, the Constitution’s committee report is
superior to committee reports in ordinary legislation generally. It is a more
prolix form of the final “statute,” and is therefore probably less ambiguous.
It is also a more reliable, consistent, and faithful guide to interpretation because it is the product of the “Congress” as a whole. 642

Under this approach, the drafting history serves as “an extratextual dictionary
of constitutional meaning.” 643
Regardless of whether the drafting history illuminates the words of the Constitution as a general matter, the presumption breaks down in the case of the dishonest scrivener. Contrary to the view expressed by Professor Klarman and the
other leading historians of the Convention, Morris did not seek to simply “put the
finishing touches on the Constitution.” 644 He did not aim to “accurately capture[]
what the Framers meant in their unadorned language”645 or fashion “the substantive equivalent of the draft phrase.”646 He selected words that changed the Constitution’s meaning. Assuming continuity of meaning is a mistake.

638. SUNSTEIN, supra note 474, at 48 (“As its name suggests, the Committee on Style and
Arrangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny that it made some substantive
changes), and it is far more likely that this particular change was made on grounds of redundancy.”).
639. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 374, at 48–49.
640. Amar & Amar, supra note 442, at 116 (“A later style committee deleted the words ‘of the
United States,’ but no evidence suggests that this style change was meant to change meaning.”).
641. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 442, at 1208.
642. Id. at 1208–09.
643. Id. at 1198.
644. KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 188–89 n.*.
645. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993).
646. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 475 (2002).
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The problem occurs again and again when Morris’s changes are overlooked
or dismissed as simply matters of style: the original public meaning of the text
is lost. When he rewrote the Preamble, or changed language in Article III’s Vesting Clause, or dropped “private” from the Contracts Clause, or added “herein
granted” to Article I’s Vesting Clause, or omitted “justly” from the Fugitive Slave
Clause, or described the Constitution as “the law of the land,” or used a negative
framing for the Qualifications Clause, or changed the punctuation of the New
States Clause or the General Welfare Clause, or made the other changes discussed in this Article, he sought to change the meaning of these clauses. Morris’s
changes enabled new textualist arguments about what the Constitution meant;
the assumption of continuity fails to recognize this change.
Indeed, in analyzing the Committee of Style’s text, scholars and jurists
should operate on an assumption of discontinuity. As I have pursued the project of comparing the Committee of Style’s text to the previously approved
text, I have repeatedly encountered changes that at first appeared cosmetic but
that in fact had substantive significance. That experience leads me to believe
that, in approaching Morris’s text and seeking to recover original public
meaning at a distance of more than two hundred years, courts and scholars
should flip the assumptions that have guided opinions like Nixon and
Thornton and mainstream academic argument. I believe it is likely that further
research will reveal that Morris changed other clauses to advance his constitutional goals. 647 Where the Committee of Style text departs from the text previously approved by the Convention, the modern reader, rather than
assuming continuity, should attempt to puzzle through the changes to see
whether they in some way covertly advanced Morris’s constitutional vision.
From the vantage point of constitutional jurisprudence, it is important to
recognize that I am not arguing that courts should today apply drafter’s intent
because it is the drafter’s intent. In other words, I am not arguing that because
Morris, the drafter of the Constitution, wanted the text to be understood in a
certain way, we should read it today as he would have wanted it read. The powerful critiques of Framers’ intent that scholars have made apply with even more
force to drafter’s intent. Because the majoritarian basis of originalism rests on
ratification by “the people” in the state ratifying conventions, the question is
what the words meant to the ratifiers (or, under another school of originalist
thought, what the words themselves meant in 1787), not what Morris (or the
other people at the Convention) hoped to achieve. 648 At the same time, he was
a drafter with remarkable awareness of how words would be construed. This
Article reveals a series of clauses whose original meaning has been wholly or
largely lost. Focusing on Morris helps us uncover readings at the time of ratification and the early republic that have disappeared from our consciousness.

647. For a discussion of some of the other clauses where Morris changed text, see supra
note 275. Although I have not found any of these clauses to reflect intentional changes of meaning, further research may produce a different result.
648. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609–10
(2004).
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The final Supreme Court approach to the Committee of Style’s text is the
approach of Justice Thomas. In his dissent in Utah v. Evans, Justice Thomas
attacked any use of the language referred to the Committee of Style. “The
Court,” he stated, “places undue weight on the penultimate version of the
Clause, the iteration that was given to the Committee of Detail and Committee
of Style. . . . Rather than rely on the draft, I focus on the words of the adopted
Constitution.” 649 Justice Thomas has not been able to convince another member of the Court to join his position and has not developed a rationale for his
approach. Dean Manning, however, has applied it in his analysis of the Presidential Succession Clause and the Committee’s omission of the words “of the
United States”: “[E]ven if the Committee of Style acted ultra vires by making
substantive changes to the text, the ratifiers accepted them. The relevant fact
is that the ratifiers acted on the text submitted to the States, not on the sequence of ‘secret deliberations’ of the Constitutional Convention . . . .” 650
Unlike the other two approaches, the Thomas-Manning approach recognizes (at least implicitly) the possibility that the Committee of Style altered the
Constitution’s meaning. Underlying the “focus on the words of the adopted
Constitution,” 651 to use Justice Thomas’s phrase, is an awareness that the words
of the ratified Constitution may have had a different meaning than the words
referred to the Committee of Style. This reliance on the words of the Constitution accords with public meaning originalism’s core principle because its
focus is on the interpretation of the words adopted by the ratifiers as “We the
People” would have understood them. 652 Thus, from the vantage point of the
public meaning originalist, the Thomas-Manning approach is the correct one.
Yet much of the text that Morris wrote did not have a clear meaning. Morris’s changes were crafted to avoid provoking the delegates who adopted the
text he was changing. Thus, the question becomes how to interpret text that can
be read in different ways. That topic that is the subject of the next Section.
2.

The Text, the Construction Zone, and the Federalist Constitution

Recovering the original public meaning of the Committee of Style’s text
at more than two hundred years’ remove is complicated. It requires recognition of three points. First, the drafter of the Committee systematically altered
constitutional meaning to advance his own constitutional vision. Second, the
constitutional text he drafted was susceptible of competing interpretations,
one he favored and one he opposed. Third, the constitutional text generally
fits the reading he favored better than the reading he opposed.

649.
650.
651.
652.

Evans, 536 U.S. at 495–96 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Manning, supra note 442, at 144.
Evans, 536 U.S. at 496 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Whittington, supra note 648, at 609–10.
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As has been discussed, Morris acknowledged that, with respect to certain
constitutional provisions, he intentionally employed opaque language to advance goals he desired while avoiding discovery: “I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. . . . [H]ad it been more
pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.” 653 “[I]t became necessary to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not
alarm others . . . .” 654
Implicit in these statements, however, is not only the idea that the text he
crafted was opaque but the idea that, when carefully read, this text supported
his constitutional vision better than the alternative vision held by other delegates. Morris “select[ed] phrases, which express[ed] [his] own notions.” 655
Moreover, he believed that constitutional interpretation should be about the
words, not what his fellow delegates hoped to achieve. As he wrote in 1814,
“[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting its provisions. This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, with
the general tenor and object of the instrument.” 656
Morris’s changes—adding the words “herein granted” to the Article I
Vesting Clause, dropping the word “private” from the Contracts Clause, or
changing “the law of the several states” to “the law of the land”—were subtle.
The one dramatic change—the revision to the Preamble—could be understood as stylistic and a pragmatic response to the possibility that not all thirteen
states would ratify the Constitution. As a result, exhausted delegates hurriedly
reviewing the final draft missed the substantive changes to the document.
From Morris’s perspective, the weakness of his approach was that, as he
created new textual readings, there were competing textual readings. Federalists could read the Preamble as a grant of authority, but Republicans dismissed
it as simply rhetoric. Federalists read Article III’s Vesting Clause as mandating
lower federal courts; Republicans disagreed. Hamilton and Wilson read the
Contract Clause to cover contracts with the state; Randolph and Williamson
read it as limited to private contracts. Moreover, when Republicans did not
engage with text, they did not feel compelled to abandon their constitutional
positions. Madison as Helvidius did not counter Hamilton’s use of the “herein
granted” argument as Pacificus, but he still argued that Hamilton’s understanding of executive power was erroneous. Hamilton and Wilson read the
law-of-the-land language to authorize judicial review, but the Constitution
does not clearly grant federal courts the power to review federal statutes for
unconstitutionality, and in the early republic, critics of judicial review could

653. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 66, at 404; see
supra text accompanying note 66.
654. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420; see supra
text accompanying notes 12, 76.
655. Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, supra note 1, at 420.
656. Id.
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argue that it lacked a constitutional basis. The question then becomes how a
modern court should choose between competing readings.
Professor Lawrence Solum has recently offered a valuable approach to
how an originalist should decide cases. The first level of inquiry is whether
“the constitutional text . . . provide[s] determinate answers to constitutional
questions.” 657 If the answer is no, the originalist moves to the “construction
zone.” 658 In the construction zone, one looks to sources beyond the text—like
structure, constitutional values, or precedent—to resolve controversies pitting
two plausible originalist readings against each other. 659
The Federalist readings of the clauses discussed here are sufficiently complete explications of the text such that, for an originalist, these clauses either
are within the construction zone or are superior readings that should be
adopted without additional reference to structure, constitutional values, or
precedent. Morris crafted his text so it would be, at the very least, ambiguous.
Because the focus of this Article is historical, detailed analyses of how the fifteen clauses discussed here should be interpreted by a modern originalist—
and whether they fall within the construction zone or whether the Federalist
reading is superior—are outside of the scope of this Article. But Morris was a
careful drafter, and it is striking that, in the debates in the early republic, Federalists were repeatedly able to parse the text closely and Republicans were not.
Republicans are often described as “strict constructionists,” whereas Federalists, such as Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall, are described as “loose
constructionists.” 660 But in the debates surveyed here, precisely the opposite is
true. The Federalists were able to explain the Constitution’s words. Republicans repeatedly had to ignore or add words—often interpreting clauses as if
they still employed the language referred to the Committee of Style rather than
the Constitution’s actual text. Federalists found power in the Preamble; Re-

Solum, supra note 616, at 458.
Id.
Id. at 578.
For classic treatments of the loose construction–strict construction divide, see LANCE
BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 273–302 (1978);
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 66–76 (1987); Powell, supra note 611, at
923–34. Professor Jonathan Gienapp has written an influential new study that reflects this dichotomy and traces its origins to the controversy about whether Congress could constitutionally create
a bank. See GIENAPP, supra note 17, at 213–47. For a significant and novel perspective on the loose
construction–strict construction divide, see Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 YALE
L.J. 2 (2020). Professor Peterson makes a strong argument that whereas the Federalist approach to
constitutional interpretation was grounded in a public-legislation model, the Republican model
was based on an analogy to private legislation. See id. at 7. This Article does not challenge Peterson’s
focus on the public legislation–private legislation model. Rather, it flips the dichotomy that underlies the loose construction–strict construction debate. The traditional view is that Republicans
closely parsed constitutional text and Federalists treated it as more open-ended. In contrast, the
research presented here shows that, at least with respect to Morris’s text, the Federalists closely
parsed the constitutional language, while Republicans were less attentive to specific word choice.
657.
658.
659.
660.
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publicans treated it as stylistic. Madison, in his Helvidius essay, ignored Hamilton’s argument about the “herein granted” text. 661 In the debate about the
presidential succession bill, Madison interpreted the Presidential Succession
Clause as if it still read “officer of the United States” rather than “officer,” and
several Congressman erroneously asserted that the clause read “officer of the
United States.” In contrast, Federalists read “officer” to mean “officer.”
In the first impeachment debate, Republicans read the impeachment
clause as if it still read “high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States,”
rather than simply “high crimes or misdemeanors.” Federalists could argue
that the text reached unofficial acts. The words “ordain” and “establish” in Article III’s Vesting Clause are best read as words of obligation, as the Federalists
read them when arguing that the Constitution mandated that Congress establish federal courts. Republicans interpreted the Contract Clause as if it still had
the word “private” in it; Federalists could appeal to the Constitution’s text,
which did not contain a limit to “private” contracts. Federalists could invoke the
text stating that the Constitution was the “law of the land” when they justified
judicial review; Republican opponents of judicial review had no text to rely on.
There are a handful of clauses for which the Republican and Federalist readings are equally plausible. The New States Clause, the Territories Clause, and the
Qualifications Clause fall into this category. In the clauses listed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Federalist readings are more consistent with the words themselves
than are the Republican readings. In contrast, with respect to the clauses in this
paragraph, the Republican and the Federalist readings parse the text equally well.
But in the great majority of instances, the Federalists had the better argument in interpreting a particular clause. Republicans had to ignore words or
phrases; Federalists were able to parse the text closely. This was no accident.
Morris advanced his constitutional vision with extraordinary skill. He was, in
the words of fellow Committee of Style members Madison and Hamilton, a
“genius,” 662 and the project he was pursuing was of the most fundamental importance. He was drafting the Federalist Constitution.
CONCLUSION
In 1798, on the floor of the House, Albert Gallatin charged that Gouverneur Morris, the drafter for the Committee of Style, had tried to revise the

661. The limits of the argument here should be noted. I am suggesting that the presence of
the phrase “herein granted” in the Article I Vesting Clause and its absence in the Article II Vesting Clause connotes that the president has all executive powers except for those expressly assigned elsewhere (such as the power to declare war). A separate and critical question is what the
phrase “executive powers” meant, a matter of sharp controversy. Compare Prakash & Ramsey,
supra note 348 (advancing the Vesting Clause thesis of broad executive power), with Mortenson,
supra note 348, at 1169 (“[Executive power] extended only to the implementation of legal norms
created by some other authority.”).
662. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, supra note 52 (Hamilton); 3
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 500 (Madison); see also supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
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General Welfare Clause in order to expand the powers of Congress but that a
fellow delegate had caught the “trick” and restored the original constitutional
text. 663 Despite the fact that this charge was made more than two hundred
years ago, and despite Morris’s reputation as lacking integrity, no previous
work of scholarship has compared the constitutional provisions referred to
the Committee of Style with the Committee of Style’s proposals in order to
assess whether he altered text to advance his constitutional vision.
This Article has shown that Morris—a committed nationalist who favored a strong executive and judiciary and strong protection for private property, and who opposed slavery and the grant of political power to the West—
subtly revised the text of a breathtaking range of clauses in order to advance
his constitutional vision, repeatedly seeking to gain victory in crucial areas
where he had been unable to obtain the result he desired during earlier Convention debates. He wrote text that could be read to expand the power of the
national government (the Preamble), strengthen the executive (the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I and II), mandate the creation of lower federal courts (the
Article III Vesting Clause), provide a textual basis for judicial review (the lawof-the-land provision), elevate the constitutional position of both the executive
and federal courts (the basic structure of Article I, Article II, and Article III),
bar state interference with public contracts (the Contract Clause), block the
admission of slave states Kentucky and Tennessee to the Union while permitting the admission of the free state of Vermont (the New States Clause), include members of Congress in the line of succession to the presidency (the
Presidential Succession Clause), expand the ability of the national government
to assume state debts (the Engagements Clause), allow Congress to add qualifications to membership (the Qualifications Clause), and broaden the
grounds for impeachment (the Impeachment Clause). Morris also removed
constitutional text suggesting that slavery was just (the Fugitive Slave Clause).
It is a remarkable list of some of the most important parts of the Constitution.
Morris’s text provided Federalists with language that they repeatedly relied on in the major constitutional debates of the early republic. Federalists
drew on Morris’s text to argue for presidential power to remove executive
branch officers, the presidential ability to issue a Neutrality Proclamation,
Congress’s power to create the Bank of the United States and enact the Sedition Act, federal courts’ right to hold congressional and state statutes unconstitutional, congressional power to impeach an officer for acts outside the
scope of office and to place members of Congress in the line of presidential
succession, and Congress’s obligation to create lower federal courts. Morris’s
text was used to argue for a congressional power to abolish slavery, and abolitionists relied on his revision of the Fugitive Slave Clause when they argued
that the Constitution did not endorse slavery. Yet Morris’s changes were subtle. Rather than creating clear constitutional meaning, he created text that was

663. For Gallatin’s charge, see 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 379; see also discussion supra Section I.D.

October 2021]

The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener

119

the subject of controversy. In the great debates of the early republic, Republicans fought Federalists with their own readings of Morris’s text.
Although it has never been presented with the full range of changes made
by the Committee, the Supreme Court has, in four cases in the past half century,
considered whether to give effect to particular language drafted by the Committee of Style. It has twice decided to disregard the Committee’s language
(even though it became the language of the Constitution) and twice adopted
the presumption that the Committee’s language had the same meaning as the
language that the Convention had previously adopted. From the perspective of
public meaning originalism, the dominant school of originalist thought, neither approach withstands scrutiny—the former because it ignores the ratified
text, the latter because it fails to see that the text was revised by the Committee
to change its meaning. Only Justice Thomas has focused on construing the
text that was ratified, the proper approach for a public meaning originalist.
More broadly, on point after point, Republican readings of the Constitution have come to be seen by academics and the Court as the original understanding. From the vantage point of public meaning originalism, however,
awareness of the early readings of the text written by Morris and the Committee enables reviving Morris and the Federalists’ readings of the Constitution.
These revived readings challenge the conventional wisdom about the original
understanding of textual provisions that are central to many of the most important debates in constitutional law. Federalist readings are consistently at
least as well grounded in the text as Republican readings. With respect to the
great majority of clauses, the Federalist readings are textually superior.
What this Article shows, most fundamentally, is that Morris was both a
legal drafter of extraordinary skill and vision and a dishonest scrivener. As a
member of the Committee of Style, he covertly rewrote critical elements of the
Constitution to achieve results he had been unable to achieve on the Convention floor. The charge made two hundred years ago concerned a “trick” that
was uncovered and undone. But that was just one trick among many, and
those other subtle but important changes have not been recognized until now.
Scholars and jurists have failed to see a critical fact: Morris’s tricks shaped the
Constitution.
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APPENDIX
PROVISION

TEXT REFERRED TO
COMMITTEE OF STYLE

COMMITTEE OF STYLE TEXT

Preamble

“We the People of the States of
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations, Connecticut, NewYork, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North-Carolina, South-Carolina,
and Georgia, do ordain, declare
and establish the following Constitution for the Government of
Ourselves and our Posterity.” 664

“We, the People of the United
States, in order to form a more
perfect union, to establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.” 665

Vesting
Clauses

Article II: “The Government
shall consist of supreme legislative,
executive and judicial powers.”
Article III: “The legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress,
to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of
Representatives, and a Senate.”
Article X, Section 1:“The Executive power of the United States
shall be vested in a single person.
His stile shall be, ‘The President of
the United States of America;’ and
his title shall be, ‘His Excellency.’ ”
Article XI, Section 1:“The
Judicial Power of the United States
both in law and equity shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such Inferior Courts as shall,
when necessary, from time to time,
be constituted by the Legislature of
the United States.”666

Article I, Section 1:“ALL legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”
Article II, Section 1: “The executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States of
America.”
Article III, Section 1: “The
judicial power of the United
States, both in law and equity,
shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” 667

664. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565.
665. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590.
666. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565 (Articles II and III); id. at 572 (Article
X); id. at 575 (Article XI).
667. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590 (Article I); id. at 597 (Article II);
id. at 600 (Article III).
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ARTICLE I
Qualifications
Article IV, Section 2: “Every
Clause
Member of the House of Repre-

Article I, Section 2, Clause a:
“No person shall be a representasentatives shall be of the age of
tive who shall not have attained to
twenty-five years at least; shall
the age of twenty-five years, and
have been a citizen of the United been seven years a citizen of the
States for at least seven years beUnited States, and who shall not,
fore his election; and shall be, at
when elected, be an inhabitant of
the time of his election, an inhab- that state in which he shall be
itant of the State in which he shall chosen.” 669
be chosen.”
Article VI, Section 2: “The
Legislature of the United States
shall have authority to establish
such uniform qualifications of
the members of each House,
with regard to property, as to the
said Legislature shall seem expedient.” 668

Enumeration Article VII, Section 3: “The proClause
portions of direct taxation [and

Article I, Section 2, Clause b:
“Representatives and direct taxes
representation] shall be regulated shall be apportioned among the
by the whole number of free citi- several states which may be inzens and inhabitants, of every age, cluded within this Union, accordsex, and condition, including
ing to their respective numbers,
those bound to servitude for a
which shall be determined by
term of years, and three fifths of
adding to the whole number of
all other persons not comprefree persons, including those
hended in the foregoing descrip- bound to servitude for a term of
tion, (except Indians not paying
years, and excluding Indians not
taxes) which number shall, within taxed, three fifths of all other perthree years after the first meeting sons. The actual enumeration
of the Legislature, and within the shall be made within three years
term of every ten years afterafter the first meeting of the Conwards, be taken in such manner
gress of the United States, and
as the said Legislature shall diwithin every subsequent term of
rect.” 670
ten years, in such manner as they
shall by law direct.” 671

668. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 565 (Article IV); 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 248 n.6 (Article VI).
669. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590.
670. Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571.
671. Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 590–91.
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Contract
Clause

Presidential
Succession
Clause
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Article I, Section 10: “No state
shall coin money, nor emit bills of
credit, nor make any thing but
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor pass any bill of
attainder, nor ex post facto laws,
nor laws altering or impairing the
obligation of contracts; nor grant
letters of marque and reprisal, nor
enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation, nor grant any title
of nobility.” 672
Article X, Section 1: “The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act
as President in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the
President and Vice President; and
such Officer shall act accordingly,
until such disability be removed,
or a President shall be
elected[.]” 673

Article II, Section 1, Clause e:
“[T]he Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,
death, resignation or inability,
both of the president and vicepresident, declaring what officer
shall then act as president, and
such officer shall act accordingly,
until the disability be removed, or
the period for chusing another president arrive.”674

IMPEACHMENT CLAUSES

High Crimes Article X, Section 2: “He [the
and Misde- President] shall be removed from
meanors
his office on impeachment by the

Article II, Section 4: “The president, vice-president, and all civil
officers of the United States, shall
House of representatives, and
be removed from office on imconviction by the Senate, for trea- peachment for, and conviction of
son or bribery or other high
treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors against crimes and misdemeanors.” 676
the United States . . . .” 675

672.
673.
674.
675.
676.

Id. at 596–97.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 573.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 599.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 600.
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Trial by the
Senate

Judicial
Vesting
Clause

Law-of-theLand
Provision

677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
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Article IX, Section 1: “The Senate
of the United States shall have
power to try all impeachments . . . .” 677
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Article I, Section 3, Clause e: “The
Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments.” 678

THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Article XI, Section 1: “The
Judicial Power of the United
States both in law and equity shall
be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such Inferior Courts as
shall, when necessary, from time
to time, be constituted by the
Legislature of the United
States.” 679
Article VIII: “This Constitution
and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made or
which shall be made under the
authority of the United States
shall be the supreme law of the
several States, and of their citizens
and inhabitants; and the judges in
the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions; any
thing in the constitutions or laws
of the several States to the
contrary notwithstanding.” 681

Article III, Section 1: “The
judicial power of the United
States, both in law and equity,
shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” 680
Article VI: “This constitution, and
the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any thing
in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary
notwithstanding.” 682

Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 572.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 592.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 575.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 600.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 572.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603.
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Slavery

Article XV: “If any Person bound
to service or labor in any of the
United States shall escape into
another State, He or She shall not
be discharged from such service
or labor in consequence of any
regulations subsisting in the State
to which they escape; but shall be
delivered up to the person justly
claiming their service or labor.” 683
New States Article XVII: “New States may be
Clause
admitted by the Legislature into
this Union: but no new State shall
be hereafter formed or erected
within the jurisdiction of any of
the present States, without the
consent of the Legislature of such
State as well as of the general
Legislature. Nor shall any State be
formed by the junction of two or
more States or parts thereof
without the consent of the
Legislatures of such States as well
as of the Legislature of the United
States.” 685
Engagements Article VII, Section 1: “All debts
Clause
contracted and engagements
entered into, by or under the
authority of Congress shall be as
valid against the United States
under this constitution as under
the confederation.” 687

683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
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Article IV, Section 2: “No person
legally held to service or labour in
one state, escaping into another,
shall in consequence of
regulations subsisting therein be
discharged from such service or
labor, but shall be delivered up on
claim of the party to whom such
service or labour may be due.” 684
Article IV, Section 3: “New states
may be admitted by the Congress
into this union; but no new state
shall be formed or erected within
the jurisdiction of any other state;
nor any state be formed by the
junction of two or more states, or
parts of states, without the consent
of the legislatures of the states
concerned as well as of the
Congress.” 686

Article VI: “All debts contracted
and engagements entered into
before the adoption of this
Constitution shall be as valid
against the United States under
this Constitution as under the
confederation.” 688

Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 577.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 601–02.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 578.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 602.
Convention Proceedings, supra note 5, at 571.
Report of Committee of Style, supra note 5, at 603.

